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Organizational Form of Disease Management Programs: A Transaction Cost Analysis 
 
Nahush Chandaver 
ABSTRACT 
 
Patient care programs such as wellness, preventive care and specifically disease management 
programs, which target the chronically ill population, are designed to reduce healthcare costs and 
improve health, while promoting the efficient use of healthcare resources, and increasing 
productivity. The organizational form adopted by the health plan for these programs, i.e. in-
sourced vs. outsourced is an important factor in the success of these programs and the extent to 
which the core objectives listed above are fulfilled. 
 
Transaction cost economics aims to explain the working arrangement for an organization and to 
explain why sourcing decisions were made by considering alternate organizational arrangements 
and comparing the costs of transacting under each. This research aims to understand the nature 
and sources of transaction costs, how they affect the sourcing decision of disease management 
and other programs, and its effect on the organization, using current industry data. Predictive 
models are used to obtain empirical results of the influence of each factor, and also to provide 
cost estimates for each organizational form available, irrespective of the form currently adopted. 
 
The analysis of the primary data obtained by the means of a web-based survey supports and 
confirms the effect of transaction cost factors on these programs. This implies that in order to 
reap financial rewards and serve patients better, health plans must aim to minimize transaction 
costs and select the organizational form that best accomplishes this objective.  
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
 
This is a thesis on the concept of outsourcing in the health insurance industry with a specific 
focus on disease management programs operated by the various health plans. It aims to answer 
the question if sourcing of disease management programs can be explained based on transaction 
cost factors and used to lead to cost savings.  
1.1 Introduction to the Disease Management Concept 
 
The quality of healthcare and health services has been the subject of public scrutiny and much 
debate, and it has recently heightened due to the rapid growth of costs and litigation in the form 
of lawsuits for negligence. There is increasing dissatisfaction of healthcare consumers with their 
experience due to significant deviations from best care practices, rise in medical errors and a large 
addition of unknown or non-value added services in healthcare [5]. A lingering concern is the 
inability of the U.S. healthcare system to deal with the chronically ill population, which has been 
increasing in recent years [39]. As noted by the Florida Medicaid Disease Management Initiative 
in 2000 [69], disease management programs have been proposed in order to improve healthcare 
by facilitating and addressing several key issues outlined below. 
 
Disease management programs are designed to benefit both the healthcare organization and the 
patient by following a two-pronged approach. At the patient side, the chronically ill and the 
population at risk for chronic diseases are admitted in these programs. The program then takes 
steps to improve the health outcomes and quality of life for the patient. It does this by fostering 
self-care/self management of the condition by the patients themselves, aided by patient education 
and by raising the awareness of the patient regarding his or her own health conditions.  Doing so 
also promotes accountability of the patient in the care and treatment decisions taken. As the 
awareness of the patient regarding the condition(s) is increased, it leads to a more beneficial and 
stronger relationship between the physician and the patient. The program staff undertakes patient 
monitoring and promotes the continuity of care, that is, takes steps to ensure that the patient 
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completes the entire treatment cycle and also measures patient satisfaction and treatment 
effectiveness for each patient on an ongoing basis. At the physician/care provider side, these 
programs aid the medical professionals by providing them valuable relevant information and 
practice/evidence-based guidelines that may prove helpful to them during patient treatment and 
care. By doing so these programs can delay and, in the best cases, even prevent complications of 
chronic health conditions. This leads to an improvement in the health outcomes and quality of life 
for the patient, while at the same time it leads to cost savings for the patient in terms of healthcare 
costs, and also for the healthcare provider, and is thus very beneficial to all parties involved. 
Disease management programs also promote efficient use of healthcare resources and increase 
medical productivity by increasing patient awareness levels and helping physicians in their 
treatment protocol. The supply chain for a disease management program is as shown in figure 1 
below. 
 
Disease management programs are particularly applicable and useful to Florida as it is the third 
largest in Medicaid spending in the U.S and ranks 41st in the nation in per capita expenditures 
[17].  The state of Florida is also a pioneer in this area as it is the first state to implement these 
programs in the Medicare and Medicaid fields in 1998 and encourage health plans to adopt these 
plans at the same time. The state government has already reduced the annual budget for Medicare 
and Medicaid by $ 66 million in anticipation of the savings that were promised by the proponents 
of these programs, and the results of the early studies done to measure the effectiveness and 
results of these programs [43]. However, subsequent findings have shown that while savings in 
healthcare costs have occurred for patients, they have been offset to some extent by rising drug 
costs. Moreover, the savings for the health management organizations have been offset by the 
cost of implementation of the disease management programs. This has reduced the actual savings 
and effectiveness of the programs in terms of efficiency and cost savings for the healthcare 
organizations.  
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1.2 Outsourcing in the Health Insurance Industry 
 
In order to remain financially viable and profitable while adhering and promoting the disease 
management principles listed above, a medical insurance organization must develop effective 
strategies for care provision to the affected population [20]. One method for this is the 
outsourcing of the disease management programs by the Health Management Organization 
(HMO) to external disease management organizations (DMOs). To date, the decision for 
outsourcing has been attributed to changes in market costs and not due to internal organization 
costs. However, internal organization costs have been thought to be just as important to the 
outsourcing decision as the external market costs, and this was proved empirically in the 
shipbuilding industry [47]. Our objective is to explain the outsourcing or integration decision of 
patient care programs based on transaction cost factors, and to determine to what extent that 
decision is supported, by measuring and comparing costs of the different organizational forms. 
 
We will study the various transaction cost factors as applied to disease management programs, 
determine the most important ones, that is, the factors which exert the most influence over the 
outsourcing decision in this industry, and study whether their primary effect is on external market 
costs or internal organization costs. 
1.3 Background, Complication and Objectives 
 
The state of Florida is unique in that it was the first state in the country to develop and implement 
disease management programs within the state healthcare plans for eligible residents, and 
encourage the implementation of these plans in the states private HMOs and healthcare providers 
in the late 1990s. The other states in the country are taking an active interest in the performance 
of these programs to see if these programs deliver on their promise of reduced healthcare costs, 
better patient health outcomes and improved efficiency and profitability for the healthcare 
organizations.   
 
While early research has shown improvements in the health outcomes and costs for patients in the 
short term, the long-term effects for both the patients and the organizations are not clear and need 
to be studied further [22, 39].  
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Employing this econometric analysis to this industry will allow a study of the strategies 
undertaken by the concerned organizations in order to meet these objectives, and bring out the 
effect of transaction costs on these organizations, while highlighting the most important 
transaction cost factors that apply to this particular industry. Thus, it will have an immediate 
broad impact. 
 
The significance of the proposed research is that it will provide a model that can be widely 
disseminated and improved upon to assist in the further research and learning in the field of 
transaction cost economics and factors as applied to disease management programs, medical tasks 
and the service industry in general. Much will be learned about how internal organization costs 
influence the outsourcing decision and what transaction cost factors have the greatest influence 
over the final form of the organization. As various organization costs will also be gathered, this 
research will also yield valuable information on the costs /savings incurred by the various forms 
of organization possible in a specific case. Transaction cost analysis applied to the outsourcing of 
disease management programs will contribute to a deeper understanding of the economics 
followed by the health management/maintenance organizations (HMOs) and government 
healthcare entities (Medicare/Medicaid). Objectives of the proposed thesis research are to:  
 
1) Determine whether transaction cost analysis can be used to validate the effectiveness of 
organizational form in disease management programs.  
2) Identify which of the transaction cost factors (such as asset specificity, uncertainty and 
complexity) exert greater influence on the outsourcing decisions in disease management 
programs. 
3) Determine whether outsourcing leads to fulfillment of disease management objectives.  
4) To isolate the effects of transactions on the cost of in-house care and outsourcing of care.  
5) Provide dollar estimates for the costs/savings associated with the sourcing decision. 
1.4 Research Approach and Benefits 
 
In economics and other related disciplines, transaction costs are defined as the costs incurred in 
addition to the price of the intended economic transaction such as a service, task or product. A 
number of kinds of transaction cost have come to be known by particular names [38]. 
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Search and information costs are costs such as those incurred in determining that the required 
good is available on the market, which has the lowest price, etc.  
 
Bargaining costs are the costs required to come to an acceptable agreement with the other party to 
the transaction, drawing up an appropriate contract and so on. In game theory this is analyzed for 
instance in the game of chicken. 
 
Policing and enforcement costs are the costs of making sure the other party sticks to the terms of 
the contract, and taking appropriate action (often through the legal system) if this turns out not to 
be the case.  
 
The factors that cause transaction costs to be incurred for organizations can be attributed to 
various factors that can be explained as follows [75, 78, 82, 51, 36, and 61]: 
 
1) Asset Specificity  
Williamson [78, 82, and 83] has suggested six main types of asset specificity:  
- Site specificity  
- Physical asset specificity  
- Human asset specificity  
- Brand names  
- Dedicated assets  
- Temporal specificity  
2) Uncertainty 
3) Similarity/relatedness [47] 
4) Frequency 
 
These factors have been explained in the next section. Transaction cost economics can be used as 
a framework for understanding the healthcare organization’s decision to outsource or integrate 
disease management programs based on these factors. Research in this area has encountered 
significant difficulty due to the difficulty of obtaining the relevant data, and empirical data have 
not been applied to the disease management programs, and the evidence of their effectiveness is 
limited [39, 34]. The application of the above analysis to disease management programs is helpful 
in explaining the outsourcing protocol followed by many medical organizations. It shows which 
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factors are the most influential in the decision to outsource patient care, and also helps in 
providing a dollar estimate of the various organizational forms in this sector, which has not been 
available before.  But most importantly, this research helps in improving profitability for medical 
organizations, without compromising the aims of the implemented disease management 
programs, among which are increasing satisfaction and quality of life and reducing costs for the 
patients.  
 
The benefits of applying the transaction costs analysis to disease management programs are as 
follows.  
 
1) It leads to more effective understanding of the organizational structures of private and 
government health management/maintenance organizations. In this research, we give explicit 
attention to the role of internal organization costs in outsourcing decisions. We use 
transaction cost analysis as a framework to study these costs. Many previous attempts to 
apply transaction cost economics to various industries have used estimations of reduced form 
relationship between organizational forms and observed characteristics. Due to this, it was 
not possible to decipher whether the resulting organizational form was due to changes in 
market transaction costs or from variations in the costs incurred in organizing the production 
internally. Using censored regression and the two-stage method outlined below, we can 
overcome the difficulties generally observed in obtaining direct observations of data, while at 
the same time giving explicit attention to the role of internal organization costs. Based on 
this, we can infer whether the effect of a particular variable raises the probability of 
integration in a particular organization due to increase in the hazards of market exchange or 
its effects on the internal organization costs.   
2) It increases understanding of the factors and costs that affect outsourcing. Application of 
these    methods shows which transaction cost factors exert a stronger influence over the 
outsourcing in the health management organizations, and whether they have a stronger effect 
on the costs of internal organization or market exchange costs.   
3) Application of censored regression techniques also leads to the isolation of the effects of 
attributes of transactions on the cost of organizing within and between firms and provides 
dollar estimates to these costs. It has been proven that the costs vary systematically with the 
nature of transaction and that the savings of choosing the right organizational arrangement are 
substantial [47]. Empirically, it has been shown that in the shipbuilding industry, mistaken 
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integration of work that is typically outsourced/subcontracted increased internal organization 
costs by 70%, while outsourcing work normally performed internally within the firm led to 
organizational costs almost three times those incurred if the jobs were done internally [47]. 
Transaction cost analysis applied to disease management program outsourcing in the form of 
censored regression techniques provides a similar estimate of the costs and savings borne by 
these organizations. 
4) It also contributes to the research on transaction costs. This work contributes to the research 
on transaction cost analysis. Various transaction cost factors have been studied in this 
research. This method of analysis has been applied to both the manufacturing and the 
construction industry. The factors for scheduling and engineering intensity have been proven 
to be important in the case of the naval shipbuilding industry [47]. Although the conditions of 
bounded rationality and opportunism may be universal, the factors that influence them may 
vary from one industry to another. Hence the effect of the factors considered will be different 
for different industries, and as a result, it is important for case studies in various other 
industries be carried out along with more formal empirical analysis. Transaction cost analysis 
has so far not been applied to the disease management industry and empirical research in this 
industry using censored regression techniques is yet to be carried out, apart from the analysis 
and results presented herein.  The application of the transaction cost analysis framework to 
this industry enhances our understanding of health plans decisions regarding outsourcing and 
their organizational behavior. 
1.5 Structure of the Report 
 
This thesis is organized as follows, spanning six chapters. 
 
Chapter 1 introduces the topic area, outlines the reasons for study, and provides details of the 
research objectives. Chapter 2 focuses on providing an extract of the literature survey prior to 
forming the hypotheses. Next, chapter 3 summarizes the theoretical concepts and articulates the 
hypotheses based on the literature review performed on disease management, patient care 
programs and transaction cost economics. Chapter 4 outlines the research methodology for 
primary and secondary data collection and analysis that is used for hypothesis testing in our case, 
and chapter 5 presents the numerical results and inference. Finally, chapter 6 provides the 
conclusions and the directions for future research in this area. 
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Chapter 2. Literature Review 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
Outsourcing is a very well researched topic and considerable research has been done in the field 
of transaction cost economics to explain the cause and effects of outsourcing in various 
industries.  
 
This chapter aims to provide a history of transaction cost theory and the previous research on this 
topic with the help of an extensive literature search involving the study of relevant theoretical 
concepts and previous related work. The conclusions reached from this exercise have been 
summarized in chapter 3 to form the background to the work done in this research.  
 
Another objective is to examine the transaction cost theory and disease management literature to 
find relevant theories and empirical evidence regarding the in-sourcing vs. outsourcing or build 
vs. buy decision faced by various organizations. The collection of the available results is used in 
the formulation of the main hypothesis of this research.  
2.2 Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) Theory 
 
There is an immense body of literature available in the field of transaction cost economics. A 
comprehensive review may be found in Shelanski and Klein’s [60] 1995 work. The main tenet of 
transaction cost economics (TCE) suggests that transactions between providers and users of 
goods or services should be organized in a manner such that transaction costs are minimized. 
 
The theory behind transaction cost analysis  was developed by Ronald coase in his seminal paper, 
The Nature of the Firm (1937) [12], which laid the foundation for all further research done in this 
area, most notably by Oliver E. Williamson. This theory was used by Coase  to develop a 
theoretical framework for predicting when certain economic tasks would be performed by firms 
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and when they would be performed on the market, as noted by Robert Kissell and Morton Glantz 
in Optimal Trading Strategies, AMACOM, 2003 [37]. Subsequently, Oliver E. Williamson 
coined the term transaction cost and has done extensive research in this area, which is elaborated 
on below.  
 
Organizations and firms usually do not place emphasis on transaction costs. According to Straub 
and Ang's (1998) [66] research, production cost (which is defined as the amount of money a 
customer pays the vendor for its services) is given six times more importance than transaction 
costs. McFetridge and Smith (1989) [49] study outsourcing service contracts in Canada in their 
research and find that simple production costs are not sufficient to explain the pattern of 
outsourcing, which validates the theory and effects of transaction costs. 
 
The theory of transaction cost economics focuses on the costs of transactions when a good or 
service is transferred from a provider to a user. When an organization outsources, the transaction 
costs will include the costs of searching and selecting the supplier(s), drawing up the contract, 
performance/results measurement, and dispute resolution (usually involving litigation and/or a 
third party adjudicator). Conversely, when transactions are internal, the total costs include 
managing and monitoring costs in addition to the cost of the capital, inputs and raw materials 
required for the transaction. According to Williamson (1989) [79], the form adopted by the 
organization, (referred to as governance structure, by Williamson) affects the transaction costs. 
Transaction costs occur before and after an economic transaction and a central proposition of 
transaction cost economics is that organizations strive for greater efficiency by implementing 
governance structures that minimize transaction costs.  
 
Organizations have many options for organizing these transactions via governance structures 
which vary from spot/open markets for generic goods and services where the buyers and sellers 
are immaterial to the transaction, to fully vertically integrated organizations, where both buyer 
and seller can be said to be one and the same and are under joint ownership and control. Between 
these two extremes of spot markets and vertical integration there are various contracting choices 
available for the organization to complete its transactions, which include shared ownership of 
assets or joint ventures. 
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Williamson (1979, 1981) [76, 77] states that markets are not the best solution for transactions 
involving asset specificity because buyers and sellers can easily walk, that is, cancel the 
transaction without any loss to themselves. Markets are also not ideal when one considers the 
possibility of opportunistic behavior by the parties, which is explained below.  
 
Williamson (1989, 1993) [79, 81] explains opportunistic behavior as follows: the value of the 
transaction-specific assets in question depends on the continued contract between the buyer and 
seller, hence, the party that has not invested in these specific assets may be tempted to threaten to 
walk away from the relationship in order to realize more value from this investment. He also 
points out that asset specificity plays a major role in the degree of vertical integration and that 
vertical integration may be the only solution for costly asset specific investments as it is highly 
difficult for these assets to be transferred or utilized for alternative buyers/sellers and used for 
other tasks and services.  
 
The types of transaction cost factors have been broadly defined by Leeman (2006) [39] as 
follows:   
 
1) Uncertainty,  
2) Asset specificity and  
3) Frequency.  
 
Another factor can be said to be the similarity of the tasks and services in question. Asset 
specificity is generally regarded as the most crucial transaction cost factor [38]. Others regard 
Uncertainty to be the most critical factor [76].  
2.2.1 Uncertainty 
 
As stated by Leeman [39], “Uncertainty generally refers to how easily performance can be 
monitored. Monitoring becomes problematic when the task requirements or outcomes are difficult 
to predict or when the service purchased requires teamwork, making it difficult to connect the 
product with an individuals input. The greater the uncertainty, the greater the transaction costs 
incurred in developing and executing a contract in a manner such that all parties are satisfied with 
the outcome”.  
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Many researchers have studied the effect of uncertainty on organizational form. Pirrong (1994) 
[53] found that in ocean shipping the type of contract used (spot markets, medium- and long-term 
contracts or vertical integration) depends on the uncertainty of providing alternative shipping 
services for the goods at short notice in the event of a problem or holdup. 
 
Stigler (1951) [65] has theorized that due to uncertainty, industries that are in decline show 
greater tendency to outsource, whereas the organizations in their growth phase show industries 
with a greater tendency to integrate. Casson (1986, 1987) [9, 10] studied the shipping industry 
and has found that that shipping companies running oil tankers and refrigerated cargo ships tend 
to have ownership of the vessels used for transport early in the company development and are 
usually leased/contracted in the case of more established companies. This observation supports 
Stigler’s theory given above.  
 
However, a contrasting view to Stigler’s theory is available in the literature and can be seen in 
Harrigan’s (1983) [27] research, which has analyzed the vertical integration within 192 firms in 
16 different industries in the period between 1960 and 1981. She states that new industries which 
are inexperienced tend to have less integration and more outsourcing in order to reduce risks. 
That is, early in an industry’s development, when costs and risks are high, firms generally operate 
with less integration. An example of the computer industry is given, which outsourced 
microprocessors and memory chips in its infancy, but began to internalize the production of these 
components as the industry grew and stabilized. The colloquial is stated as the greater prevalence 
of outsourcing within industries in decline, in order to meet fluctuating demands and market 
conditions (uncertainty), which can be limited due to high levels of integration.  
Harrigan also states that certain firms with bargaining power over suppliers, distributors, and 
customers can reduce prices by reducing supplier profit margins, and can avoid integration, thus 
the disadvantages associated with it.  
 
These results contrast with Stigler’s (1951) [65] hypothesis that firms integrate early during 
industry development in order to achieve competitive advantages. 
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Figure 2.1 Flexibility Need v/s Control Need Option Range 
Source: Quinn, James Brian, and Frederick G. Hilmer, Strategic Outsourcing, 
Sloan Management Review, Summer 1994, pp. 43–55. [58] 
 
Quinn and Hilmer (1994) [58] have studied uncertainty in terms of flexibility and control. If the 
firm is subjected to uncertainty in the form of changing demand for its products or services then 
outsourcing gives the firm the flexibility to meet the changing scenarios but causes it to lose some 
control over the outsourced activity in terms of execution and performance. They state that when 
firms outsource they normally transfer certain risks and investments that they would have 
normally incurred by the contracted party. Figure 2 above shows all the choices of organization 
form depending on the company’s control and flexibility needs.  
 
In order to minimize the effects of uncertainty, Quinn & Hilmer [58] in the same article also 
suggest that outsourcing be done by carefully taking the firm’s skills and resources into account, 
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and also by comparing the potential of gaining a competitive advantage in the market with all the 
costs that would be incurred due to contracting.  
 
This compromise has been diagrammatically represented by them as per the matrix in Figure 3. If 
the activity is such that it allows the organization to gain a competitive advantage while 
vulnerability/uncertainty is low, then, it can be outsourced, else it should be integrated. 
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Figure 2.2 Competitive Advantage v/s Strategic Vulnerability Matrix 
Source: Quinn, James Brian, and Frederick G. Hilmer, Strategic Outsourcing, 
Sloan Management Review, Summer 1994, pp. 43–55. [58] 
 
Both Badaracco (1991) [4] and Harrigan and Newman (1990) [28] state in their research that 
there is a potential for knowledge leaks when organizations outsource, which, if associated with 
the source of its competitive advantage can lead the organization to  suffer a  major setback.  
These uncertainties or risks, which are the loss of critical skills or loss of control over a supplier, 
have to be managed by careful monitoring and management of the outsourcing relationship, 
which leads to an increase in transaction costs for the organization.  
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The counter argument to this is that transaction costs can still increase due to uncertainty even if 
the task or service is integrated. Internal employees and departments may fail to perform to their 
full capacity, and may require policing and monitoring resources to improve performance. In 
some cases it is more difficult to enforce and measure performance for internal tasks and services 
than for external suppliers, which increases uncertainty and thus leads to more transaction costs 
for the organization. Thus, as per Blumberg and Blumberg (1994) [6] an organization may lag 
behind industry best practices if internal departments are not world-class providers, due to an 
increase in transaction costs.  
 
Therefore, if the disease management industry were considered to be in a state of growth then 
previous research evidence would suggest that health plans would tend to vertically integrate to 
include disease management operations and not outsource it. The disease management sector is 
indeed seen to be in the growth phase (as per our literature review in the next section), however, it 
is seen that organizational form for these programs is likely to be outsourced as a result of the 
specialized nature of this sector. 
2.2.2 Asset Specificity and its Effect on Organizational Form 
 
 Asset specificity refers to transaction specific investments in human, physical or other forms of 
capital. Asset specificity also refers to how specifically a particular product or service is designed 
or produced for a specific customer or if the product or service uses a specific asset. It is broken 
up into six main types, as explained below:  
 
1) Site or location specificity— the location of the buyer and seller in order to economize on 
inventories or transportation costs, or transportation and inventory costs specific to the 
transaction; 
2) Physical asset specificity—investments such as specialized equipment, tools , machines 
or systems designed for a particular customer or applications; 
3) Human asset specificity— the skills, experience or knowledge of the people involved in 
the transaction, or one or both of the parties develop skills or knowledge specific to the 
buyer-seller relationship; 
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4) Brand specificity—the evaluation and selection of vendors and suppliers based on their 
reputations, or when the involved parties must maintain the reputation of a shared brand 
name such as a franchise relationship;  
5) Dedicated capacity—capacity that is created to serve a particular customer , and this 
capacity is  difficult to adapt to use for alternative customers; and, 
6) Temporal specificity—the level or importance and specificity of the timing of a particular 
product or service. 
 
Joskow (1985) [36] has studied asset specificity with respect to mines supplying raw materials to 
electricity generator plants and his study shows that vertical integration is positively associated 
with all forms of asset specificity such as site specificity (when transportation costs are high), 
physical asset specificity, and human capital/know-how specific to the transaction.  Stuckey 
(1983) [67] and Hennart  (1988) [32] have researched site specificity specifically and their results 
support the above results and shows that aluminum refiners generally own their own bauxite 
mines because of high transportation costs (site specificity) whereas this is not true in the case of 
tin refiners as the refiners are able to handle different ores. 
 
Masten (1984) [45] studied asset specificity in the aerospace industry and found that integrated 
components were generally more complex and specialized than ‘buy’ components. The higher 
transaction costs for these components due to a higher degree of physical and human asset 
specificity were stated as the causes of integration. Masten, Meehan, and Snyder have extended 
the above research by studying the organizational form in the U.S. Auto Industry (1989) [46]. 
They conclude that while physical and site specificity were not the major factors that decide 
vertical integration, engineering intensity is, and the reason for this is theorized as the greater 
human asset specificity required for these components and the difficulty of managing this when 
they are outside the firm make it more suitable for these components and services to be 
integrated. 
 
Chandler (1961) [11] has also analyzed the maintenance strategies of the North American airline 
industry after the introduction of jet engines, based on human asset specificity. The airlines had 
always maintained their own piston engines using their internal maintenance departments. Jet 
engines were found to require new maintenance skills and facilities but less frequent 
maintenance. Due to this, the maintenance of these engines continued to be integrated during the 
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early years of the jet age. However, once maintenance practices and routines became standard 
across airlines and engine types, internal maintenance departments were outsourced to external 
independent maintenance specialists 
 
Fuhr and Thorsten [23] have studied the Vertical Governance between Airlines and Airports 
using transaction cost analysis in 2006. They conclude that temporal specificity and uncertainty 
play a major role in the contracting between airlines and airports of various sizes. 
 
Anderson and Schmittlein’s (1984) [3] work on human asset specificity reinforces the above 
finding. Their study of the factors that determined the use of company sales staff as opposed to 
independent distributors led to findings that an internal sales staff is used to reduce transaction 
costs when the following is required: 1) specialized training, 2) detailed or proprietary knowledge 
of the selling company 3) continuing relationship between salespersons and clients 4) detailed 
knowledge of product or customer, and 5) when output measures of sales staff are unreliable. 
 
Masten, Meehan, and Snyder [47] have also studied the organizational form and associated costs 
in their 1991 study of naval shipbuilding industry and found that higher the importance of timely 
completion/scheduling of the component in construction the higher is the likelihood of 
integration. This is because an interruption in any stage of construction disrupts all subsequent 
operations by having a cascading effect which causes delays to the whole project. This also gives 
subcontractors incentives to delay in order to gain price concessions, which is a type of 
opportunistic behavior. 
 
Monteverde and Teece (1982a) [50] found that in General Motors and Ford the probability that a 
component is produced in-house increased with the engineering effort required to design it. This 
has been attributed to human capital specificity due to the engineering knowledge required in 
these applications. Monteverde and Teece’s work (1982b) [51] on physical specificity found that 
automobile manufacturers in general were more likely to retain title to the more specialized and 
expensive tooling used by suppliers. This again supports the theory that greater the asset 
specificity, the higher the incentive is for organizations to integrate those tasks/applications. 
 
Lehmann and O’Shaughnessy (1974) [40] have studied Reputation (Brand Specificity) and they 
state that it is very important in the selection and evaluation of vendors and suppliers.  
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They say that this is due to management’s desire to reduce risks to their companies and for 
themselves. This is achieved by selecting suppliers with a good reputation and high credibility, 
which can also improve the image of the contracting firm itself in some cases.  
 
Panayides and Cullinane (2002) [52] have studied the importance of reputation in ship manager 
selection. Their research was aimed at finding the most important criteria for ship manager 
evaluation and selection.  Their sample size consisted of 48 ship management companies and 36 
ship owners.  They state that the inspection for selection is done mainly on two levels; the first 
level is financial variables, profitability, location and managerial ability. The second and more 
important level is a measure of the manager’s reputation, image and reliability, integrity, 
trustworthiness, and commitment. Thus, they state that brand specificity in the form of the ship 
manager’s experience, establishment and status is a significant factor for the organizational form 
chosen by shipping companies for ship management. Reputation of the contracting parties can be 
said to reduce the risk of opportunism, which would reduce the monitoring costs and increase the 
efficiency and profits to both parties involved.  
 
The above literature shows that in general, an increase in asset specificity in any form is 
positively related to integration.  
2.2.3 Similarity and Frequency 
 
Similarity can be said to refer to the nature of the tasks or processes and how closely they 
resemble the ones done on a regular basis by the firm or organization. Leeman (2006) [39] further 
states that transaction cost analysis studies the relationship between characteristics of transactions 
and the forms of governance organizations implement to negotiate and execute those transactions. 
Some examples of organizational structure include long term contracting, short-term contracting 
and internal production. The view shared by shared by most economists is that organizations 
choose specific arrangements by comparing the costs of transacting under each. This insight 
needed empirical support, which was provided by noting the observable attributes of transactions 
by Williamson (1975, 1979) and Klein et al. [75, 76, 60].  
However, these efforts have generally concentrated on factors aggravating the hazards of market 
exchange, and the costs of internal organization have been treated only as a barrier to be 
overcome before integration (Masten et al., 1991) [47]. 
  
19 
Frequency refers to how often the purchaser transacts in the market. Due to economies of scale, 
frequency decreases the per transaction cost of asset-specific investments. Therefore, greater 
transaction frequency will enhance the value of asset-specific investments, for example, the costs 
of implementing new care management processes (Leeman, 2006) [39]. 
 
Masten et al. [47] have given specific attention to the role of transaction cost factors on internal 
organization costs in organization integration decisions, and have provided the empirical study of 
a naval project, which has provided dollar estimates of the costs of various organizational 
arrangements. The most important result of this research is regarding the contribution of changes 
in market and internal organization costs to the final arrangement adopted by the firm. It is well 
known that internal organization sacrifices the advantages of market exchange, while preventing 
problems such as opportunism, scheduling and uncertainty. However, this demands greater 
investments in administration and monitoring (Williamson, 1985; 1990) [78, 80].  
 
Economists and theorists have paid little attention to the influence that these factors make on the 
costs of managing and monitoring tasks and services internally, and to what extent they weigh on 
the form finally adopted by the organization. They have concentrated on how these factors affect 
the market prices, while neglecting the former effect. Ronald Coase has been one of the 
exceptions to this view and states “the effect of activities in which a firm is already engaged on 
the cost of undertaking additional activities” is essential to explaining why particular operations 
are chosen within specific firms (1988:40) [14]. He goes on to say, “ The way in which industry 
is organized is…dependent on the relation between the costs of carrying out transactions on the 
market and the costs of organizing an activity within that firm which can perform this task at 
lowest costs. Furthermore, the costs of organizing an activity within any given firm depends on 
what other activities it is engaged in. A given set of activities will facilitate the carrying out of 
some activities, but hinder the performance of others. It is these relationships which determine the 
actual organization of industry.” (1972:64) [13]. He also states that internal organization costs are 
likely to be higher for transactions other than those in which the firm is already engaged in, for 
which there is a higher degree of uncertainty. Asset specificities of the various types explained 
above tend to raise organization costs, if integration is carried out, and also raises market 
exchange costs, if outsourcing is favored, however, in the case of this factor, integration is usually 
preferred as it allows greater flexibility for change and modifications. Similarly, uncertainty and 
complexity, while producing a net increase in market as well as internal organization costs, favors 
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integration to subcontracting as integration gives the organization allows the organization to adapt 
to changing situations and circumstances, where outsourcing does not. The similarity of 
transactions, on the other hand, is unlikely to drive down market costs as the parties engaged in 
the bargaining are most concerned about the final outcomes and not the manner in which the 
goods or services are provided [47]. In order to verify the above statements, empirical data needs 
to be collected in order to support or refute them. This has only been done in the shipbuilding 
industry and needs to be applied to the disease management field in order to study the effects of 
these factors on disease management program sourcing decision. 
2.2.4 Bounded Rationality 
 
Managers and organizations have limited managerial time and control, and hence they cannot 
manage all tasks internally or plan and contract for all possibilities in the future in the case of 
outsourced tasks or services. This is due to bounded rationality, and thus, bounded rationality 
influences organizations in their attempts to reduce transaction costs.  
 
The theory of bounded rationality was proposed in 1957 by Herbert Simon [62, 63], and it can be 
explained as the limitations on decision-making due by time, costs, human abilities, availability 
of information, and technology. He states, “Bounded rationality is a central theme in behavioral 
economics. It is concerned with the ways in which the actual decision-making process influences 
decisions. Theories of bounded rationality relax one or more assumptions of standard expected 
utility theory”. 
 
For most transactions, markets are the preferred governance structure as markets provide the 
incentives to cut costs and maximize value net of production costs, while at the same time they 
allow the parties involved to respond quickly to changes in the market. As stated before by 
Williamson (1981) [77], markets are not the ideal solution for transactions involving asset 
specificity because buyers and sellers can cancel the transaction entirely. Contracts of differing 
lengths can offer some protection against the drawbacks of market transactions; however bounded 
rationality makes it impossible to draw up contacts that cover all possible circumstances, due to 
which the involved parties may indulge in opportunistic behavior to make profits.   
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As a result, complex internal control and monitoring systems may be needed to police the 
contract, make changes, and settle disputes if needed. Thus, bounded rationality brings out the 
negative aspects of market transactions due to the possibility of opportunistic behavior by the 
parties and increases transaction costs. For other types of transactions a more integrated 
governance structure may be desired. If outsourcing is not possible due to asset specificity, and 
bounded rationality, vertical integration can be used in order to maximize profits and reduce 
transaction costs. Bounded rationality also plays a role in internal organization as control within 
the organization may be lacking in certain aspects, due to which opportunism by employees and 
an increase in transaction costs within the firm may be seen.  Therefore bounded rationality 
affects transaction costs in both governance structures, and organizational form should be chosen 
in order to minimize it.  
2.2.5 Core Competence and Transaction Costs 
 
Prahalad and Hamel [54] introduced the concept of core competence in their 1990 study which 
they define as “the collective learning in the organization, especially in coordinating diverse 
production skills and integrating multiple streams of technologies.” Excellence in a few core 
competencies is what gives the organization a competitive edge in the market. 
 
Quinn and Hilmer (1994) [58] in their article Strategic Outsourcing recommend outsourcing only 
non-core activities to minimize transaction costs. This suggestion has been made so that firms can 
concentrate their limited internal resources on a set of core competencies and tasks where they 
can achieve pre-eminence and provide unique value for their customers. In order to differentiate 
and identify these core functions in an organization, they have put forth the guidelines given 
below: 
 
1) Core competencies are limited in number. 
2) Core competencies are flexible and long-term platforms capable of change. 
3) Core competencies are skills or knowledge sets not products or functions. They also cut 
across traditional functions. Hence, they are activities that are based on knowledge rather 
than on ownership of assets.  
4) Core competencies should be embedded in the organizations systems and not dependent 
on a few people.  
  
22 
5) Core competencies can be used as sources of leverage in the value chain. 
6) Core competencies are Core functions/services that are important to the customer in the 
long term such as understanding and serving the customer.  
 
We can infer from the above that companies must retain only activities that give them the 
competitive advantage and other tasks and services may be outsourced. However, Quinn & 
Hilmer [58] point out that this is in fact not possible as the “supplier markets are not totally 
reliable and efficient”.  According to them most outsourcing will entail some risks, which have 
been elaborated above.  
 
Harrigan [27] supports the above recommendation with her 1983 work in which she analyzes the 
vertical integration strategies of 192 firms in 16 different industries from 1960 to 1981. She finds 
that generally finds that firms internalize the tasks and services that they consider to be their core 
competencies or those that contribute to their competitive advantage in order to minimize 
transaction costs.  One example cited in this work is how computer firms manufactured the logic 
chips and processors for their product internally but purchased the other components. Another 
example of this is that pharmaceutical firms used their own trained sales agents for marketing 
their medical products in order to protect their patents and increase sales and also integrated 
production of certain chemicals and pharmaceuticals during high demand. 
 
Thus we see that evidence from the business management literature shows that integration 
reduces transaction costs associated with market transactions and common administrative 
functions. 
 
However, integration can also increase transaction costs in the form of internal coordination, 
policing and enforcement costs and reduce incentives to maximize performance and efficiency 
within the organization. Hence it is clear from the above that firms will benefit more by firstly 
outsourcing activities or parts of activities that are less critical to its survival.  
 
The main benefits of outsourcing can be summarized as stated by Corbett (1995) [15], and they 
are: improved business focus, access to world-class capabilities, reduced cycle times and 
improved quality, sharing risks and costs in new technology. Other main benefits are reducing 
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operating costs, converting capital investment in non-core functions into operating expense and 
gaining better control integrated tasks. 
 
Buzzel (1983) [8] has studied 1649 manufacturing units from the Profit Impact of Market 
Strategy (PIMS) database. His research shows that either a very high or a very low level of 
vertical integration yields an above average rate of return while earnings are lowest in the middle, 
and he recommends vertical integration only when a company needs savings as well as high 
control over its tasks and services. A measure of integration is given by the value added to sales 
ratio. According to him, the advantages of in-sourcing are lower transaction costs, supply 
assurances, improved coordination, and lower uncertainty. The disadvantages are capital 
investments, unbalanced throughput, reduced flexibility and a loss of specialization.  
 
D’Aveni and Ravenscraft’s (1994) [16] work on the benefits of vertical integration support 
Buzzel’s findings by showing that vertical integration can reduce total costs by avoiding the 
transaction costs associated with market transactions, combining administrative functions 
previously performed separately, and providing better information about costs.  Like Buzzel, they 
also point out that integration can increase transaction costs in the form of costs for coordination 
and production. The additional coordination of activities required in integrated organizations may 
increase overhead. They state that production costs may increase because of the lack of market 
pressure to improve the efficiency of internal processes and employees, lower economies of scale, 
or failure to innovate. Other costs that increase are the costs needed to monitor market 
information, manage inventories, and plan and schedule activities. 
 
In closing, we see that higher asset specificity in all its forms is generally associated with greater 
vertical integration due to higher transaction costs of outsourcing these specific tasks.  
Other factors that influence the transaction costs and organizational form are bounded rationality, 
frequency and uncertainty. Thus, in making decisions regarding organizational form, it is 
important to consider not only the actual cost of the good or service in each case, but also the 
transaction cost factors that will be most prominent in that scenario, and the level of these costs 
when managing the transaction both internally and externally. 
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2.2.6 Empirical Measurement of Transaction Costs 
 
To the authors knowledge based on the literature review, the empirical estimation of costs 
incurred due to transaction cost factors has been done only twice before, first by Wallis and North 
[73] in 1986, who attempted to measure transaction costs of the economy over a 100  years. 
However, they faced severe problems in defining and more so in measuring transaction costs that 
are detailed in the methodology section. Their analysis concludes that the transaction sector is a 
significant part of the economy and grew from 25% to 40 % between 1870 and 1970.   
 
The second is by Masten , Meehan and Snyder in 1991 [47], who provided empirical evidence of 
both the influence of  each transaction cost factor but also provided cost estimates of each 
organizational form applicable to a shipyard involved in Naval construction projects. The 
problems faced by Wallis and North were mitigated by using switching regression techniques. 
This was done using probit regression models to compute the effects of each factor on the form 
actually adopted. A problem of selection bias was encountered for the second stage cost 
calculation since the efficient organization structure is chosen, the other forms are not observed, 
for which the Heckman two-step procedure and correction factor was used to eliminate the 
selection bias as outlined below. The structural equations were estimated as censored regression 
models analogous to the way actual and reservation wages are estimated in labor supply 
applications. From this technique they obtain actual dollar estimates of transaction costs and can 
therefore estimate the magnitude of individual coefficients and not just their relative impact. They 
found that transaction costs account for 14% of the total value of all components analyzed and 
that costs of the components made internally would rise to three times the actual were they to be 
outsourced. Integration of the contracted components would lead to a 70% increase in transaction 
costs. Masten [44] has applied the above methodology to assess the performance implications of 
governance choices and its effect on business performance.  
 
Also reported is the fact that the transaction cost factors mainly affect the costs if internal 
organization, rather than market costs as is normally assumed. Thus, the importance of 
organizational form is substantial.   
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2.3 Disease Management Literature Review 
 
Disease management is quickly emerging as one of the most important new areas of medical 
management as noted by Quilty and Lewis in the article Case Studies in Disease Management in. 
Medical Interface Magazine [56].  The World Health Organization (WHO) estimates that chronic 
diseases make up 60% of the global disease burden, which is expected to rise to 80% by the year 
2020 for developing countries [55].  For the United States, the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention (CDC) estimate the total cost for diabetes as $137.7 billion in 1995.  According to 
Thompson, Edelsberg, Kinsey, and Oster [70], nearly half of the American workforce is either 
overweight or obese. Americans with chronic conditions account for 75% of total healthcare costs 
[33]. Chronic illnesses are the major cause of morbidity in the United States, and due to the 
increase of senior population in the country, the prevalence of these conditions is bound to 
increase. At the same time the effectiveness of the U.S. healthcare system in providing care for 
this segment of the population has been wanting. The medical system has also come under harsh 
criticism for rising costs and large deviation from best care practices, which is to say the 
treatment and care which is most suitable for the affected person at that particular time. As noted 
by Wheatley (2002) [74],” amid rising healthcare expenditures and declining tax revenues state 
efforts to expand access to health insurance coverage have been put on hold in many parts of the 
country. Recently, states have had to take a number of difficult steps to reduce program 
expenditures, including restricting eligibility, reducing benefits, and cutting provider payments. 
These measures generate cost savings but also restrict access to care. Another option, which is 
now being more widely adopted by states, is to develop disease management (DM) programs that 
are designed to contain costs by improving health among the chronically ill. Disease management 
programs are meant to benefit both the medical insurance organization and the consumer/patient 
by containing costs by improving health among the chronically ill. More than 20 states are now 
engaged in developing and implementing disease management programs for their primary care 
case management and fee for service populations [75]. The popularity of disease management 
springs from the fact that the proactive management or prevention of chronic conditions presents 
the single largest opportunity to improve health and reduce healthcare costs.  
 
Disease Management programs focus on patient identification, monitoring and early intervention. 
This shifts healthcare expenses to less invasive and expensive care, thus, disease management 
programs are meant to strive to achieve two seemingly conflicting goals: improving health care 
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while achieving cost savings at the same time. These programs work by drawing on the 
commitment and self-interest of patients, expert coaching, monitoring and treatment by 
experienced nurses. The treatment guidelines are grounded in evidence-based medicine. These 
resources are deployed to monitor patients’ conditions and coordinate treatments with the 
physicians in various settings and diseases. 
 
According to Lewis [42], in disease management, the word intervention can loosely be defined as 
“that set of products, services, education, expert resources and data offered to the patient, 
patient’s family/caregiver, and/or provider in order to reduce the likelihood of acute 
exacerbations and complications and/or to improve the baseline health status of the member 
overall.” The term intervention is also used in medicine generally, but is done so to define the 
medical treatments given to a patient. The main difference between a medical intervention and 
one through a disease management program is one of duration. A medical intervention is usually 
a treatment, procedure, medical test or therapy, a disease management intervention consists of 
patient monitoring, follow-through, support and assistance and outcome reporting. Interventions 
done through these programs can have many points of contact and changes as per the condition of 
the individual, and may last a lifetime [42].    
 
These programs tackle critical factors that have the greatest influence on quality of life, health 
and associated costs for most of the populations, especially the chronically ill segment.  Currently 
many DMOs and health plans have overhauled their programs to manage co-morbid patients, i.e. 
patients with two or more chronic conditions.  
2.3.1 A Brief History of Disease Management 
 
According to Boston Consulting Group (BCG) [48]; the earliest known implementation of disease 
management was the launch of blood glucose monitoring (BGM) units to diabetes patients in the 
1980s as this required significant education and monitoring of patients along with the setup of the 
required infrastructure, and the mindset of both patients and doctors needed to be modified. 
 
This was followed by the first wave of DM programs in the early 1990s, mainly supported by 
pharmaceutical companies. Pharmaceutical companies supported these programs as they knew 
that prescription drugs help keep diseases in check and would reduce or minimize hospitalization, 
particularly in chronic conditions. Many health plans were skeptical, as they view it as a ploy to 
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sell more drugs. Another limitation they had was that these first-generation pharmaceutical 
company-sponsored programs came with too many formulary constraints [57].  Thus, most of 
these programs had closed by the end of the decade.    
 
A second wave started in the middle of the decade when entrepreneurs began to work to serve the 
large demand for disease management services, which required specialized technology, data 
mining and management. These early DMOs usually focused on a single disease at a time, and 
recently there has been a change towards managing co-morbidities, especially in the case of 
Medicare and Medicaid. 
 
The latest and current wave of disease management has been fuelled by the health plans as they 
have widely embraced these programs, and support and provide disease management programs 
either internally or through contracting with external vendors. Today many health plans are 
working to integrate these programs into other aspects of medical management such as wellness 
programs. The accreditation by the National Committee for Quality Assurance (NCQA) has 
helped in wider acceptance of these programs as well. 
2.3.2 Current State of the Disease Management Industry 
 
According to the BCG report Realizing the Promise of Disease Management [48], published in 
Feb 2006, today DM enjoys widespread use amongst the majority of U.S. health plans.  
According to the above report, out of the 120 health plans assessed from the 150 total in the U.S, 
all but 4 offered DM programs, meaning that 96% of the American health plans survey offered 
disease management programs. 
 
DM is now viewed as a competitive necessity according to more than 80% of the decision makers 
in the health plans studied by BCG in the study noted above. 72 of the 120 health plans surveyed 
stated cost savings as their reason for disease management program implementation. DM 
programs are widespread today even though there is marked uncertainty about results, savings 
and outcomes measurement methodology, and DM vendors or disease management organizations 
(DMOs) have enjoyed rapid growth over the last decade.   
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The Disease Management Purchasing Consortium [19] estimates that DMO revenues have 
increased from $78 million in 1997 to almost $1.2 billion in 2005, which gives a compound 
annual growth rate (CAGR) of 40%. The revenue is expected to grow to $1.8 billion in 2008, 
with the growth coming from Medicare and Medicaid. Today many businesses offer DM 
services, and most DMOs have expanded beyond their focus on a single disease. Humana is 
generally acknowledged as the leader in disease management [71]. Amongst DMOs, the top five 
based on market revenues are: Healthways, Health Dialog, CorSolutions, LifeMasters Supported 
Healthcare, and Matria Healthcare. DMOs have also diversified into informatics, where they sell 
data and analysis tools for employers to allow them to assess their employee health and health 
plan performance (Source- DMPC) [71]. 
 
The BCG report Realizing the Promise of Disease Management [48] finds that health plans are 
almost equally as likely to develop and run these DM programs internally as they are to contract 
with external DMOs to purchase DM services, given the situation within the organization and 
associated transaction costs. Another option available to them is the combination or hybrid 
approach, where some health plans combine internal and external resources- such as in-house 
nurses and purchased software in order to execute DM programs. 
 
Although private U.S health plans are the largest implementers of DM programs today and 
majority of employers access DM through these health plans, several other sectors such as the 
direct-to-employer segment  is a rising trend and this segment is growing rapidly. Employers are 
also taking an active interest in managing and coordinating employee health plans and disease 
management programs and frequently request it when contracting with a health plan. Large 
employers are also likely to contract separately with a DMO for disease management programs 
separately from their health plan. These employers usually have multiple health plans and seek a 
single DM benefit that they can apply across the organization for their employees. For large 
employers, disease management is growing in importance because they increasingly see the value 
of such programs in reducing absenteeism and short-term disability expense, not to mention 
employee morale and retention [2].  
 
Federal and state governments are also getting heavily involved in DM using the Centers for 
Medicare and Medicaid (CMS) pilots to implement these programs. In addition, Governments 
abroad are showing an increased interest in this sector. Given the above, we see that disease 
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management programs are usually implemented for diabetes, asthma, coronary artery disease 
(CAD), congestive heart failure (CHF) and chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD), 
which are known as the five core chronic diseases. The number of health plans that offer all five 
programs represent only 21% of the total, as can be seen from figure 2.3. Also, the number of 
health plans offering these programs for other chronic diseases such as end-stage renal disease, 
lower-back pain and cancer are low. 
 
 
Figure 2.3 Percentage of DM Programs Offered by Health Plans in the U.S. 
Source: BCG Landscape database, Feb 2006. [48] 
 
The highest governing body overseeing all the organizations in the U.S is the Disease 
Management Association of America (DMAA) [19]. DMAA is a non-profit association that 
represents all stakeholders in the DM community. The association does this through public and 
private advocacy by targeting the healthcare industry, government agencies, employers, and the 
general public to educate them on the important role DM programs play in improving healthcare 
quality and outcomes for chronically ill patients [21]. The components of disease management as 
defined by the DMAA [22] are:  
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1) Population identification processes;  
2) Evidence-based practice guidelines;  
3) Collaborative practice models to include physician and support-service providers;  
4) Patient self-management education (may include primary prevention, behavior 
modification programs, and compliance/surveillance);  
5) Process and outcomes measurement, evaluation, and management;  
6) Routine reporting/feedback loop (may include communication with patient, physician, 
health plan and ancillary providers, and practice profiling).  
 
 Full-service disease management programs are those that include all six components. Programs 
consisting of fewer components are known as disease management support services. 
Traditionally, disease management has focused on the big five chronic diseases: ischemic heart 
disease, diabetes, COPD, asthma and heart failure. Disease management programs generally are 
offered telephonically, involving interaction with a trained nursing professional, and require an 
extended series of interactions, including a strong educational element. Patients are expected to 
play an active role in managing their diseases. Because of the presence of co-morbidities or 
multiple conditions in most high-risk patients, this approach may become operationally difficult 
to execute, with patients being cared for by more than one program. Over time, the industry has 
moved more toward a whole person model in which all the diseases a patient has are managed by 
a single disease management program (Source-DMAA) [18].  
 
As stated by the Disease Management Purchasing Consortium (DMPC) [19], disease 
management requires a comprehensive clinical and economic understanding of a disease state that 
can only be developed through a team approach.  Clinical input is required to design the 
interventions, identify patients, and understand the impact of co-morbidities.  Information 
systems input is required to integrate the disparate data bases of medical information for a 
particular disease. Legal and network development assistance is required for contracting and to 
understand how disease costs are impacted by capitation arrangements. And once a program is 
developed marketing support will be required to develop physician communication materials.  
According to Managed Care magazine [43], a typical disease management program consists of 
the following teams: 
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Program administrators: These are the individuals who run a health plan and are the best source 
of information on organizational structure, goals and expectations, pay and incentive programs, 
and fiscal commitments to the disease management program. The success of such programs is 
dependent on the support it receives from the administration during its development and 
implementation. 
 
Pharmacists: Academic and professional training in pharmacotherapeutics and pharmaceutical 
care empowers pharmacists to play a critical role in disease management. Pharmacists in highly 
integrated managed care settings participate in formulary decisions, drug treatment protocols and 
critical pathway design. Pharmacists in disease management programs also perform the following 
activities –  
 
1) Patient education concerning drug use, especially in high-risk/high-use cases. 
2) Compliance education and monitoring for selected populations. 
3) Disease state monitoring (blood glucose, blood pressure, serum cholesterol, etc.). 
4) General wellness education. 
5) Intervention with physicians to encourage drug protocol adherence. 
 
Information managers: Data analysis plays a critical role in designing and operating a DM 
program. For the implementation of these programs, algorithms, based on specific correlates of 
drug, diagnosis, procedure and specialist codes are needed, to query claims data in order to 
identify the health plan’s members who have the diseases in question.  As a result of this level of 
specificity, the entire population with these diseases can be identified. Baseline measurements are 
necessary for later comparisons to ascertain whether care has been improved and costs have been 
controlled. Information managers help the planning team decide on data formats and definitions. 
They determine the usefulness of current information systems and also promote exchange of 
appropriate data elements among the partners. Continual improvement of the information systems 
used in the programs is necessary in order to capture and track data used in outcomes research 
and the information required for future improvement. 
 
Finance managers: The programs finance team is needed to analyze current costs of care, 
including the costs of failing to achieve intended outcomes and the predicted financial 
consequences of the disease management program. In addition, this team is responsible for 
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negotiating contracts among the disease state management partners, and for clarifying 
arrangements among them with regard to risk sharing and capitation. 
Florida operates the largest (and one of the oldest) Medicaid disease management programs in the 
country, which was initiated in 1998. Florida has the fourth largest Medicaid population in the 
nation, with 2.1 million eligibles and $8.8 billion spending in FY 00-01; $9.9 billion 
appropriations for FY 01-02; $ 11 billion FY 02-03, and $13 billion in FY 04-05 [17]. The 
Florida disease management program is the most comprehensive disease management program in 
the nation for Medicaid recipients [68, 1]. The diseases covered by Medicaid DM programs are 
asthma, HIV/AIDS, CHF, hemophilia, ESRD, diabetes, hypertension, pre-diabetes and 
depression. In May 2001, a Florida legislative audit was released which criticized the DM 
program for not being close to producing the projected savings of $113 million over the period of 
1998 to 2001 as was initially expected. It has also been found that while the DM programs 
generally reduced inpatient hospital costs, produced improvements in patient care quality and led 
to a reduction in spending, these reductions were generally offset by DM program costs [75]. 
Table 2.1 shows the most popular disease management programs in the country, while table 2.2 
reports the tools used for their implementation.  
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Table 2.1 Disease Management Program Statistics Across the U.S. 
Source: Managed Healthcare Executive; Apr 2006.  [72] 
Disease management programs offered by HMOs: 
Disease state Percentage of HMOs offering programs 
Diabetes 81.5% 
Asthma 79.6% 
Cardiovascular disorders 64.7% 
High – risk pregnancy 31.4% 
Hypertension 20.0% 
COPD(chronic obstructive pulmonary disorder) 16.6% 
Multiple sclerosis 8.4% 
HIV/AIDS 7.7% 
Gastrointestinal disorders 4.3% 
Hormonal therapy 1.9% 
 
Other disease management programs offered 45.6% 
Top three other programs offered:  
Low – back pain 32.1% 
Smoking cessation 22.6% 
ESRD (end stage renal disease) 22.2% 
 
Table 2.2 Method of Disease Management Program Implementation 
Source: Tracy Walker, Managed Healthcare Executive; Apr 2006. [72] 
 
Implementation tool Percentage of HMOS offering service 
Patient education newsletter 71.4% 
Physician education newsletters 59.6% 
Information on web site 54.0% 
Patient education courses 48.4% 
Reminders at physician visits 38.5% 
Physician education courses 34.8% 
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The investment required in terms of capital and human resources is thus significant when it 
comes to the implementation of disease management programs. A healthcare organization has the 
choice of implementing such programs itself, or contracting them to outside disease management 
vendors. In order to remain profitable and financially viable while upholding the principles of 
disease management and reducing healthcare costs, a medical care provider must develop 
effective strategies, as noted by Einstein [20]. Outsourcing of these programs to disease 
management organizations (DMOs) is one strategy that is widely practiced. 
2.3.3 Effect of Transaction Cost Factors on DM Organizational Form 
  
We can see the effect of TCE factors on health plans in the survey conducted by BCG in February 
2006 [48]. As seen in figure 2.4; health plans are as likely to integrate DM programs as they are 
to outsource them to a DMO. One way larger health plans have integrated their disease 
management programs is by purchasing the DMO outright. For example, Wellpoint has 
purchased Health Management Corporation and UnitedHealth Group has purchased the DMO 
Optum. Health plans such as Cigna have contracted with DMOs, while others such as Kaiser 
Permanante have a completely integrated approach. The decision on organizational form, 
according to the February 2006 BCG report, is made at an individual level by each health plan. 
They state “it’s not the payer’s size but the perspective of senior management that largely 
determines whether the payer develops its own DM programs or turns to the market for external 
options.” 
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Source: Realizing the promise of disease management, BCG, 2006. [48] 
 
The BCG report continues, “they (health plans) recognize the capabilities required to implement 
the approach and the difficulties involved”, which can be interpreted as asset specificity in the 
form of technology and software. Also, they go on to say, “[Health plans] view disease 
management as a highly specialized set of skills that are difficult to master or replicate at low 
cost. Some payers may view disease management as so central to their business that they will 
make every effort to make or bring the approach in-house. Others may feel that they cannot 
afford the fees associated with outsourcing or they can best limit their expenditures by relying on 
an internal or assembled program” [48]. This shows that human and physical asset specificity 
plays a large part in determining the organizational form for these programs. 
 
There is uncertainty regarding the savings for the health plan with these programs, and the 
savings for different programs can be realized at different times.  
Figure 2.4 Organizational Form of DM Programs in 
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For example, end-stage renal disease savings can begin in as few as 45 days [59], whereas a 
Healthcare Business roundtable consensus showed an average interval before savings are realized 
to be approximately 18 months for other programs [29]. 
 
In addition, they BCG report shows that due to lack of a standard methodology in order to 
measure effects and outcomes, health plans face uncertainty in terms of measuring results, and by 
choosing an appropriate organizational form, they try to minimize the transaction costs associated 
with this uncertainty. The biggest obstacle in the path of disease management is that no standard 
methodology exists for measuring savings and outcomes. The results reporting done for disease 
management programs consists of usually three outcome measures—process outcomes, i.e. (Did 
the compliance rate go up?), health status outcomes, i.e. (Did ER visits decline?  Did self-
reported health assessment scores improve?), and member satisfaction.  However, due to no set 
standards across the industry, the methods used to measure these usually vary from organization 
to organization. A common mistake is the first is regression to the mean.  Any disease 
management program which starts with last year’s high users—a common starting point in 
asthma and CHF disease management—will automatically show improvement simply because 
few diseases progress linearly.  
 
Although various industry groups such as the Disease Management Association of America 
(DMAA) and the DMPC [24] have issued guidelines, there has not been an agreement in terms of 
adopting a particular methodology, which introduces uncertainty and increases the transaction 
costs of implementing the program in each organizational form as “each payer will need to 
examine a variety of issues, such as the magnitude and reliability of its savings measurements”, 
and “we expect other payers to find disease management so resource intensive and difficult to 
manage effectively that they will turn to DMOs when their serviced-delivery or internal outcomes 
prove unsatisfactory” [48]. Uncertainty is also stated as the risk of failure for a disease 
management program implemented by a health plan, which would cause a setback to the 
company. Additionally, health plans are seen to look for “common vision and committed 
leadership” while searching for an appropriate DMO, which is an example of brand specificity. 
Another view of brand specificity is given in the DMPC report Outsourcing: Lessons Learned as 
“examples of favorable first contracts would be NYLCare-AirLogix, Foundation-Vivra Specialty 
Partners, Humana-Ralin, Humana-Paidos, Humana-Baxter, Principal-Accordant, and a large 
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number of health plans fortunate enough to receive programs that were literally given away, no 
strings attached, in order for a vendor to start generating experience and outcomes.” 
On the surface, it might seem risky and problematic to contract with a new or inexperienced 
vendor for disease management programs. However, due to the relatively new nature of the 
industry and the unique requirements it entails, new/inexperienced vendors have actually shown 
better performance as compared to established vendors/DMOs, as noted by the DMPC. As an 
example, Apria was an established DMO with a vast experience in asthma, and Stuart Disease 
Management Services (financed by Zeneca), were handling programs for various national health 
plans, but both pulled out of disease management and left their customers (the health plans with 
which they were contracted) in the lurch with what are now essentially orphan disease 
management programs [41]. The above shows the pitfalls of stressing on brand name and 
reputation and its effect on transaction costs to the level that the programs failed. 
 
Frequency is reported as the number of interventions as well as the retention and penetration 
among its customers by the DM program. Most health plans screen all policy holders for program 
eligibility using their preferred algorithms, which take into account the medical history and risk 
of the individual. If eligible, the individual is enrolled into the program at no expense or for a 
small monthly fee. The person is free to opt out of the program at any time. Due to this, the 
number of people enrolled in a particular program is always in flux. The adherence of the patients 
to the program protocol is also something that needs to be constantly monitored and hence the 
frequency of contact within a program can vary significantly based on the characteristics of the 
people enrolled. Hence, this factor also plays an important role in the final form adopted by the 
health plan for these programs.  
 
According to the DMPC report Outsourcing: Disease Management’s Magic Bullet (1999) [42], 
Outsourcing is not always the answer for health plans any more than building programs internally 
is always the answer.  Many health plan medical directors are given directives along the lines of:  
“You have to institute a disease management program, and you have to do it within your existing 
budget.” [57]. Thus, there are many variables that influence internalizing or contracting a 
particular program in order to maximize benefits and profits. 
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From the above, three main factors can be used to distinguish between those disease categories 
and health plan circumstances which should lead to a buy decision and those which should lead to 
a build decision [42]: 
 
1) Health plan organization, culture, and budget  
2) Severity of disease - disease management programs which look like a typical health 
plan’s day-to-day operations can be successfully built by most health plans, but those 
which require a set of skills not normally found within a health plan are better served 
through outsourcing to an expert vendor. This shows how similarity may affect the 
organization form of these programs in health plans. 
3) Availability of tools and expertise - The more widespread the expertise and tools 
available for patient management in a particular category, the easier it is to build a 
program.  For instance, health plans often build their own prenatal care programs, using 
readily available scripts to help their call center nurses triage pregnant members to 
identify those needing the most attention.  The experience base in pregnancy 
management is built on close to 4,000,000 US pregnancies every year.  Rare diseases by 
definition lack that experience base, and hence expertise and tools are much harder to 
find.  For instance, the nationwide experience base for hemophilia is built on only 20,000 
patients.  In the case of rare diseases, a health plan can spend more time just trying to 
assemble the requisite tools itself (assembling the tools being a small piece of the overall 
disease management program) than it would spend creating an entire program through an 
outsource. However, Evaluating and selecting vendors, contracting, and claims analysis 
require some effort and expertise. If integrated, a health plan would need to purchase its 
own retrospective claims analysis/predictive utilization software.  Such a tool can help 
identify tomorrow’s high users (the people one wants in a disease management program) 
as well as ones from previous periods. Such software, such as CodeReview, is helpful but 
not exhaustive.  Several vendors have very sophisticated algorithms, supervised by 
medical directors, to find opportunities which software alone can overlook, and they 
guarantee significant amounts of savings. 
 
The above statements again show how asset specificity in the form of physical and human asset 
specificity affect the form chosen by health plans for these programs. 
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It is also reported by Matheson, et al. [48] that “health plans actually make the build-or-buy 
decision on a condition-by-condition basis. Harvard Pilgrim exemplifies this approach, by having 
internal programs for some conditions, such as asthma and diabetes, while contracting with one 
DMO for a cardiac program and another for rare diseases. Furthermore, some payers blend in-
house resources and external services in the same program, for example, using in-house nurses in 
coordination with data analytics purchased from a vendor.” This shows that the transaction cost 
factors will affect each program in a health plan differently, leading to different organizational 
forms for each as the situation demands. They recommend that DMOs reduce transaction costs 
for health plans by “more effectively targeting and communicating to employer groups and health 
plans, and differentiating and marketing”. Employers and health plans are already requesting 
customized reporting on the outcomes of the DM programs, with greater detail in savings and 
health improvements which reduce uncertainty at the cost of higher transaction costs. They state 
that using efficient disease management programs, health plans and employers can leverage them 
strategically in order to build a competitive advantage. The most important element to make this 
possible is that “they should strive for excellence in the management of administrative and 
information technology costs”, both of which are components of transaction costs.   
 
According to an article in Disease Management News [35], “Creating a successful disease 
management will require senior management commitment and dedicated resources”, and that 
“(disease management) programs are difficult because they require an unprecedented level of 
coordination, communication, and synthesis of information.” Both internal and contracted 
programs require time from senior management and commitment of capital and resources to be 
successful. In the case of contracted programs, it is seen that there needs to be close 
communication and information flow between many departments of both the health plan and the 
DMO to build a successful disease management program. The information systems department in 
both firms in particular, needs to have a close bond in order to develop the outcomes tracking and 
reporting functions. The medical directors of both firms also need to work together on the 
program protocols and integrating the program with the case management function [35]. Thus we 
can see that transaction costs are very prominent in the implementation of these programs and it is 
imperative that the organization choose a form as to minimize these costs. 
We can conclude that all the major transaction cost factors which are asset specificity, frequency, 
and uncertainty will play a part in the final form adopted by a particular health plan for these 
programs.  
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2.3.4 Future of Disease Management 
 
Disease management is also expanding worldwide, especially in Europe and Asia, due to its rapid 
growth in the U.S., particularly in the Medicare and Medicaid sectors. Australia has implemented 
many DM pilots recently, and Singapore has invested significantly in DM. other countries 
implementing DM are Brazil and South Africa, whereas the United Kingdom and the Calgary 
health region in Canada are developing initiatives in DM [48]. Most of the DMOs and health 
plans are also looking to apply DM to additional areas such as obesity, cancer, and other cardiac 
conditions as they seek to achieve additional savings and meet employer demands for these 
programs, according to Matheson, et al., in 2006 [41]. Also, they are counting on increasing the 
number of people being covered by these programs, mainly by going deeper into the risk 
categories for each condition. Most health plan executives and decision makers view the DM 
industry to be in its growth phase [48]. Figure 2.5 shows the areas most likely for expansion and 
program development in the near future.  
 
 
Figure 2.5 Percentage of Health Plans and Respective Anticipated Areas of Expansion for 
DM Programs 
Source: Market data, BCG, Feb 2006. [48] 
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2.4 Selection Bias and the Heckman Two-Step Method 
 
There are two forms of the selection bias problem. In the standard case of selection bias, 
information on the dependent variable for part of the respondents is missing. In the other version 
of the selection bias problem, information on the dependent variable is available for all 
respondents, but the distribution of respondents over categories of the independent variable we 
are interested in has taken place in a non-random manner.     
 
Common to both forms of selection bias is that there is a selection process by which data is 
divided over two (or more) groups and that non-randomness in this process disturbs the 
estimation of other relationships which are of substantial interest. Thus, as described by Smits 
[64], there are two processes (which can be described with two equations, called selection 
equation and substantial equation) and these processes are related to each other. This relationship 
will be reflected in a non-zero correlation between the error terms of the equations. If such a 
correlation is present, we cannot estimate the substantial equation without taking the selection 
process into account. The Heckman two-step procedure can also be used to address both the 
forms of selection bias, and is taken from the classical papers of Heckman (1979, 1980). 
 
This method was first derived by James Heckman in 1979 [30]. In this paper, the bias that results 
from the usage of non-randomly selected samples to estimate behavioral relationships as an 
ordinary specification error or omitted variable bias is discussed. The specification error 
framework is assumed to be the same as that specified by Griliches [25], Breen [7], and Theil 
[69]. He states that sample selection bias may arise for two reasons. First, there may be self 
selection by individuals or data units being studied. Second, sample selection decisions by 
researchers may lead to this bias. Using a computationally tractable technique, a simple consistent 
two stage estimator is considered that enables analysts to utilize simple regression methods to 
estimate behavioral functions using least squares method. The asymptotic distribution of the 
estimator is also derived. 
 
In the first step of the Heckman procedure, the selection process which is responsible for 
selection bias problems is studied with the so-called selection model. For this purpose, generally a 
probit model is estimated (as the error term of this model is normally distributed, one of the 
assumptions underlying the Heckman model).  
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Next, the residuals of the selection equation are used to construct a selection bias control factor, 
which is called lambda. This factor is a summarizing measure which reflects the effects of all 
unmeasured characteristics which are related to the selection decision. Lambda is called the 
inverse mills ratio and is denoted as: f(z)/F(z), where z is the estimated value from the probit 
equation and “f” and “F” denote the standard normal density and distribution functions, 
respectively. The value of this variable for each of the respondents is saved and used as an 
additional variable. 
 
In the second step of the Heckman procedure, the main analysis is performed, in this case an 
ordinary least squares (OLS) regression analysis of the effects of sourcing decision on costs. In 
this substantial analysis we use the selection bias control factor calculated above as an additional 
independent variable. Because this factor reflects the effect of all the unmeasured characteristics 
which are related to the dependent variable of the initial model, the coefficients of this factor in 
the substantial analysis catches the part of the unmeasured characteristics related to the dependent 
variable in the secondary equation. Due to the presence of a control factor (lambda) in the 
analysis  to compensate for the unmeasured characteristics of the dependent variable, which is 
also related to the dependent variables in the (initial) selection model, the predictors in the 
equation are freed from this effect and the regression analysis produces unbiased coefficients. 
 
This method was first applied by Hanoch [26] in labor applications. In this industry, wages are 
observed only for those who actually work. However, one can infer from the decision to work and 
characteristics of the working laborers the reservation wage that most likely generated the pattern 
of observed employment and the observed wages at that time. 
 
Heckman has applied his own methodology in his 1980 paper [31]. Here, he presents an 
empirically tractable model of the life cycle labor supply decisions of married women in an 
environment of perfect certainty. He integrates two distinct dimensions of life – time labor 
supply: annual hours worked and annual participation in the work force using his two – step 
approach, and using eight years of panel microdata from the Michigan panel Survey of Income 
Dynamics in order to estimate the model. Thus he extends the work done by Hanoch above, as 
that has stated only hours per week and hours per year as the two arbitrary dimensions.  
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He finds that labor supply is inversely related to life–time wealth measures, children affect life– 
time labor supply decisions, and that future values of variables determine current labor supply 
decisions.  The usage of this methodology in this research has been detailed in the methodology 
section. 
 
From the above literature review it seems very essential that further study of the sourcing 
decision of these programs be conducted. The proposed project builds on research in the study of 
factors affecting the outsourcing of disease management programs in a medical insurance 
organization. It focuses primarily on using transaction cost economics as a framework for better 
understanding the sourcing decisions and the internal organization costs and the external market 
costs that lead to this decision. 
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Chapter 3. Literature Summary and the Hypotheses 
 
3.1 Literature Summary and Application to Health Plans 
 
As the number of topics related to both transaction cost economics and disease management is 
very large, the researcher acknowledges that the literature review is not exhaustive, however the 
literature reviewed is sufficient to get a grasp on the key issues with which the research is 
concerned. These have been summarized here and used as a basis for the hypothesis detailed in 
this chapter.  
 
We can infer from the literature review that all types of asset specificity, uncertainty and 
frequency affect the levels of transaction costs and hence affect the organizational form.  
Bounded rationality also places limits on the organization’s ability to complete all activities 
internally or outsource completely and foresee and contract for all possible contingencies.  Firms 
internalize their most important tasks and personnel to control quality and production, ensure 
access to scarce inputs, and have a better understanding of complex production/service techniques 
and technology. Based on the particular situation, firms should only integrate transactions that 
they can perform more effectively in-house than through contracting. This implies that if the total 
cost inclusive of the costs of selection, contract management, performance measurement, and 
dispute resolution are less than internal costs of providing the same good or service, then it must 
be outsourced, as the associated transaction costs are lower in that case. 
 
According to transaction cost theory services formerly performed internally will tend to be 
outsourced if 1) the scale at which the service is performed efficiently increases relative to 
demand and 2) if the service becomes more standardized, less customer specific or more widely 
used. 
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Therefore, for an organization considering outsourcing there is not one clear answer regarding 
organizational form. It depends on the type of transaction and the specific conditions and factors 
that influence the organization and the industry.  
3.2 Application of TCE Factors to Health Plans 
 
Transaction cost analysis has been applied to various manufacturing applications, which deals 
with continuous processing of a large quantity of material as they move from one processing 
station to the next, and construction industries, which involves the building of a single or unit at a 
fixed location, and the finished unit may or may not be made up of a small number of finished 
units. The various transaction cost factors and their effect on the organizational form in the 
healthcare sector can be hypothesized as follows: 
 
In manufacturing, physical asset specificity is usually higher due to the high volume of 
production and the portability of the finished goods, compared to construction projects, where the 
final product is unique or produced in limited quantities, but the assets themselves are 
multipurpose and mobile.  Disease management programs are mainly concerned with the 
monitoring of the individuals enrolled, which requires advanced software and computing power, 
and the provision of timely information to both the patient and the physician (which is done 
through various means of communication), hence, physical asset specificity is likely to be an 
important factor in the determination of the organizational form of a disease management 
program. We state hypothesis 1 such that integration of disease management programs becomes 
more likely as physical asset specificity increases. 
 
Temporal specificity does not play a major role in the organizational form for manufacturing 
operations as it is of a high volume and continuous nature, whereas in the construction field a 
delay at one stage can reverberate through the entire project, and thus is more important in this 
application. The same can be said of the disease management, as it requires the timely 
dissemination of medical information both to the patient and to the physician.  A delay in this 
regard could potentially lead to serious consequences to the afflicted person, and to the 
organization in the form of treatment costs, and hence this factor is likely to play an important 
role in the arrangement of the firm.  We state hypothesis 2 such that integration of disease 
management programs becomes more likely as temporal specificity increases. 
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The factor site specificity can be explained as the distance between the interacting firms, Or 
Transportation and inventory costs specific to the transaction.  Disease management programs are 
mainly concerned with the timely disposal of critical information to patients and physicians and 
coordination of medical services and tasks between the providers and the patients in order to 
provide best evidence care, and to make the patients active participants in their own care. Thus, 
these programs are not involved in delivering specific services or components at specific sites or 
individuals; hence, this factor is hypothesized to exert a very low influence on the outsourcing 
decision, and has thus not been considered in the empirical analysis.  We state hypothesis 3 such 
that site specificity does not play an important role in the determination of the organizational 
form for disease management programs. 
 
The factor dedicated assets can be defined as substantial, general-purpose investments specific to 
the transaction, and that need to be invested in for the proper completion of the transaction or 
service, or high-capacity equipment whose capacity is intended to be dedicated to a particular 
customer. In this context, dedicated assets may refer to capacity that is created to serve 
particular/specific customers, so that it would be difficult to find alternative customers, or an 
alternative use for the capacity created. Here, the effect of this factor will depend on both the 
disease being monitored and the size of the population enrolled. We state hypothesis 4 such that 
outsourcing/contracting of disease management programs will be more likely as the dedicated 
asset specificity rises.   
 
The factor human asset specificity is generally not important in the manufacturing area due to the 
generalized and labor-intensive nature of the tasks involved. In the construction field, this factor 
may vary in importance, while generally it mirrors the construction field and the importance of 
this factor is low, however, there may be some construction applications (such as naval 
shipbuilding) may require specialized knowledge and skills, which increases the influence of this 
factor over the firm. Similarly, Human asset specificity will most likely exert a big influence over 
the organization structure as the experience, knowledge and skills needed for managing and 
running disease management programs are very specialized and specific. Usually, only 
experienced medical professionals (physicians and nurses) make up any given disease 
management team.  We state hypothesis 5 such that outsourcing/contracting of disease 
management programs will be more likely as human asset specificity rises.   
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Uncertainty or Complexity also has a role to play in disease management programs. Disease 
management programs are generally very complex and require advanced knowledge of medical 
protocol, treatments and procedures. The symptoms and issues of the enrolled people will differ 
from person to person and this will lead to a degree of complexity much higher then that found in 
either the construction or the manufacturing areas, and is highly likely to play a major role in the 
form of the organization.  We state hypothesis 6 such that programs with lower uncertainty and 
complexity will tend to be integrated while those which entail higher uncertainty and complexity 
will be contracted.  
   
Disease management programs consist of many high–technology, medical knowledge intensive 
activities, unlike construction and manufacturing operations, where labor intensive, low-tech 
activities make up the bulk of the work. The tasks involved will also vary significantly on a 
patient to patient and also on a program-to-program basis. Thus, similarity in the disease 
management context is hypothesized to be low (between as well as within programs) and will 
likely play an important factor in determining organizational form. We state hypothesis 7 such 
that disease management programs similar to the ones already offered by the health plan are 
likely to be in-sourced, while those dissimilar to current programs will tend to be outsourced.  
 
In this context, frequency refers to how often contact is made with the patients for interventions 
relating to their specific conditions. In other industries, it is seen that increased frequency leads to 
a greater probability of outsourcing or contracting to external vendors. The effect of this factor 
here is hypothesized to be similar, i.e. programs that require frequent contact will tend to be 
outsourced.  We state hypothesis 8 such that the higher the frequency, the higher the chances of 
the disease management program being outsourced or contracted. 
 
This study will focus on the factors outlined above and will involve collection of data based on 
the previously stated transaction cost factors as a means of constructing a probit regression model 
to study the effect of these factors on the form adopted by an organization for implementing 
disease management programs and to provide a dollar estimate of the costs borne by the 
organization.  
The proposed study will focus on health management organizations who have implemented 
disease management programs both internally and through external vendors as a means to gather 
representative data based on the previously stated transaction cost factors as a means of 
  
48 
constructing a regression model to study the effect of these factors on organizational form, 
organization cost, and the role played by the major transaction cost factors in disease 
management programs through out the country and to provide a dollar estimate of the costs borne 
by the organization. Answers to the above questions can give a better insight into the issues of 
outsourcing from a health plan’s perspective. 
3.3 The Hypotheses 
 
Based on the understanding and the appreciation of this literature stated above, the researcher 
formed the following hypotheses to be tested: 
 
1) Transaction cost factors yield influence over the organization form of disease 
management programs in managed care health plans. 
2) The transaction cost factors exert their principal effect on the costs of internal 
organization, rather than external market costs. 
 
The researcher’s primary and secondary data collection is centered on testing these hypotheses. In 
order to test these hypotheses the researcher had to answer the four secondary questions outlined 
below and explained in the measures, instruments, and data sources section:  
 
1) What is the nature of organization adopted for the disease management programs 
implemented by various health plans in the country? 
2) What is the impact of transaction cost factors on integration decisions for disease 
management programs?  
3) What are the implications for designing regression models for prediction of organization 
form and costs on the basis of transaction cost factors? 
4) To analyze if selective organization leads to savings for the managed care organization or 
health insurance organization. 
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Chapter 4. Methodology 
4.1 Research Approach 
 
The research approach and methodology used in this thesis will be based on quantitative data 
analysis collected by surveys and secondary data obtained from organizations in the health 
insurance industry such as managed care organizations, indemnity health plans, Medicare, etc. 
 
The primary data and the secondary data will be collected by in-depth survey from the internal 
departments of willing health insurance organizations.  
4.2 Research Method 
 
Transaction cost analysis of organizational form maintains the hypothesis that the organization is 
so arranged as to minimize the cost of governing the transactions. The organization of the firm 
can be expressed as a binary variable, which is make or buy, that is, whether the component or 
service will be produced in-house or contracted/outsourced to an external vendor.  There are two 
methodologies generally used for the measurement of transaction costs: 
 
Direct Measurement: the first and most straightforward way of predicting the organizational form 
chosen would be by direct measurement and comparison of the costs, for example, if we denote 
the form chosen as F*, a model of the choice between the two arrangements can be shown as: 
 
F* = Fo, if Co < Cm, and “Fo” represents the integrated form for the task or service. 
    = Fm, if Co >= Cm, and “Fm” represents the outsourced form for the task or service. 
 
where “Co” and “Cm” represents the costs of internal production and market subcontracting 
respectively [47]. However, many costs such as inflexibility or need of litigation may not be 
addressed. Also, the most basic and fundamental problem in this approach is that organization 
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costs cannot be observed for the organizational forms not chosen. For example, if an organization 
chooses internal production and the associated costs are measured, the costs of organization for 
the alternative form i.e. outsourcing cannot be measured as that organizational form does not 
exist. Thus, direct cost observation is not a feasible method for the application of transaction cost 
analysis. In order to address this shortcoming, the following methodology has been adopted. 
 
Reduced form analysis: in this methodology, the transaction costs in each possible organization 
form are related to observable features and then predictions of final adopted organizational form 
are made based on these features. Hence, the true costs of organization can be said to be: 
 
Co = AX + e,      (1) 
Cm = BZ + u,     (2) 
 
where X and Z are vectors of attributes (in this case, they are transaction cost factors) influencing 
the respective organizational costs, A and B are coefficient vectors and e and u are normally 
distributed random variables. Thus, the probability of observing organization form ‘Fo’ becomes: 
 
Fo = Pr (Co < Cm) = Pr (e-u < BZ-AX). 
 
Thus, the comparison is now based on the signs and magnitudes of the coefficients A and B, and 
not on the direct costs (Co and Cm) themselves. However, if the variance of the difference 
between the random variables (e-u) is not known, the coefficients of the above equations can only 
be identified up to a proportionality factor. Additionally, if X and Z share elements, only the 
differences between the vectors A and B can be identified [47]. As a result, it is not possible to 
deduce where the principal effect of the transaction cost factors lie, on internal or market costs. In 
order to obtain stronger tests of the theory, the method given below will be used in this analysis. 
 
Two-stage analysis: as the name implies, this method consists of two stages. The first stage 
consists of the construction of a logistic or probit regression model as shown below. The logistic 
model takes the form: 
 
 
  
51 
 
 
 
Where “α” is the constant/intercept obtained from the model, “k” represents the numbers of the 
independent variables “x”, which each can have “i” levels as shown above. “β” is the parameter 
coefficients obtained for each of the independent variables from the model, and “pi” is the 
probability of the task or service being in-sourced. Thus, “pi” can be calculated as: 
 
         
here, Y = 1 for the in-house case, and 
                      Y = 0 for the contracted case. 
 
 
 
The parameters α, β1, ..., βk are usually estimated by maximum likelihood. 
The probit model assumes that: 
 
where Φ is the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal distribution, Y is the 
binary outcome variable, and X the vector of regressors. The parameters β are typically estimated 
by maximum likelihood. In this research we estimate a probit model in the first stage. 
 
In this case, only the costs of organization for the form actually adopted are calculated. Thus, the 
model becomes: 
 
C = Co = AX + e, if Co < Cm,    
C = Cm = n.a., If Co >= Cm. 
In the second stage, switching regression techniques can be used to provide estimates of the 
internal organization costs. Estimation of the equations as a censored regression model will 
further reduce the need of large quantities of data. First, the inverse mills ratio (the ratio of the 
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probability density function over the cumulative distribution function of a distribution) is 
calculated as M = f (z)/F (z), where “z” is the estimated probit values from the model, f = the 
probability density function and F = cumulative distribution function of a distribution. 
 
The internal organization cost equation is constructed by regressing each transaction cost factor 
against our measured costs for in-sourcing. The equation for the internal organizational form is 
thus deduced by using the above equation and the inverse mills ratio. 
 
The transaction cost methodology described above was applied to a specific application, which is, 
the outsourcing of disease management services by health plans and health management 
organizations (HMOs) to disease management organizations (DMOs). Whereas previous 
empirical research has dealt with manufacturing and construction applications, the process of 
disease management is quite different and removed from these, which in turn influences the 
circumstances that lead to opportunism and affects the nature of the organization and the 
associated costs. 
4.3 Design and Study Participants 
 
A linear regression model featuring the decision to integrate as the dependent variable and the 
various transaction cost factors explained above as independent variables will be constructed. 
Health management organizations, including Medicare and Medicaid which engage in disease 
management plans and its outsourcing will be considered in this study. Initially, only those health 
management organizations situated and serving the population of Florida were considered. 
However, in order to obtain sufficient data, the sample size was expanded to include health 
management organizations from other states in the U.S. as well.   
 
After the selection of the health organizations, data was collected for the construction of this 
model based on the disease management programs implemented for chronic diseases (see table 
2.1). Pertinent data regarding any disease management program that was obtained was added to 
the construction of the model in addition to the basic five diseases. The collection of this data 
provides insight and better understanding of the effect that the considered factors of transaction 
cost have on the final organization form and allows estimation of the organization costs incurred 
with the current form and also under the other allowable alternative. Moreover, this model shows 
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the importance of internal organization costs in the outsourcing decision, which has previously 
only been applied to the construction and manufacturing fields, and never to the disease 
management field.  
4.4 Measures, Instruments and Data Sources 
 
The inquiry was guided by four research questions: 1) What is the nature of organization adopted 
for the disease management programs implemented by various health plans in the country; 2) 
what is the impact of transaction cost factors on integration decisions for disease management 
programs; 3) what are the implications for designing regression models for prediction of 
organization form and costs on the basis of transaction cost factors?; and 4) to analyze if selective 
organization leads to savings for the managed care organization or health insurance organization.   
 
To determine the nature of organization in the various managed care health plans in the country 
that implement disease management programs (Question 1), an analysis of various health 
management organizations (including Medicare and Medicaid) was conducted. The number and 
types of disease management programs were noted and used to answer this question. The 
organization of the different plans (vertically integrated or subcontracted) were of particular 
interest. The purpose is to establish a frame of reference for the identification of the factors to be 
studied and included in the regression model. 
 
To assess the impact of transaction cost factors on integration decisions for disease management 
programs (Question 2), all voluntary health management organizations were asked to complete a 
survey design based on previous surveys done by Monteverde and Teece (1982a) [51], Masten 
(1984) [45], and Anderson and Schmittlein [3]. These surveys were previously used to collect 
data from firms engaged in construction and manufacturing, such as the automotive and 
aerospace industry.  
 
The survey covers a sample of tasks and services that can be integrated or outsourced by a health 
management organization while implementing a particular disease management program.  The 
original survey has been extensively modified in order to adapt it to gather information on the 
disease management area, and it differs significantly from its original usage in the other 
industries. The original variables, the definitions, descriptive details and layout of the survey 
along with the modified version will be presented below. It is designed such that a team of 
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company officials such as the planning and implementation managers of the specific health plans 
and in some cases the higher management of the company can respond to each item on the survey 
based on their judgment.  This data enables the construction of the linear regression model for the 
estimation of the decision to integrate services within the organization and the coefficients of the 
respective transaction cost factors in order to judge their importance. 
 
Thirdly, to determine the implications for designing regression models for prediction of 
organization form and costs on the basis of transaction cost factors (Question 3), a summative 
analysis of the quantitative data was conducted, along with a comparison of the predictions made 
by our model with the actual organizational form, in order to determine the effectiveness of the 
constructed model, which also provides a more reliable picture of the performance of the model. 
In addition, data on organization costs were collected in order to estimate the cost of alternate 
arrangements. 
 
Finally, to analyze if selective organization leads to savings for the managed care organization or 
health insurance organization (Question 4), we obtained the organization costs for the disease 
management programs that have been integrated into the organization, and also those that have 
been contracted to external vendors (DMOs). Thus, we can obtain estimates of organizational 
transaction costs for both the cases possible for these programs for evaluation and comparison of 
the costs incurred.  
4.5 Primary Data Collection 
As noted above, hypotheses regarding the effect of various transaction cost factors on the 
outsourcing decision for a disease management program have been put forth. To test these 
hypotheses, data was collected from health management organizations. 
The independent variables corresponding to the hypotheses stated above are based on the 
respective transaction cost factors and are scored using a 5-point Likert scale and are explained in 
table 4.1 below. The specific questions asked in the survey have been detailed in appendix B at 
the end of the document. 
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Table 4.1 Probit Model Variable Definitions and Descriptions 
 
Question Variable Definition 
Q – 1 Disease class The disease managed by the program. 
Q – 2 
Organization 
form 
= 1, if the program was in - sourced, 
= 0, if the program was outsourced. 
Q - 3-a, Q - 3-b,  
 Q – 4, Q – 5 
Measurement 
of transaction 
costs (Co) 
This can be measured as the time spent in 
relation to the program X the average hourly 
management wage. 
Q - 6  
Temporal 
specificity 
Ranking of the importance of timing of 
interventions, patient/program effectiveness 
checks, risk evaluations, etc. 
Q – 7 
Physical asset 
specificity 
The degree to which the facilities and equipment 
is specific to the application. 
Q – 8 
Human asset 
specificity 
The degree to which the knowledge, skills and 
experience of employees is specific to the 
application. 
Q – 9 
Dedicated 
asset 
specificity 
A ranking of the degree of dedicated assets 
required for the program. 
Q – 10 
Complexity 
(proxy for 
uncertainty) 
A ranking of the complexity of the tasks 
involved in the program. 
Q – 11 Similarity 
A variable that ranks a program according to the 
similarity of tasks with respect to the other 
programs run by the health plan, and how similar 
the required care is between the patient classes in 
the different programs. 
Q – 12 Frequency 
This variable ranks how often patient and 
physician contact is made by the program staff. 
Q – 13 
Uncertainty 
(proxy for 
uncertainty) 
Provides a ranking of the difficulty in measuring 
the results, performance evaluation and 
effectiveness of the program. 
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In addition to these independent variables, data was collected on organization costs for the 
estimation of the structural cost equations as given in (1) and (2). The acquisition of this data has 
proved difficult and has varied based on the organization. For outside contracting particularly, 
this difficulty is exacerbated as outsourcing involves two parties and costs will be borne by both 
of them, necessitating the need for data to be collected from two sources. Also, contractual 
failures occur probabilistically over a period of time in the future, which leads to the data being 
collected being based on the views and expectations of the decision makers involved. 
 
By contrast, costs of internal organization (planning, execution) occur in a single organization 
and in a more routine manner. Thus, these costs are easier to obtain or if actual measurement is 
not possible, reasonable proxies can be constructed. We thus concentrated on obtaining these 
costs, that is, the costs of internal organization for the processes and services actually done in 
house by the firm. Based on this, the costs of organization can be obtained by calculating the 
number of hours consumed by the decision makers for the planning, set up and execution of a 
service or process times the average hourly wage rate for the management involved, which was 
found to be $60/hr after investigation into the industry and its associated wages.  
 
In the designed survey, there are four questions pertaining to costs. As transaction costs are not 
usually measured and recorded, the questions ask for time estimates that are then converted to a 
monetary value. These questions are the questions 3a, 3b, 4 and 5. Question 3a is concerned with 
obtaining the time estimate for the administrative and facility planning tasks associated with an 
in-house program. If the program is to be integrated, there will need to have been substantial time 
and effort spent in order to fulfill the required administrative and startup tasks of starting a 
program from scratch. These costs will be unique to an in-house program and will not be present 
in the case of an outsourced program. Question 3b is used to measure the legal costs incurred 
while contracting a disease management program. When the decision is made to outsource, an 
appropriate contract needs to be drawn up between the two parties in order to define and put 
down the terms and conditions of the partnership. This will involve negotiations and bargaining 
between the parties involved which leads to an additional cost incurred for the contracted 
programs. This cost is unique to outsourced programs and will not occur in the case of programs 
built internally by the health plans. 
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The next question (question 4) is concerned with the measurement of search and information 
costs. This question is common to both cases (in-sourced and outsourced), as relevant information 
regarding the disease management program will need to be collected regardless of the form 
decided upon. In the integrated case, costs will be incurred in obtaining information about the 
tools and facilities required, the expertise needed, and the outcomes and benchmarks to be set. In 
the case of outsourced programs, it will involve the selection of a vendor that meets all the set 
requirements from all the choices available in the market. 
 
Question 5 is used to record the supervisory costs that are an integral part of transaction costs. 
This question is again meant for both cases of organizational form, as  in the integrated case, the 
effectiveness and outcomes of the implemented program will need to be monitored and changes 
will need to be made (if needed) to the internal staff and tools of the health plan. In the case of an 
outsourced program, time will be spent on monitoring the outcomes/results reported to the 
management by the external DMO, and changes or improvements may need to be worked out as 
needed based on the decisions of the health plan management. The dollar values for this question 
are annualized. 
 
Thus, the in-sourced costs are calculated as follows: 
 
In-sourced costs = (Q3a + Q4)* working hours*average hourly management wage + 
Q5*weeks/yr*Average hourly management wage 
 
The outsourced costs are calculated as follows: 
 
Outsourced costs = Q3b + (Q4)* working hours*average hourly management wage + 
Q5*weeks/yr*Average hourly management wage 
4.6 Data Analysis 
 
Upon collection of the data, analysis was conducted upon the gathered data in a two-step 
procedure.  
In the first stage, a probit regression model was constructed for the estimation of the selection 
decision regarding whether the process will be done internally (integrated) or if the task will be 
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subcontracted (outsourced) to an outside service provider. The building of this model provided us 
with the coefficients of the various factors considered and explained in table 4.1, and their effect 
on the final organization decision and the form chosen. This stage of the analysis provided 
answers as to the importance of the various factors considered in the analysis and their influence 
on the outsourcing decision. 
 
In the second stage, estimation of the structural equations of the model is carried out. First, we 
estimate the internal organization cost equation for each integrated program based on the costs 
obtained for each program from the organization and the values for each of the coefficients 
obtained from the first stage results. For this, using the sample of integrated services, we can 
estimate the coefficients for the internal organization cost equation by regressing our measure of 
internal organization costs against each of the independent variables. We also obtain the log 
specifications of the linear internal cost equation calculated, as the log specification will constrain 
the organization costs in the positive direction and also provide a better fit to the obtained data. 
Estimates of the transaction costs for the contracted disease management programs are also 
calculated as detailed in section 4.5 and compared with the in-house costs obtained. 
  
Upon obtaining the cost estimations for both integrated and outsourced programs, the in-house 
cost equation is used to estimate the transaction costs for the integrated organizational form for 
each program, given its specific attributes. Thus, a comparison of the various organizational 
forms can be made.  We obtain the predicted dollar value of the integrated transaction costs to 
compare with the costs for the organizational form actually adopted. The costs to the firm that 
would be incurred if all the tasks/services or programs were to be integrated can also be obtained 
and compared to find the costs or savings caused to the health plan under each organizational 
form.  
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Chapter 5. Numerical Results and Inference 
 
This chapter describes the application of transaction cost economics theory to the area of disease 
management programs in health plans. Section 5.1 reports the frequencies of the data set obtained 
from the electronic survey responses. In Section 5.2 the data analysis is performed. In Section 5.3 
the data set is separated in to the training and validation sets. Section 5.4 onwards details the 
modeling, results and inference from the resulting models. 
 
TCE analysis is applied to cost prediction for the integrated subset of the obtained data set. These 
health plans with integrated programs are selected for cost analysis because the costs associated 
with integrated programs are much more accurately measurable as compared to the outsourced 
subset.  
5.1 Frequencies of Respondents and Corresponding DM Programs 
 
In order to collect relevant data for the construction of the required models for the analysis, an 
electronic survey was sent to the health plans that agreed to participate in the research over a 
period of two and a half months. The survey was sent to health plans across the nation in order to 
obtain the largest possible sample size for analysis, and only completed surveys with responses 
for all questions were included in the analysis. The frequencies of the resulting aggregated data 
set are as given below in tables 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3, which list the responding health plans, the 
programs implemented and the frequencies of the ranking questions based on the transaction cost 
factors respectively. 
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Table 5.1 Responding Organizations and Number of Respective Responses 
 
Organization Frequency Cumulative Frequency 
Ault International Medical 
Management, LLC 1 1 
BCBSVT 6 7 
Blue Cross Blue Shield of Florida 5 12 
BlueCross BlueShield of Tennessee 5 17 
CareGuide, Inc. 5 22 
Contra Costa Health Plan 1 23 
Direct Remedy Inc. 1 24 
Florida Health Care Plans 4 28 
Great-West healthcare 5 33 
Health Alliance Plan 5 38 
Health Integrated 1 39 
Health Net Inc. 5 44 
HealthPartners 5 49 
Healthy Futures, Inc 1 50 
Humana, Inc. 7 57 
IMS Managed Care, Inc. 5 62 
Independence Blue Cross 3 65 
Interactive Performance 
Technologies LLC 2 67 
Medica 4 71 
Memphis Managed Care Corp 1 72 
Miller & Huffman Outcome 
Architects, LLC 2 74 
Mountain States Home Care 1 75 
Parkland Community Health Plan 1 76 
Partners HealthCare 1 77 
QualChoice 5 82 
Quality First Healthcare, Inc. 1 83 
Solucia Inc 5 88 
Utah Medicaid 1 89 
VillageHealth Disease Management 2 91 
WellPoint, Inc. 1 92 
William Blair 1 93 
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Table 5.2 Frequency of Corresponding DM Programs 
                                                                                      
Disease Frequency Cumulative Frequency 
Asthma 17 17 
Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary 
Disease (COPD) 11 28 
Congestive Heart Failure (CHF) 17 45 
Coronary Artery Disease(CAD) 14 59 
Diabetes 17 76 
Low Back Pain 1 77 
Other:   End Stage Renal 
Disease 2 79 
Other:  16 complex chronic 
conditions (e.g., Crohn's, 
Parkinson's, Multiple Sclerosis, 
Sickle Cell, etc.)          
1 80 
Other:  CKD 1 81 
Other:  Cancer 2 83 
Other:  Complex Conditions 1 84 
Other:  High risk pregnancy 1 85 
Other:  Hypertension 2 87 
Other:  Integrated program for 5 
conditions (asthma, diabetes, 
congestive heart failure, 
coronary artery disease, COPD)     
1 88 
Other:  Our Synergy program 
covers 21 conditions 1 89 
Other:  Rare Diseases 1 90 
Other:  all chronic health 
conditions 1 91 
Other:  maternal child 1 92 
Other:  Pressure ulcers 1 93 
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Table 5.3 Frequencies of the Organization Form  
 
FORM 
FORM Frequency Cumulative Frequency 
In-
sourced/Integrated 40 40 
Outsourced 53 93 
 
  DEP 
                                 
DEP Frequency 
Cumulative 
Frequency 
0 53 53 
1 40 93 
                                    
DEP is the binary variable corresponding to the organization form encountered for each DM 
program. Each health plan was requested to fill out one survey for each disease management 
program they offered, and the organizational form for each program was asked. The answer to 
this variable was converted to the dependent variable “DEP” for the purpose of modelling. DEP = 
1, if the program is in - sourced/integrated by the health plan, and DEP = 0, if the program is 
outsourced. Table 5.4 reports the frequencies of each independent transaction cost factor. 
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Table 5.4 Frequencies of the Eight TCE Factors 
 
  
                             
UNCERTAINTY Frequency Cum. Freq. 
  
                              
PHYSICAL Frequency 
Cum. 
Freq. 
1 5 5   1 18 18 
2 12 17   2 4 22 
3 33 50   3 41 63 
4 34 84   4 15 78 
5 9 93   5 15 93 
  
      
      
  
                                
HUMAN Frequency Cum. Freq. 
  
                               
CAPITAL Frequency 
Cum. 
Freq. 
1 26 26   1 6 6 
2 7 33   2 20 26 
3 28 61   3 31 57 
4 20 81   4 22 79 
5 12 93   5 14 93 
  
    
  
      
  
                             
COMPLEXITY Frequency Cum. Freq. 
  
                             
SIMILARITY Frequency 
Cum. 
Freq. 
1 4 4   1 14 14 
2 4 8   2 11 25 
3 12 20   3 17 42 
4 56 76   4 18 60 
5 17 93   5 33 93 
  
    
  
      
  
                              
FREQUENCY Frequency Cum. Freq. 
  
                           
TEMPORAL Frequency 
Cum. 
Freq. 
2 7 7   2 1 1 
3 52 59   3 30 31 
4 16 75   4 29 60 
5 18 93   5 33 93 
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5.2 Data Analysis 
 
In order to ensure the validity of the data, the statistics of the data and the correlations between 
the eight independent transaction cost variables each and also the correlation of each independent 
factor with the dependent variable needs to be checked. This is done by checking the Pearson 
correlation coefficient between all nine variables involved in the construction of the model. The 
results are as given below.  
 
Pearson Correlation Coefficients – This statistic measures the strength and direction of the linear 
relationship between the two variables.  The correlation coefficient can range from -1 to +1, with 
-1 indicating a perfect negative correlation, +1 indicating a perfect positive correlation, and 0 
indicating no correlation at all.  (A variable will always have a correlation coefficient of 1 with 
itself.)   
N = 93 - This indicates that 93 observations were used in the correlation of each pair of variables. 
Prob > |r| under H0: Rho=0 - This is the p-value and indicates the probability of observing this 
correlation coefficient or one that is more extreme under the null hypothesis (Ho) that the 
correlation (Rho) is 0. The section is constructed in a way so that the top number is the 
correlation coefficient and the bottom number is the p-value.   
The results of the procedure are presented in tables 5.5 and 5.6 below. Table 5.5 shows the means 
and statistics for all nine variables involved, while table 5.6 reports the results of the correlation 
procedure carried out where each variable is checked for correlation with itself and the eight 
others included in the analysis. 
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Table 5.5 Means and Statistics for all Modeling Variables 
 
The CORR Procedure 
 
9  Variables:    DEP         TEMPORAL    PHYSICAL    HUMAN       CAPITAL          
COMPLEXITY SIMILARITY  FREQUENCY   UNCERTAINTY 
 
Variable N Mean Std Dev Sum Minimum Maximum   Label 
 DEP 93 0.43011 0.49777 40 0 1  DEP 
 TEMPORAL 93 4.01075 0.85331 373 2 5 
 
TEMPOR
AL 
 PHYSICAL 93 3.05376 1.27999 284 1 5 
 
PHYSICA
L 
 HUMAN 93 2.83871 1.38541 264 1 5  HUMAN 
 CAPITAL 93 3.19355 1.135 297 1 5  CAPITAL 
 COMPLEXITY 93 3.83871 0.9242 357 1 5 
 
COMPLE
XITY 
 SIMILARITY 93 3.48387 1.45672 324 1 5 
 
SIMILARI
TY 
 FREQUENCY 93 3.48387 0.89215 324 2 5 
 
FREQUE
NCY 
 
UNCERTAINTY       93 3.32258 1.00175 309 1 5 
 
UNCERT
AINTY       
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Table 5.6 Correlations for all Modeling Variables 
 
Pearson Correlation Coefficients, N = 93 
Prob > |r| under H0: Rho=0 
 
 DEP TEMPORAL PHYSICAL HUMAN CAPITAL 
1 0.09135 0.11685 -0.00864 0.37051 
DEP 
- 0.3838 0.2647 0.9345 0.0003 
0.09135 1 0.23831 0.24054 0.05394 
TEMPORAL 
0.3838 - 0.0214 0.0202 0.6076 
0.11685 0.23831 1 0.086308 0.09002 
PHYSICAL 
0.2647 0.0214 - <.0001 0.3908 
 
 
COMPLEXI
TY 
SIMILARIT
Y FREQUENCY UNCERTAINTY 
-0.27286 -0.1852 -0.10659 0.0675 
DEP 
0.0081 0.0755 0.3092 0.5203 
0.15383 -0.4415 0.19298 -0.10583 
TEMPORAL 
0.141 <.0001 0.0638 0.3127 
0.09929 -0.0957 -0.01351 0.09653 
PHYSICAL 
0.3437 0.3614 0.8977 0.3573 
 
 DEP TEMPORAL PHYSICAL HUMAN CAPITAL 
-0.00864 0.24054 0.086308 1 0.02007 
HUMAN 
0.9345 0.0202 <.0001 - 0.8486 
0.37051 0.05394 0.09002 0.02007 1 
CAPITAL 
0.0003 0.6076 0.3908 0.8486 - 
-0.27286 0.15383 0.09929 0.0304 -0.05281 
COMPLEXITY 
0.0081 0.141 0.3437 0.7724 0.6151 
-0.1852 -0.4415 -0.09572 -0.21943 -0.02439 
SIMILARITY 
0.0755 <.0001 0.3614 0.0346 0.8165 
-0.10659 0.19298 -0.01351 0.06383 -0.05056 
FREQUENCY 
0.3092 0.0638 0.8977 0.5433 0.6303 
0.0675 -0.1058 0.09653 -0.0091 0.25041 UNCERTAINT
Y 0.5203 0.3127 0.3573 0.931 0.0155 
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Table 5.6 (Continued) 
 
 
COMPLEXIT
Y SIMILARITY FREQUENCY UNCERTAINTY 
0.0304 -0.2194 0.06383 -0.0091 
HUMAN 
0.7724 0.0346 0.5433 0.931 
-0.05281 -0.0244 -0.05056 0.25041 
CAPITAL 
0.6151 0.8165 0.6303 0.0155 
1 -0.0948 0.20115 0.35032 
COMPLEXITY 
- 0.366 0.0532 0.0006 
-0.0948 1 -0.35775 -0.01129 
SIMILARITY 
0.366 - 0.0004 0.9144 
0.20115 -0.3578 1 -0.26168 
FREQUENCY 
0.0532 0.0004 - 0.0113 
0.35032 -0.0113 -0.26168 1 UNCERTAINT
Y 0.0006 0.9144 0.0113 - 
 
If an independent variable is heavily correlated with another independent variable, one of them 
can be removed as both produce the same effect in the model and it is not necessary that both 
variables be included in the model. If an independent variable is heavily correlated with the 
dependent variable of the model, then the effect of the independent factor can be explained by the 
nature of the correlation between the two variables. However, from the above results we see that 
none of the independent variables are correlated strongly with each other and neither is any 
independent variables strongly correlated with the dependent variable (DEP). Hence all 8 of then 
can be included in the analysis. 
5.3 Creating the Training and Validation Sets for the First Stage Selection Model 
 
The total sample size consists of 93 data points. The responses cover a large number of the 
disease management programs offered by health plans. The responses also show that there was no 
clear consensus as to which organizational form is better for these programs, as already evidenced 
from the literature review. For the sample obtained for the purpose of this research, it is seen that 
outsourced programs (N = 53) slightly outnumber the integrated cases (N = 40).  
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This data set was randomly split into two groups: the training set on which the selection model 
was built and the inference was deduced, consisting of 80 observations and the validation set, 
which was used to test the model and determine its accuracy, containing 13 observations. The 
frequencies for the two sets are as given below in tables 5.7 and 5.8. 
 
Table 5.7 Frequencies for the Training Set 
 
The FREQ Procedure 
 
DEP 
DEP Frequency Percent Cumulative Frequency Cumulative Percent 
0 47 58.75 47 58.75 
1 33 41.25 80 100 
 
Table 5.8 Frequencies for the Validation Set 
 
ACTUAL_FORM Frequency Percent Cumulative Frequency Cumulative Percent 
0 6 46.15 6 46.15 
1 7 53.85 13 100 
 
5.4 Training Stage 
5.4.1 Step 1. Creating the First Stage Selection Model 
 
  The first step is to create the selection model. The results of this model will provide answers to 
the following questions: 
 
1) Do transaction cost factors affect and influence the sourcing decision for disease 
management programs? 
2) If so, which factors play the most important role in determining organizational form and 
what is their effect? 
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The combined set of responses needs to be split into two for the purposes of modeling. The first is 
the training set (with 80 randomly selected observations) on which the model is built and the 
coefficients and significance of the independent factors is noted. The second set is the testing set, 
which has the remaining 13 observations, where the model accuracy will be tested by comparing 
the predicted organizational form with the actual, which is known in our case. The training set 
created from the total sample is used to create the first stage probit selection model.  
 
To compute the first stage selection model, the command “proc probit” can be used in SAS. This 
procedure does not allow for the classification table to be obtained, however, which is very 
helpful for checking the model accuracy in this case. As an alternative, a the “proc logistic” 
command is used along with the “link  = probit” command. This command estimates a probit 
model based on the given data, while also allowing for the probabilities for each observation and 
the classification table to be constructed. 
 
In this research based on the effect of transaction cost factors on organizational form of disease 
management programs, the selection model contains the eight independent transaction cost 
variables. The dependent variable DEP is an indicator variable with value 1 for integrated 
programs and a value 0 for outsourced programs. The SAS commands are as follows: 
 
proc logistic data=TRAINING descending; 
model DEP = temporal physical human capital complexity  
similarity frequency uncertainty/LINK=PROBIT ctable 
pprob=(0.05 to 1 by 0.05); 
output out=prob XBETA= g predicted=phat; 
TITLE 'FIRST STAGE SELECTION MODEL'; 
  run; 
 
Where, “training” is the data set containing the 80 data points, the command “XBETA” gives us 
the probit scores generated for each of the observations. The command “predicted” provides us 
with the probabilities for each of the observations recorded. In the output of this analysis, we find 
the estimates of the parameters. On the basis of these parameters, for each observation the 
predicted probit score is also obtained, which is stored in the variable “g”.   
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The command “predicted” gives us the probability values calculated for each of the observations 
in the training set. The results are as given below. Table 5.9 gives the model fit statistics and the 
significance of the probit model for to the data using the statistical parameters given below. 
 
Table 5.9 Full Model Response, Fit Statistics and Null Hypothesis for Training Stage 
 
FIRST STAGE SELECTION MODEL 
 
The LOGISTIC Procedure 
 
Model Information 
 
                     Data Set                      WORK.TRAINING 
                     Response Variable             DEP                  DEP 
                     Number of Response Levels     2 
                     Model                         binary probit 
                     Optimization Technique        Fisher's scoring 
 
                            Number of Observations Read          80 
                            Number of Observations Used          80 
 
Response Profile 
 
Ordered Value DEP Total Frequency 
1 1 33 
2 0 47 
 
Probability modeled is DEP=1. 
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Table 5.9 (Continued) 
 
Model Convergence Status 
 
Convergence criterion (GCONV=1E-8) satisfied. 
 
Model Fit Statistics 
 
Criterion Intercept Only 
Intercept 
and 
Covariates 
AIC 110.441 98.614 
SC 112.823 120.052 
-2 Log L 108.441 80.614 
 
Testing Global Null Hypothesis: BETA=0 
 
Test Chi-Square DF Pr > ChiSq 
Likelihood Ratio 27.8271 8 0.0005 
Score 23.6146 8 0.0027 
Wald 18.0993 8 0.0205 
 
An explanation of the terms and results is given below:  
1) Data Set - The data set used in this procedure.  
2) Response Variable - The response variable in the logistic regression. 
3) Number of Response Levels - The number of levels our response variable has. Here we 
have DEP = 0 and DEP = 1. 
4) Model - The type of regression model that was fit to our data.  
5) Optimization Technique - This refers to the iterative method of estimating the regression 
parameters. In SAS, the default is method is Fisher's scoring method 
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6) Number of Observations Read and Number of Observations Used - The number of 
observations read and the number of observation used in the analysis. The Number of 
Observations Used may be less than the Number of Observations Read if there are 
missing values for any variables in the equation. By default, SAS does a list wise deletion 
of incomplete cases. We see that all 80 observations of the training set have been used for 
the construction of the model, and none have been deleted. 
7) Ordered Value - Ordered value refers to how SAS orders/models the levels of the 
dependent variable. When the descending option is specified in the procedure statement, 
SAS treats the levels of DEP in a descending order (high to low). By default SAS models 
the 0's (the outsourced cases). The descending option is necessary so that SAS models the 
1's, that is, the integrated cases. 
8) Total Frequency - The frequency distribution of the response variable. Our response 
variable has 33 observations with a DEP = 1 and 47 with DEP = 0.  
9) Probability modeled is DEP = 1 - This is a note informing which level of the response 
variable we are modeling.  
10) Model Convergence Status - this describes whether the maximum-likelihood algorithm 
has converged or not, and what kind of convergence criterion is used to asses 
convergence. The default criterion is the relative gradient convergence criterion 
(GCONV), and the default precision is 10-8. 
11) Criterion – this lists various measurements used to assess the model fit, which consists of 
the following:  
1) AIC - The Akaike Information Criterion. It is calculated as AIC = -2 Log L + 2((k-
1) + s), where k is the number of levels of the dependent variable and s is the 
number of predictors in the model. AIC is used for the comparison of models from 
different samples or non-nested models. The model with the smallest AIC is 
considered the best. 
2) SC - This is the Schwarz Criterion. It is defined as - 2 Log L + ((k-1) + s)*log(Σ fi), 
where fi's are the frequency values of the ith observation, and k and s are as defined 
previously. Like AIC, SC penalizes for the number of predictors in the model and 
the smallest SC is most desirable. 
3) Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and Schwarz Criterion (SC) are deviants of 
negative two times the Log-Likelihood (-2 Log L). AIC and SC penalize the log-
likelihood by the number of predictors in the model. 
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4) -2 Log L - This is negative two times the log-likelihood. The -2 Log L is used in 
hypothesis tests for nested models. 
12) Intercept Only - This column refers to the respective criterion statistics with no predictors 
in the model, i.e., just the response variable.  
13) Intercept and Covariates - This column corresponds to the respective criterion statistics 
for the fitted model. A fitted model includes all independent variables and the intercept. 
We can compare the values in this column with the criteria corresponding Intercept Only 
value to assess model fit/significance. 
14) Test - These are three asymptotically equivalent Chi-Square tests. They test against the 
null hypothesis that at least one of the predictors' regression coefficient is not equal to 
zero in the model.  
15) Likelihood Ratio - The Likelihood Ratio (LR) Chi-Square tests that at least one of the 
predictors' regression coefficient is not equal to zero in the model. The LR Chi-Square 
statistic can be calculated by  -2 Log  L(null model) - 2 Log L(fitted model), where L(null 
model) refers to the Intercept Only model and L(fitted model) refers to the Intercept and 
Covariates model. 
16) Score - The Score Chi-Square tests that at least one of the predictors' regression 
coefficients is not equal to zero in the model. 
17) Wald - The Wald Chi-Square tests that at least one of the predictors' regression 
coefficients is not equal to zero in the model. 
18) Chi-Square, DF and Pr > ChiSq - The Chi-Square test statistic, Degrees of Freedom (DF) 
and associated p-value (PR>ChiSq) corresponding to the specific test that all of the 
predictors are simultaneously equal to zero. The null hypothesis is that all of the 
regression coefficients in the model are equal to zero. The DF defines the distribution of 
the Chi-Square test statistics and is defined by the number of predictors in the model. 
PR>ChiSq is compared to a specified alpha level (willingness to accept a type I error), 
which is often set at 0.05 or 0.01.  
5.4.1 Step 2. Evaluate Results of the Training Stage 
 
From the above results, we see that the model is a good fit for the data obtained via the survey. It 
is now necessary to obtain the coefficients for each independent transaction cost factor in order to 
gauge their effect on the final organizational form chosen by the health plan for. The statistics and 
results obtained in this step are explained below: 
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1) Parameter – this column lists the predictor variables in the model and the intercept. 
2) DF - This column gives the degrees of freedom corresponding to the Parameter. Each 
Parameter estimated in the model requires one DF and defines the Chi-Square 
distribution to test whether the individual regression coefficient is zero, given the other 
variables in the model. 
3) Estimate - The binary probit regression estimates for the Parameters in the model.  
4) Intercept - The probit regression estimate when all variables in the model are evaluated at 
zero.  
5) Standard Error - The standard errors of the individual regression coefficients.  
6) Wald Chi-Square and Pr > ChiSq - The test statistics and p-values, respectively, testing 
the null hypothesis that an individual predictor's regression coefficient is zero, given the 
other predictor variables are in the model.  
7) Percent Concordant - A pair of observations with different observed responses is said to 
be concordant if the observation with the lower ordered response value (DEP = 0) has a 
lower predicted mean score than the observation with the higher ordered response value 
(DEP = 1).  
8) Percent Discordant - If an observation with the lower ordered response value has a higher 
predicted mean score than the observation with a higher ordered response value, then the 
pair is discordant. 
9) Percent Tied - A pair of observations with different responses is neither concordant nor 
discordant, and is termed a tied pair. 
10) Pairs - The total number of distinct pairs with one case having a positive response (DEP 
= 1) and the other having a negative response (DEP = 0). The total number ways the 93 
observations can be paired up (excluding be matched up with themselves) is 93(92)/2 = 
4278. 
11) Somers' D - Somer's D is used to determine the strength and direction of relation between 
pairs of variables. Its values range from -1.0 (all pairs disagree) to 1.0 (all pairs agree). It 
is defined as (nc-nd)/t where nc is the number of pairs that are concordant, nd the number 
of pairs that are discordant, and t is the number of total number of pairs with different 
responses.  
12) Gamma - The Goodman-Kruskal Gamma method does not penalize for ties on either 
variable. Its values range from -1.0 (no association) to 1.0 (full association). Because it 
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does not penalize for ties, its value will generally be greater than the values for Somer's 
D. 
13) Tau-a - Kendall's Tau-a is a modification of Somer's D that takes into the account the 
difference between the number of possible paired observations and the number of paired 
observations with a different response. It is defined to be the ratio of the difference 
between the number of concordant pairs and the number of discordant pairs to the 
number of possible pairs (2(nc-nd)/(N(N-1)). Tau-a is usually smaller than Somer's D 
since there are many paired observations with the same response. 
14) c - c ranges from 0.5 to 1, where 0.5 corresponds to the model randomly predicting the 
response, and a 1 corresponds to the model perfectly predicting the response.  
Through this step we obtain the parameter estimates for each transaction cost factor, as presented 
in table 5.10. 
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Table 5.10 Analysis of Parameter Coefficients for the Training Stage 
 
FIRST STAGE SELECTION MODEL                                 
The LOGISTIC Procedure 
Analysis of Maximum Likelihood Estimates 
                                                    
Parameter DF Estimate Standard Error 
Wald Chi-
Square 
Pr > 
ChiSq 
Intercept 1 1.6295      1.6646        0.9583         0.3276 
TEMPORAL 1 0.0476 0.2179 0.0478 0.827 
PHYSICAL 1 0.6327 0.2587 5.9824 0.0144 
HUMAN 1 -0.5188 0.2496 4.3196 0.0377 
CAPITAL 1 0.5214 0.1813 8.27 0.004 
COMPLEXITY 1 -0.6031 0.2401 6.3088 0.012 
SIMILARITY 1 -0.2788 0.1416 3.873 0.0491 
FREQUENCY 1 -0.1736 0.2283 0.5785 0.4469 
UNCERTAINTY 1 -0.067 0.2079 0.104 0.7471 
 
Association of Predicted Probabilities and Observed Responses 
                        
Percent Concordant 80.1 Somers' D 0.603 
Percent Discordant 19.7 Gamma 0.605 
Percent Tied 0.2 Tau-a 0.296 
Pairs 1551 c 0.802 
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5.4.1 Step 3. Use the Classification Table to Determine Optimal Cut-Off Point 
 
In order to maximize the effectiveness of the model in classifying events and non events for the 
validation set, we need to select a cut-off point for the predicted probabilities, one below which 
the program will be classified as outsourced, and above which the program will be classified as 
in-sourced. This comparison table was created using the “pprob” option in the modeling syntax 
available in the SAS software. Each event can be classified as a true positive or a false positive 
according to the following definitions: 
 
1) Event: if the organizational form of a given DM program is predicted as in-sourced/integrated 
then it is termed as an event. 
2) Non–event:  if the organization form of a given DM program is predicted as outsourced then 
it is termed as a non-event. 
3) False POS (False positive): if an event identified by the model is not an integrated program it 
constitutes a false positive. 
4) False NEG (False negatives): if the non-event identified by the model as outsourced program 
is actually an event (in-sourced organizational form) it is termed as a false negative. 
 
The results are as shown in table 5.11.  
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Table 5.11 Classification Table for Training Set 
 
  Correct Incorrect Percentages 
Prob 
Level Event 
Non - 
Event Event 
Non - 
Event Correct Sensitivity Specificity 
False 
POS 
False 
NEG 
0.05 33 3 44 0 45 100 6.4 57.1 0 
0.1 32 11 36 1 53.8 97 23.4 52.9 8.3 
0.15 32 11 36 1 53.8 97 23.4 52.9 8.3 
0.2 25 16 31 8 51.3 75.8 34 55.4 33.3 
0.25 24 19 28 9 53.8 72.7 40.4 53.8 32.1 
0.3 23 21 26 10 55 69.7 44.7 53.1 32.3 
0.35 23 25 22 10 60 69.7 53.2 48.9 28.6 
0.4 23 30 17 10 66.3 69.7 63.8 42.5 25 
0.45 23 38 9 10 76.3 69.7 80.9 28.1 20.8 
0.5 20 39 8 13 73.8 60.6 83 28.6 25 
0.55 17 44 3 16 76.3 51.5 93.6 15.0 26.7 
0.6 15 45 2 18 75 45.5 95.7 11.8 28.6 
0.65 14 45 2 19 73.8 42.4 95.7 12.5 29.7 
0.7 14 45 2 19 73.8 42.4 95.7 12.5 29.7 
0.75 8 45 2 25 66.3 24.2 95.7 20 35.7 
0.8 7 45 2 26 65 21.2 95.7 22.2 36.6 
0.85 7 46 1 26 66.3 21.2 97.9 12.5 36.1 
0.9 7 47 0 26 67.5 21.2 100 0 35.6 
0.95 4 47 0 29 63.8 12.1 100 0 38.2 
1 0 47 0 33 58.8 0 100 . 41.3 
 
From the above we see that we have the best prediction and highest value of correct 
classifications (and corresponding lowest number of false positives and negatives) occurs at the 
0.55 probability level, hence that value is selected as the cut-off point to be used for the validation 
set. 
5.5 Validation Stage 
5.5.1 Step 1. Embed the Validation Set Into the Training Set 
 
In this step we combine the training and validation data sets into one, but we leave the dependent 
variable information as unknown for the validation set.  
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When the model is run, the model is built again on the basis of the training set. However, the 
predicted probabilities for the validation set are also calculated and displayed. The SAS 
commands are as follows: 
 
proc logistic data=COMBINED descending; 
model DEP = temporal physical human capital complexity  
similarity frequency uncertainty/LINK=PROBIT ; 
output out=prob2 XBETA= g2 predicted=phat2; 
TITLE 'FIRST STAGE SELECTION MODEL FOR COMBINED DATA SET'; 
  run; 
 
Where, “combined” is the data set containing all the 93 data points. Using the cut-off point 
described above, one can then classify them as in–sourced or outsourced, and a comparison with 
the actual form (known in our case) can be made, if this information is stored in another variable 
(for this analysis, the actual form is stored in the variable “actual_form”. The initial output for 
this step again details the number of observations used and the model fit statistics with the terms 
as explained in section 5.4.1 (step 1). The results are detailed in table 5.12, and show that out of 
the total 93 observations used, only the original 80 are used to construct the model, whereas the 
newly added training observations are not used as they have the dependent variable (DEP) as 
missing. However, predicted probabilities are still calculated for the testing set as well as this set 
contains all the independent variable values for each observation. Thus, a comparison of the 
predicted and actual form can be made in the later stages. 
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Table 5.12 Full Model Response, Fit Statistics and Null Hypothesis for Testing Phase 
 
FIRST STAGE SELECTION MODEL FOR COMBINED DATA SET                      
 
The LOGISTIC Procedure 
Model Information 
 
                     Data Set                      WORK.COMBINED 
                     Response Variable                   DEP                  DEP 
                     Number of Response Levels     2 
                     Model                                        binary probit 
                     Optimization Technique           Fisher's scoring 
 
Number of Observations Read          93 
Number of Observations Used          80 
 
Response Profile 
                                
Ordered  
Value DEP 
Total  
Frequency 
1 1 33 
2 0 47 
 
 
Probability modeled is DEP=1. 
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Table 5.12 (Continued) 
 
NOTE: 13 observations were deleted due to missing values for the response or explanatory 
variables. 
 
Model Convergence Status 
 
Convergence criterion (GCONV=1E-8) satisfied. 
 
Model Fit Statistics 
                                                     
                             
Criterion 
Intercept
Only 
Intercept 
and 
Covariates 
                             
AIC 110.441 98.614 
                             
SC 112.823 120.052 
                             
-2 Log L 108.441 80.614 
 
 
FIRST STAGE SELECTION MODEL FOR COMBINED DATA SET 
 
The LOGISTIC Procedure 
Testing Global Null Hypothesis: BETA=0 
 
                     
Test 
Chi-
Square DF 
Pr > 
ChiSq 
                 
Likelihood 
Ratio 
27.8271 8 0.0005 
                    
Score 23.6146 8 0.0027 
                    
Wald 18.0993 8 0.0205 
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5.5.1 Step 2. Results of the First Stage Selection Model With Combined Data Set 
 
As in the earlier case with the training set, in this step we obtain the parameter estimates for the 
transaction cost variables included in the modeling. The terms and statistics are the same as those 
explained in section 5.4.1 step 2. Table 5.13 reports the parameter coefficients for the 
independent factors. 
 
Table 5.13 Analysis of Parameter Coefficients for Testing Stage 
 
Analysis of Maximum Likelihood Estimates 
                                                        
Parameter DF Estimate Standard Error 
Wald Chi-
Square 
Pr > 
ChiSq 
Intercept 1 1.6295      1.6646        0.9583         0.3276 
TEMPORAL 1 0.0476 0.2179 0.0478 0.827 
PHYSICAL 1 0.6327 0.2587 5.9824 0.0144 
HUMAN 1 -0.5188 0.2496 4.3196 0.0377 
CAPITAL 1 0.5214 0.1813 8.27 0.004 
COMPLEXITY 1 -0.6031 0.2401 6.3088 0.012 
SIMILARITY 1 -0.2788 0.1416 3.873 0.0491 
FREQUENCY 1 -0.1736 0.2283 0.5785 0.4469 
UNCERTAINTY 1 -0.067 0.2079 0.104 0.7471 
 
Association of Predicted Probabilities and Observed Responses 
 
Percent Concordant 80.1 Somers' D 0.603 
Percent Discordant 19.7 Gamma 0.605 
Percent Tied 0.2 Tau-a 0.296 
Pairs 1551 c 0.802 
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5.5.2 Classification of the Training Set 
 
As we have selected the optimum cut-off point for classifying the observations in the model, we 
can classify the output according to the predicted probabilities for each data point in the training 
set to check the accuracy of the model on the training set. From table 5.11, it is seen that selecting 
a cut-off point of 55% as the demarcation between integrated and outsourced organizational form 
gives us the most correct classifications and the least number of false positives and false 
negatives. This cut-off point is now used on the training and validation set. Those observations 
from both sets that have a predicted value of less than 0.55 are classified as outsourced and the 
one’s that have a predicted value of 0.55 or higher are classified as having an integrated 
organizational form. The results for both the training and the validation set can now be checked 
for accuracy. The results for the training set are presented in table 5.14. The first column denotes 
the predicted form, classified on the basis of the cut-off point, whereas the first row denotes the 
dependent variable (DEP), which is the actual organizational form for the disease management 
programs.  The diagonal elements represent the frequency of the correct classifications, while the 
non-diagonal elements are the number of observations that have been erroneously classified. 
 
Table 5.14 Prediction Accuracy for the Training Set 
 
The FREQ Procedure 
Table of PRED_FORM by DEP 
 
Frequency 0 1 Total 
0 45 13 58 
1 2 20 22 
Total 47 33 80 
 
Frequency Missing = 13 
 
Hence, prediction accuracy = (45+20)/80 = 81.25 % 
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5.5.3 Classification of the Validation Set 
 
We follow the same procedure as in section 5.5.2 in order to check the classification of the 
validation set, which is the true measure of model effectiveness. The outcome is reported in table 
5.15.  Based on the classification process detailed earlier, it is seen that 76.92% of the 
observations in the testing/validation set are correctly classified. Thus, the model is accurate in 
the prediction of organizational form of disease management programs in health plans. 
 
Table 5.15 Prediction Accuracy for the Validation Set 
 
The FREQ Procedure 
 
Table of PRED_FORM by ACTUAL_FORM 
 
Frequency 0 1 Total 
0 5 2 7 
1 1 5 6 
Total 6 7 13 
 
Frequency Missing = 80 
 
Hence, prediction accuracy = (5+5)/13 = 76.92 % 
5.5.4 Inference for the First Stage Selection Model 
 
In table 5.13, results for the probit estimation of the decision to integrate the disease management 
production using the proxies for the seven transaction cost factors are shown. Of these factors, the 
coefficient for temporal specificity is positive as expected, indicating that the program is more 
likely to be integrated the more critical the scheduling of a task or service is to the program.  
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The coefficient for temporal specificity (TEMPORAL) is positive, meaning that as the 
importance of scheduling of the various tasks in the program rises, the more likely the program is 
to be integrated and not outsourced. The insignificance of the factor may be due to the fact that 
scheduling does not play as vital a role in DM programs as it does in other industries such as the 
automotive and ship building industries, and does not have a reverberating or domino effect on 
the rest of the program if the completion of a particular task or service is not according to 
schedule. Thus, according to the results, while our hypothesis detailed in section is correct to the 
extent of the effect of this factor on the organization form, the degree of importance that was 
hypothesized was overstated. Thus, hypothesis 2 from section 3.2 is only partially satisfied. 
 
 The coefficient for physical asset specificity (PHYSICAL) is also positive and significant, 
meaning that as the more specific the tools and assets used in the program; the more likely the 
program is to be integrated and not contracted. Results show that hypothesis 1 is completely 
satisfied and that the effect of physical asset specificity is as stated in section 3.2. 
 
Another factor that demonstrates a similar effect is “CAPITAL”. The coefficient for dedicated 
asset specificity (CAPITAL) is also positive and significant, which supports the hypothesis that 
integration is more likely for programs that require specific investments that are unusable for any 
other purposes. 
 
It is seen that hypothesis 4 is not satisfied and that the effect of dedicated asset specificity is the 
converse of what was detailed in section 3.2. It’s significance is correctly stated.  
The coefficient for Human asset specificity (HUMAN) is negative and significant, which 
supports the hypothesis that contracting/outsourcing is more likely for programs needing specific 
skill sets and experience from the employees. Thus, hypothesis 5 is proved correct as the results 
from the above model match the effect detailed for this factor in section 3.2.   
 
The coefficient for Uncertainty (COMPLEXITY) is negative and significant, which again 
supports the hypothesis detailed in section 3.2 that contracting/outsourcing is more likely for 
programs where the outcome reporting and performance measurement may be more difficult for 
the health plan, which may lead to higher transaction costs if such a program were integrated. 
Specifically, increases in complexity make it less likely that the program will be integrated within 
the firm. Hypothesis 6 is thus satisfied and results support our claim made in the earlier section. 
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The coefficient for similarity (SIMILARITY) is negative and significant, meaning that DM 
programs which are dissimilar to the ones the health plan may be involved in have a higher 
chance of integration than ones which may be similar to the ones already offered by the 
organization.The significance of this factor is correctly predicted, however, the effect on 
organizational form on DM programs is converse of that noted, leading to a partial validation of 
hypothesis 7. 
 
The coefficient for frequency (FREQUENCY) is again negative but insignificant, meaning that as 
the frequency of contact required with the patents enrolled in the program rises, the probability of 
contracting the DM program to an external DMO rises. The insignificance of the factor may be 
explained by the fact that frequency within a program may vary significantly based on the 
individual characteristics of the patient and hence may not be a major factor in the sourcing 
decision for health plans. The effect agrees with our hypothesis stated in section in 3.2. 
Hypothesis 8 is thus partially satisfied. While the effect is concurrent with the stated hypothesis, 
the degree of effect exerted by this factor on the sourcing decision is not as high as was 
postulated.  
 
Finally, the coefficient for uncertainty (UNCERTAINTY) is again negative but insignificant. 
This factor has already been covered by the independent variable “COMPLEXITY” which is a 
proxy for uncertainty. We see that the effect is similar to the effect of “complexity”, i.e. as the 
uncertainty of effectiveness and outcomes in a DM program rises, health plans tend to contract 
rather than build such programs themselves. The insignificance may be due to the fact that the 
effect has already been covered as stated before. 
 
At this stage of the analysis, a reduced form model for the transaction cost study of integration is 
constructed. The results are consistent with the hypotheses regarding the potential holdups in the 
market transactions in the case of human asset specificity and uncertainty, along with the costs of 
managing unfamiliar or complex activities within the firm. Thus, from the above we see that the 
hypothesis 1 from section 3.3 is satisfied. 
5.6 First Stage Selection Model Excluding Uncertainty 
 
We create the first stage selection model again, but this time without the factor 
“UNCERTAINTY” in order to note the effect of its exclusion on the model as a whole.  
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The variable “complexity” is generally used as a proxy for measuring uncertainty in transaction 
cost analysis. This variable has been included in the first stage model as detailed in the previous 
sections. Due to the specialized nature of disease management programs, another question was 
included in the survey to capture all effects of uncertainty on the final form chosen by the health 
plan. Based on the frequencies and the correlations of this variable with the other independent 
factors and the dependent variable, it is seen that the effect of this factor is similar to that of 
“complexity”, but is insignificant in the final model. Thus, it is necessary to note the model 
performance and accuracy with this factor removed. 
5.6.1 Training Stage 
 
In this stage, we use the same 80 observations of the earlier training set as shown in section 5.4.1 
step 1, but without the independent variable uncertainty, in order to study the effect of its 
exclusion on the whole model and its accuracy.  The SAS commands and data sets used are the 
same as detailed in section 5.4.1 step 1, with the independent factor “uncertainty” excluded. The 
results for the model information are as shown below in table 5.16. 
 
5.6.1 Step 1. Creating the First Stage Selection Model Excluding Uncertainty 
 
Table 5.16 Seven Factor Model Response, Fit Statistics and Null Hypothesis for Training 
Stage 
 
FIRST STAGE SELECTION MODEL WITH NO UNCERTAINTY                        
 
The LOGISTIC Procedure 
Model Information 
 
                     Data Set                      WORK.TRAINING 
                     Response Variable                   DEP                  DEP 
                     Number of Response Levels     2 
                     Model                                        binary probit 
                     Optimization Technique           Fisher's scoring 
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Table 5.16 (Continued) 
 
Number of Observations Read          80 
Number of Observations Used          80 
 
Response Profile 
             
                              
Ordered 
Value 
DEP Total Frequency 
1 1 33 
2 0 47 
                                                     Probability modeled is DEP=1. 
                                                        
                                                        Model Convergence Status 
 
Convergence criterion (GCONV=1E-8) satisfied. 
 
Model Fit Statistics 
 
Criterion Intercept Only 
Intercept 
and 
Covariates 
AIC 110.441 96.711 
SC 112.823 115.767 
-2 Log L 108.441 80.711 
 
 
Testing Global Null Hypothesis: BETA=0 
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Table 5.16 (Continued) 
 
                         
Test 
Chi-
Square DF     
Pr > 
ChiSq 
                    
Likelihood 
Ratio 
27.73 7 0.0002 
                    
Score 23.5741 7 0.0014 
                    
Wald 18.2744 7 0.0108 
 
5.6.1 Step 2. Evaluate Results of the Training Stage for the Seven Factor Model 
 
Once the model is run, we obtain the new coefficients for the independent variables involved, 
which are presented in table 5.17. 
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Table 5.17 Analysis of Parameter Coefficients for the Seven Factor Model 
 
FIRST STAGE SELECTION MODEL WITH NO UNCERTAINTY 
The LOGISTIC Procedure 
Analysis of Maximum Likelihood Estimates 
 
Parameter DF Standard Estimate Error 
Wald 
Chi – 
Square 
Pr > 
ChiSq 
Intercept 1 1.3695 1.4507 0.8912 0.3452 
TEMPORAL 1 0.0559 0.2165 0.0667 0.7962 
PHYSICAL 1 0.6194 0.2563 5.8406 0.0157 
HUMAN 1 -0.5072 0.2469 4.2191 0.04 
CAPITAL 1 0.5062 0.1723 8.6348 0.0033 
COMPLEXITY 1 -0.6265 0.2302 7.4046 0.0065 
SIMILARITY 1 -0.2675 0.1354 3.9058 0.0481 
FREQUENCY 1 -0.1452 0.2136 0.462 0.4967 
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Table 5.17 (Continued) 
 
Association of Predicted Probabilities and Observed Responses 
 
                       
Percent 
Concordant 
80.6 Somers' D     0.622 
                       
Percent 
Discordant 
18.4 Gamma 0.628 
                       
Percent 
Tied 
1 Tau-a 0.305 
                       
Pairs 1551 C 0.811 
 
5.6.1 Step 3. Use the Classification Table to Determine Optimal Cut-Off Point 
 
As in section 5.4.1 (step 3), the classification table is constructed once again in order to obtain the 
best possible cut-off point for classification of the data points in the training and validation sets. 
Table 5.18 details the results of this step. It is seen that 55% once again serves as the best cut-off 
point for the classification purposes of the model. The observations from both sets that have a 
predicted value of less than 0.55 are classified as outsourced and the one’s that have a predicted 
value of 0.55 or higher are classified as having an integrated organizational form. 
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Table 5.18 Classification Table for the Seven Factor Training Stage 
 
  Correct Incorrect Percentages 
Prob 
Level Event 
Non – 
Event Event 
Non - 
Event Correct Sensitivity Specificity 
False 
POS 
False 
NEG 
0.05 33 3 44 0 45 100 6.4 57.1 0 
0.1 32 11 36 1 53.8 97 23.4 52.9 8.3 
0.15 32 11 36 1 53.8 97 23.4 52.9 8.3 
0.2 25 17 30 8 52.5 75.8 36.2 54.5 32 
0.25 24 20 27 9 55 72.7 42.6 52.9 31 
0.3 23 21 26 10 55 69.7 44.7 53.1 32.3 
0.35 23 25 22 10 60 69.7 53.2 48.9 28.6 
0.4 23 30 17 10 66.3 69.7 63.8 42.5 25 
0.45 23 37 10 10 75 69.7 78.7 30.3 21.3 
0.5 20 39 8 13 73.8 60.6 83 28.6 25 
0.55 17 44 3 16 76.3 51.5 93.6 15 26.7 
0.6 15 45 2 18 75 45.5 95.7 11.8 28.6 
0.65 15 45 2 18 75 45.5 95.7 11.8 28.6 
0.7 14 45 2 19 73.8 42.4 95.7 12.5 29.7 
0.75 9 45 2 24 67.5 27.3 95.7 18.2 34.8 
0.8 7 45 2 26 65 21.2 95.7 22.2 36.6 
0.85 7 47 0 26 67.5 21.2 100 0 35.6 
0.9 7 47 0 26 67.5 21.2 100 0 35.6 
0.95 4 47 0 29 63.8 12.1 100 0 38.2 
1 0 47 0 33 58.8 0.0 100 . 41.3 
 
5.6.2 Testing Stage 
 
The new model is to be tested again for prediction accuracy, which done as below by running the 
model again using a combination of both the training and validation sets as input. The SAS 
commands and data sets are the same as detailed in section 5.5.1 step 1, excluding the factor 
“uncertainty”.  
5.6.2 Step 1. Embed the Validation Set Into the Training Set 
 
In the first step, the two sets (training and validation) are combined, and the model is run again as 
below. The results are as reported in table 5.19. 
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Table 5.19 Seven Factor Model Response, Fit Statistics and Null Hypothesis for Testing 
Stage 
 
FIRST STAGE SELECTION MODEL FOR COMBINED DATA SET WITH NO 
UNCERTAINTY 
 
The LOGISTIC Procedure 
Model Information 
 
                 Data Set                      WORK.COMBINED_NO_UNCERT 
                 Response Variable                     DEP                         DEP 
                 Number of Response Levels        2 
                 Model                                        binary probit 
                 Optimization Technique           Fisher's scoring 
 
Number of Observations Read          93 
Number of Observations Used          80 
 
Response Profile 
                              
Ordered 
Value 
DEP Total Frequency 
1 1 33 
2 0 47 
                                                      Probability modeled is DEP=1. 
 
NOTE: 13 observations were deleted due to missing values for the response or explanatory 
             variables. 
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Table 5.19 (Continued) 
 
Model Convergence Status 
Convergence criterion (GCONV=1E-8) satisfied. 
Model Fit Statistics 
 
                             
Criterion 
Intercept
Only 
Intercept 
and 
Covariates 
                             
AIC 110.441 96.711 
                             
SC 112.823 115.767 
                             
-2 Log L 108.441 80.711 
 
 
FIRST STAGE SELECTION MODEL FOR COMBINED DATA SET WITH NO 
UNCERTAINTY 
 
The LOGISTIC Procedure 
 
Testing Global Null Hypothesis: BETA=0 
 
                         
Test 
Chi-
Square DF     
Pr > 
ChiSq 
                    
Likelihood 
Ratio 
27.73 7 0.0002 
           
Score 23.5741 7 0.0014 
                    
Wald 18.2744 7 0.0108 
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5.6.2 Step 2. Results of the First Stage Selection Model With Combined Data Set for Seven 
TCE Factors 
 
The model run provides us with the parameter coefficients again as detailed below in table 5.20. 
The output parameters are similar to those explained in section 5.4.1 step 2. 
 
                         Table 5.20 Analysis of Parameter Coefficients for the Testing Stage of the 
Seven Factor Model 
 
              
Parameter DF 
Standard 
Estimate Error 
Wald 
Chi – 
Square 
Pr > 
ChiSq 
              
Intercept 1 1.3695 1.4507 0.8912 0.3452 
              
TEMPORAL 1 0.0559 0.2165 0.0667 0.7962 
              
PHYSICAL 1 0.6194 0.2563 5.8406 0.0157 
              
HUMAN 1 -0.5072 0.2469 4.2191 0.04 
              
CAPITAL 1 0.5062 0.1723 8.6348 0.0033 
              
COMPLEXITY 1 -0.6265 0.2302 7.4046 0.0065 
              
SIMILARITY 1 -0.2675 0.1354 3.9058 0.0481 
              
FREQUENCY 1 -0.1452 0.2136 0.462 0.4967 
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Table 5.20 (Continued) 
 
Association of Predicted Probabilities and Observed Responses 
 
                       
Percent 
Concordant 
80.6 Somers' D     0.622 
                       
Percent 
Discordant 
18.4 Gamma 0.628 
                       
Percent 
Tied 
1 Tau-a 0.305 
                       
Pairs 1551 C 0.811 
 
5.6.3 Classification of the Training Set 
 
From section 5.6.1 step 3, we have selected 55% as the cut-off point to differentiate between 
integrated and contracted programs (the same as in the case of the full model), and we check the 
accuracy of the new model on the training set first. This is done in order to gauge the accuracy of 
the new model, which may change significantly due to the exclusion of the factor “uncertainty”. 
The diagonal elements again represent the correct classifications for both the training and the 
validation phase. The results for the training set are detailed in table 5.21. 
 
Table 5.21 Prediction Accuracy for the Training Set 
The FREQ Procedure 
Table of PRED_FORM by DEP 
Frequency 0 1 Total 
0 45 13 58 
1 2 20 22 
Total 47 33 80 
 
Frequency Missing = 13 
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5.6.4 Classification of the Validation Set 
 
We also need to test the new model on the validation set in order to get the true accuracy of the 
model. The results are as shown below in table 5.22. 
 
Table 5.22 Prediction Accuracy for the Validation Set 
              
The FREQ Procedure 
Table of PRED_FORM by ACTUAL_FORM 
 
Frequency 0 1 Total 
0 5 2 7 
1 1 5 6 
Total 6 7 13 
 
Frequency Missing = 80 
 
From the above, it is seen that the prediction accuracy of the seven factor model is the same as 
that of the full model for both the training and validation sets. It can thus be concluded that 
exclusion of the factor “uncertainty” does not affect the model accuracy.   
5.7 Comparison of the Model With and Without the TCE Factor Uncertainty 
 
Presented below in table 5.23 is a comparison of the parameter coefficients for both the full and 
seven factor models. 
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Table 5.23 Comparison of the Full and Seven Factor Models 
 
Estimate 
Parameter DF 
w/ Uncertainty w/o Uncertainty 
1.6295 1.3695 Intercept 1 (0.3276) (0.3452) 
0.0476 0.0559 
TEMPORAL 1 (0.827) (0.7962) 
0.6327 0.6194 
PHYSICAL 1 (0.0144) (0.0157) 
-0.5188 -0.5072 
HUMAN 1 (0.0377) (0.04) 
0.5214 0.5062 CAPITAL 1 (0.004) (0.0033) 
-0.6031 -0.6265 COMPLEXITY 1 (0.012) (0.0065) 
-0.2788 -0.2675 SIMILARITY 1 (0.0491) (0.0481) 
-0.1736 -0.1452 
FREQUENCY 1 (0.4469) (0.4967) 
-0.067 
UNCERTAINTY 1 (0.7471)   
Pr>Chisq statistics in parenthesis 
 
5.8 Inference From the Comparison of Full and Seven Factor Model 
  
It is seen that the coefficient and significance of “TEMPORAL” increases slightly, while the 
factor coefficient of “COMPLEXITY” decreases. This effect is consistent with the observed 
correlations between the variables for temporal specificity and uncertainty as “TEMPORAL” is 
negatively correlated with the factor “UNCERTAINTY” due to which its value increases when 
the second factor for uncertainty is removed. The coefficients for factors “SIMILARITY”, 
“FREQUENCY” and “HUMAN” also show the same effect. On the other hand, 
“COMPLEXITY” is positively correlated with “UNCERTAINTY”, and thus the value of this 
factor decreases upon the removal of “UNCERTAINTY”. The same can be said for the values of 
coefficients for the factors “PHYSICAL” and “CAPITAL”. Thus, we see that the coefficients of 
the factors change slightly, however the prediction accuracy of the model remains unchanged.  
  
99 
5.9 Calculation of Actual In-Sourced and Outsourced Costs 
 
Based on the literature review and industrial inquiry, the average hourly wage for health plan 
executives and decision makers responsible for initiating, developing and managing DM 
programs was found to be $60. This value was multiplied to the time estimates that were obtained 
from our survey in order to obtain an estimate of the actual transaction costs for each DM 
program, the results of which have been presented below. 
5.9.1 Breakup of Actual In-Sourced Costs 
 
Using the time estimates from the survey, and the average hourly wage, we obtain the estimates 
of the transaction costs for both the in-sourced and outsourced cases of the responses. The means 
and statistics for the in - sourced case are reported in table 5.24. 
 
For the in-sourced costs, the questions 3a (time taken for administrative/facility planning tasks), 
and 4 (search and information time spent) are multiplied with the number of hours in each 
working day (taken here as 8 hours/day) and then multiplied with the average hourly management 
wage, which is $60. To this is added the supervisory cost, which is given in terms of hours per 
week. To annualize it, the number of weeks in a year is multiplied along with the average hourly 
management wage in order to obtain this cost. The sum of these three elements gives us an 
estimate if the in-sourced costs for a particular integrated disease management program. 
 
For the estimation of the outsourced costs, the cost estimates from questions 4 and 5 are 
calculated and added as above; in addition, the value obtained from question 3a 
(legal/negotiations costs) is directly added to the above as a direct dollar amount is asked for this 
question, and no conversion is necessary. The addition of these three values provides the 
outsourced cost estimate for each observation in the outsourced subset.  
 
The first row of table 5.24 details the administrative/facility planning costs for the integrated 
cases of disease management programs, while the second and third rows show the search and 
information costs and supervisory costs respectively. The last row reports the means and statistics 
for the total in-sourced costs, which is the sum of the first three rows.  
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Table 5.24 Means for the Actual In-Sourced Costs 
 
The MEANS Procedure 
Variable N Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum 
INSOURCED_ADMIN_COST 40 55812 68014.12 0 288000 
SEARCH_INFO_COST 40 27408 47821.8 0 288000 
SUPERVISORY_COST 40 52488 68036.08 0 288000 
TOTAL_INSOURCED_COST 40 135708 150068.67 0 691200 
 
5.9.2 Breakup of Actual Outsourced Costs 
 
As in the earlier case, the means and statistics for the outsourced case are presented in table 5.25 
below. The first row shows the legal cost, which is in dollars. The second and third rows report 
the dollar values of the calculated search and information costs and the supervisory costs, while 
the fourth row reports the means and statistics for the total outsourced costs, which is the sum of 
the first three terms explained above. 
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Table 5.25 Means for Actual Outsourced Costs 
 
The MEANS Procedure 
 
Variable N Mean Std Dev 
LEGAL_COST_OUTSOURCED_DOLLARS 53 14132.08 24255.99 
SEARCH_INFO_COST 53 17750.94 21043.81 
SUPERVISORY_COST 53 20513.21 21706.79 
TOTAL_OUTSOURCED_COST 53 52396.23 48103.72 
  
  Variable                                                              Minimum          Maximum 
  
LEGAL_COST_OUTSOURCED_DOLLARS 0 100000 
  SEARCH_INFO_COST 0 86400 
  SUPERVISORY_COST 0 108000 
  TOTAL_OUTSOURCED_COST 0 197920 
 
We see that outsourced costs are approximately 1/3 of in–sourced costs due to the difficulties 
noted by Masten et al., who state that contracting costs are incurred by each party included in the 
transaction, hence, cost data needs to be collected from two or more sources. In addition, the 
contractual changes and failures that occur in this case occur probabilistically over time, which 
requires that data be collected on the intangible expectations of the decision makers. Thus, the 
collected outsourcing costs have been disregarded and the focus is placed on the in–sourced costs 
for building of the predictive models in the next stage.    
5.9.3 Calculation of the Inverse Mills Ratio and the Help and Control Factor Delta 
 
As the outsourced are disregarded, the dependent variable information is missing for part of our 
data set. The standard selection bias problem is thus encountered when constructing the cost 
equation as detailed in chapter 4. In order to correct the selection bias, an additional independent 
variable is needed to be added along with the transaction cost factors. This variable is the 
Heckman correction factor lambda, which is the inverse mills ratio. 
 
To compute the Heckman correction factor Lambda with a PROBIT selection model, the 
following SAS commands are used: 
  
102 
proc logistic data=COMBINED descending; 
model DEP = temporal physical human capital complexity  
similarity frequency uncertainty/LINK=PROBIT ; 
output out=prob2 XBETA= g2 predicted=phat2; 
TITLE 'FIRST STAGE SELECTION MODEL FOR COMBINED DATA SET'; 
 run; 
 
Where, “combined” is the data set containing all 93 data points, the command “XBETA” gives us 
the probit scores generated for each of the observations. The command “predicted” provides us 
with the probabilities for each of the observations recorded. 
 
In the output of this analysis, we find the estimates of the parameters. On the basis of these 
parameters, for each observation the predicted probit score is also obtained, which is stored in the 
variable “g2”. These probit scores obtained in the variable “g2” are used to compute the Heckman 
control factor LAMBDA, using the SAS command as follows: 
 
LAMBDA1 = ((1/sqrt(2*3.141592654))*(exp(-G2*G2*0.5)))/CDF('NORMAL',G2); 
Or 
LAMBDA2 = (PDFG2/CDFG2); 
Or 
lambda3 = (1/sqrt(2*3.141592654)*exp(-1*g2**2/2))/probnorm(g2). 
 
For applying the two-step procedure it is important that all rows with missing values on variables 
which are used in the substantial analyses are removed from the active file. This means that all 
the outsourced cases and the cases where the dependent variable or any of the independent 
variables are missing are removed, and the following analysis is done on the remaining in-
sourced subset only. The next step is to compute the value of the control factor: 
 
DELTA1 = -LAMBDA1*G2-LAMBDA1*LAMBDA1; 
DELTA2 = -LAMBDA2*G2-LAMBDA2*LAMBDA2; 
DELTA3 = -LAMBDA3*G2-LAMBDA3*LAMBDA3; 
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Three values of the control factor are calculated in order to check the values of all three inverse 
mills ratios obtained by the different methods. The values of DELTA1, DELTA2 and DELTA3 
should be between -1 and 0. The values of both the inverse mills ratio and the control factor are 
checked as follows: 
 
PROC MEANS DATA = LAMBDA ; 
VAR LAMBDA1 LAMBDA2 lambda3 DELTA1 DELTA2 DELTA3 H1 H2 H3; 
TITLE 'RESULTS FOR THE INVERSE MILLS RATIO AND CONTROL FACTOR DELTA'; 
RUN; 
 
The table 5.26 details the values of the inverse mills ratio and the control factor delta. “Data = 
Lambda” denotes the data set lambda, from which all outsourced and missing data points have 
been excluded. 
 
Table 5.26 Results and Statistics for the Inverse Mills Ratio and Control Factor Delta  
The MEANS Procedure 
 
Variable N Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum 
         
LAMBDA1 39 0.6465018 0.4819293 0.0085964 1.7400238 
         
LAMBDA2 39 0.6465018 0.4819293 0.0085964 1.7400238 
         
lambda3 39 0.6465018 0.4819293 0.0085964 1.7400238 
         
DELTA1 39 -0.4992273 0.2347647 -0.8291143 -0.0238978 
         
DELTA2 39 -0.4992273 0.2347647 -0.8291143 -0.0238978 
         
DELTA3 39 -0.4992273 0.2347647 -0.8291143 -0.0238978 
         h1 39 0.4992273 0.2347647 0.0238978 0.8291143 
         h2 39 0.4992273 0.2347647 0.0238978 0.8291143 
         h3 39 0.4992273 0.2347647 0.0238978 0.8291143 
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All three formulas give us the same values for the variable “lambda”. The variables “h1”, “h2”, 
and “h3” are the inverses of the three control factors calculated. The value of the control factor 
delta (DELTA1 in our case) should be between -1 and 0 which is satisfied for all three cases as 
seen above. Hence, one case of the calculated inverse mills ratio and the control factor delta can 
be used in the planned analysis. The inverse mills ratio is calculated and added to the analysis as 
an additional independent variable as detailed in chapter 4. 
5.10 Frequencies for the In-Sourced Subset 
 
Before constructing the cost model, the frequencies of the integrated portion of the data set is 
presented. 
5.10.1 Frequencies for the Organizations in the In-Sourced Subset 
 
Table 5.27 reports the frequencies for the health plans that have in–house DM programs, whereas 
table 5.28 in the next section provides the number of DM program present in this subset of the 
full data set.  
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Table 5.27 Frequencies for Responding Organizations of the In-Sourced Subset 
The FREQ Procedure 
Organization Frequency Cumulative Frequency 
Ault International Medical 
Management, LLC 1 1 
CareGuide, Inc. 5 6 
Contra Costa Health Plan 1 7 
Florida Health Care Plans 4 11 
Health Alliance Plan 4 15 
HealthPartners 2 17 
Healthy Futures, Inc 1 18 
IMS Managed Care, Inc. 5 23 
Memphis Managed Care Corp 1 24 
Miller & Huffman Outcome 
Architects, LLC 2 26 
Mountain States Home Care 1 27 
Partners HealthCare 1 28 
QualChoice 5 33 
Quality First Healthcare, Inc. 1 34 
Solucia Inc 5 39 
WellPoint, Inc. 1 40 
 
5.10.2 Frequencies for the Diseases in the In-Sourced Subset 
 
The frequencies for the diseases managed by the programs implemented in-house by the health 
plans in the in-sourced subset are as shown below in table 5.28. 
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Table 5.28 Frequencies for the DM Programs of the In-Sourced Subset 
 
Disease Frequency Cumulative Frequency 
Asthma 7 7 
Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary 
Disease (COPD) 4 11 
Congestive Heart Failure (CHF) 8 19 
Coronary Artery Disease(CAD) 7 26 
Diabetes 10 36 
Other:  Hypertension 2 38 
Other:  all chronic health conditions 1 39 
Pressure ulcers 1 40 
 
5.11 Organization Cost Model for In-Sourced Costs 
 
In this analysis, the factor “UNCERTAINTY” is removed, as this factor is a proxy for the 
transaction cost factor uncertainty, which is already accounted for with the variable 
“COMPLEXITY”. Also, as detailed by Heckman, one independent variable from the selection 
equation must be removed during the substantial analysis. Inclusion of all eight independent 
variables from the first stage into the organization cost equation causes the estimated correlation 
coefficients between the errors in the selection and cost equations to exceed the logical upper 
bound. The SAS commands used are given below: 
 
PROC REG DATA=LAMBDA; 
MODEL TOTAL_INSOURCED_COST = temporal physical human capital complexity  
similarity frequency LAMBDA1; 
output out=INSOURCED_PRED predicted=PRED_IN_COST; 
TITLE 'ORGANIZATION COST MODEL FOR IN - SOURCED COSTS'; 
RUN; 
  
107 
In this analysis, the in-sourced cost (total_insourced_cost) is the dependent variable, whereas the 
transaction cost factors (excluding “uncertainty”) and the inverse mills ratio are the independent 
variables. The data set “lambda” is that part of the combined data set that has no missing 
independent or dependent variables and contains only the integrated portion of the total sample. 
The command “predicted” produces the predicted values of the in-source costs and stores them in 
the variable called “pred_in_cost” in the data set “insourced_pred” (defined by the “output out” 
command). The results are as detailed in the sections below. 
5.11.1 Running the Model 
 
In this step, the model is run with the calculated in–house cost as the dependent variable, and the 
survey responses to the TCE questions as the independent variables. The tests and statistics 
displayed in this part of the results are explained below: 
 
1) Source - The source of variance, Model, Residual, and Total. The Total variance is 
divided into the variance which can be explained by the independent variables (Model) 
and the variance which is not explained by the independent variables (Residual or Error).   
2) DF - The degrees of freedom associated with the sources of variance.  The total variance 
has N-1 degrees of freedom.  In this case, N=39, so the DF for total is 38.  The model 
degrees of freedom correspond to the number of predictors minus 1 (K-1).  The intercept 
is automatically included in the model. Including the intercept, there are 9 predictors, so 
the model has 9-1= 8 degrees of freedom.  The Residual degree of freedom is the DF total 
minus the DF model, 38 - 8 is 30.  
3) Sum of Squares - The Sum of Squares associated with the three sources of variance, 
Total, Model and Residual. 
4) Mean Square - The Sum of Squares divided by their respective DF. 
5) F Value and Pr > F - The F-value is the Mean Square Model divided by the Mean Square 
Residual.  The p-value associated with this F value is displayed.  The p-value is 
compared to the alpha level (typically 0.05) and, if smaller, it can be concluded that the 
independent variables reliably predict the dependent variable.  If the p-value is greater 
than 0.05, it can be said that the group of independent variables does not show a 
statistically significant relationship with the dependent variable, or that the group of 
independent variables does not reliably predict the dependent variable. 
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6) Root MSE - Root MSE is the standard deviation of the error term, and is the square root 
of the Mean Square Residual (or Error). 
7) Dependent Mean - The mean of the dependent variable. 
8) Coeff Var - The coefficient of variation, which is a unit-less measure of variation in the 
data.  It is the root MSE divided by the mean of the dependent variable. 
9) R-Square - R-Square is the proportion of variance in the dependent variable (in-sourced 
cost) which can be predicted from the independent variables (the transaction cost factors 
and inverse mills ratio).  This value indicates that 68.65% of the variance in science 
scores can be predicted from the independent variables.   
10) Adj R-Sq - As predictors are added to the model, each predictor explains some of the 
variance in the dependent variable simply due to chance. The adjusted R-square attempts 
to yield a more honest value to estimate the R-squared for the population.   The value of 
R-square was 0.6865, while the value of Adjusted R-square was 0.6029. Adjusted R-
squared is computed using the formula 1 - ((1 - Rsq)((N - 1) / (N - k - 1)).   
Table 5.29 reports the results from the analysis of variance and the R – square value for the model 
constructed. 
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  Table 5.29 Analysis of Variance for the In-Sourced Cost Model 
 
The REG Procedure 
Model: MODEL1 
                           Dependent Variable: TOTAL_INSOURCED_COST 
 
                     Number of Observations Read                                  40 
                     Number of Observations Used                                  39 
                     Number of Observations with Missing Values           1 
 
 
         
Source DF 
Sum of 
Squares 
Mean Square 
Value F  Pr > F 
         
Model 8 5.900092E+11 73751145750 8.21 <.0001 
         
Error 30 2.694055E+11 8980184083     
         
Corrected 
Total 
38 8.594147E+11       
 
                  
Root MSE 94764 R-Square 0.6865 
                      
Dependent 
Mean 
139188 Adj R-Sq 0.6029 
                      
Coeff Var 68.08349     
 
5.11.2 Results of the In-Sourced Cost Model With Correction for Selection Bias 
 
Table 5.30 below reports the coefficients of the independent factors for the linear specification of 
the internal cost equation. The explanation for the terms and statistics found in this result are 
given below: 
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1) Variable - This column shows the predictor variables (the independent transaction cost 
factor).  The first variable represents the intercept. 
2) Label - This column gives the label for the variable.   
3) DF - This column give the degrees of freedom associated with each independent 
variable.   
4) Parameter Estimates - The values for the regression equation for predicting the dependent 
variable from the independent variable. The regression equation is presented in many 
different ways, for example: 
           Yp = a0 + a1*x1 + a2*x2 + a3*x3 + a4*x4+………….+aN*xN 
The column of estimates provides the values for a0, a1, a2, and so on for this equation.  
In this case, the regression equation is:  
TOTAL_INSOURCED_COST = 277864 + (-123102)*TEMPORAL + (-
71011)*PHYSICAL + 142950*HUMAN + (-98136)*CAPITAL + 
18113*COMPLEXITY + 53406*SIMILARITY + 160158*FREQUENCY + (-
335922)*LAMBDA 
5) Standard Error - The standard errors associated with the coefficients. The standard errors 
in this case are still biased, which shall be removed using the methodology detailed in 
section 5.11.3. 
6) t Value and Pr > |t|- These columns provide the t-value and 2 tailed p-value used in 
testing the null hypothesis that the coefficient/parameter is 0.  Coefficients having p-
values less than alpha are statistically significant.  
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Table 5.30 Parameter Estimates for the Independent Variables in the In-Sourced Cost 
Model 
 
Variable Label DF Parameter Estimate 
Standard 
Error 
t 
Value Pr > |t| 
 Intercept Intercept 1 277864 129379 2.15 0.0399 
 TEMPORAL TEMPORAL 1 -123102 22140 -5.56 <.0001 
 PHYSICAL PHYSICAL 1 -71011 67213 -1.06 0.2992 
 HUMAN HUMAN 1 142950 48164 2.97 0.0058 
 CAPITAL CAPITAL 1 -98136 34980 -2.81 0.0087 
 
COMPLEXITY COMPLEXITY    1 18113 45284 0.4 0.692 
 SIMILARITY SIMILARITY 1 53406 22626 2.36 0.025 
 FREQUENCY FREQUENCY 1 160158 27855 5.75 <.0001 
 LAMBDA1   1 -335922 139581 -2.41 0.0225 
 
5.11.3 Correcting the Standard Error Terms 
 
The above analysis produces unbiased parameter estimates for the independent variables. 
However, the standard estimates of these parameters are biased because of heteroskedasticity. 
The variance of the error term is not the same for each respondent. To correct the standard errors 
and get the unbiased estimates, the following additional steps have to be taken. 
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First, a command was added to the substantial regression analysis to save the residuals of the 
regression model in a new variable (which is called RES), as given below: 
 
PROC REG DATA=LAMBDA; 
MODEL TOTAL_INSOURCED_COST = temporal physical human capital complexity  
similarity frequency LAMBDA1; 
output out=INSOURCED_PRED predicted=PRED_IN_COST residual= RES; 
RUN; 
 
This variable must be squared: 
 
RES2 = RES*RES. 
 
Two other help variables must also be computed. The first one is the regression coefficient of the 
variable LAMBDA (the inverse mills ratio) in the OLS analysis, which is called LAMB. The 
second one is the number of cases used in the OLS regression, called N. The results for both are 
given below. 
 
LAMB=-335922. 
N=39. 
 
The variable RES2 and also DELTA, which was computed in the first part of the analysis, have to 
be summed over all cases. The values of the sum of these two variables are as given below. 
 
DELTAS1 = -19.4699. 
RESS = 2.694E11. 
Where, RESS and DELTAS1 are the sums of the residuals and the control factor DELTA, 
respectively. 
 
Now the corrected value of the variance (VARC) and the standard error (SEC) of the error term 
of the substantial equation can be estimated: 
 
VARC = RESS/N-LAMB*LAMB*DELTAS/N. 
  
113 
SEC = sqrt(VARC). 
 
Computation of RHO, the correlation between the error terms of the selection and substantial 
equations: 
 
RHO = sqrt(LAMB*LAMB/VARC). 
If (lamb<0) RHO = 0-RHO. 
 
Now the values of VARC, SEC and RHO can be computed, the values of which are noted in table 
5.31: 
 
Table 5.31 Values of Corrected Variance, Std. Error and Error Correlation 
 
The MEANS Procedure 
 
Variable N Value 
VARC 40 63242395246 
SEC 40 251480.41 
RHO 40 -1.335778 
          
Computation of the standard errors of the separate observations (RHOI) and transformation of the 
standard errors into weights (WGT): 
 
RHOI = sqrt(VARC+LAMB*LAMB*DELTA). 
WGT = 1/RHOI. 
Now the corrected standard errors can be computed by running the substantial analysis again, but 
this time as Weighted Least Squares (WLS) regression with WGT as weight: 
 
PROC REG DATA=INSOURCED_PRED; 
MODEL TOTAL_INSOURCED_COST = temporal physical human capital complexity  
similarity frequency LAMBDA1; 
weight WGT; 
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output out=INSOURCED_PRED_NEW predicted=PRED_IN_COST_NEW residual= 
RES_NEW; 
title 'CORRECTING HETEROSKEDASTICITY FOR COST MODEL'; 
RUN; 
 
The results of the new regression are as reported below in table 5.32. The term “weight” indicates 
that the variable “WGT” calculated above is used as a weight in this regression. 
 
Table 5.32 Results From Heteroskedasticity Correction 
 
CORRECTING HETEROSKEDASTICITY FOR COST MODEL 
 
The REG Procedure 
Model: MODEL1 
Dependent Variable: TOTAL_INSOURCED_COST 
 
Number of Observations Read 40 
Number of Observations Used 39 
Number of Observations with Missing Values 1 
Weight: WGT 
 
Analysis of Variance 
 
Source 
 
DF 
Sum of 
Squares 
Mean 
Square 
 
F Value 
 
Pr > F 
Model 8 4964233 620529 6.58 <.0001 
Error 30 2827930 94264 
Corrected 
Total 38 7792163  
 
 
Root MSE 307.025 R-Square 0.6371 
Dependent Mean 141982 Adj R-Sq 0.5403 
Coeff Var 0.21624   
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Table 5.32 (Continued) 
Parameter Estimates 
 
Variable Label DF Parameter Estimate 
Standard 
Error 
t 
Value Pr > |t| 
Intercept Intercept 1 196189 127481 1.54 0.1343 
TEMPORAL TEMPORAL 1 -105395 24307 -4.34 0.0002 
PHYSICAL PHYSICAL 1 -70407 75141 -0.94 0.3562 
HUMAN HUMAN 1 129803 55543 2.34 0.0263 
CAPITAL CAPITAL 1 -81541 40472 -2.01 0.053 
COMPLEXITY COMPLEXITY 1 25955 54356 0.48 0.6365 
SIMILARITY SIMILARITY 1 38124 25757 1.48 0.1493 
FREQUENCY FREQUENCY 1 149350 30494 4.9 <.0001 
LAMBDA1  1 -280786 163067 -1.72 0.0954 
 
By combining the parameter estimates of the substantial analysis with the standard errors of this 
WLS analysis, the Heckman procedure is completed. To indicate the explained variance R2 of the 
analysis, the R2 of the substantial analysis should be taken. Thus, combining the parameter 
estimates and R2 from the initial step and the corrected standard errors, we get the final results as 
shown in table 5.33. The standard errors given below have been corrected for heteroskedasticity 
and endogeneity of the selection correction index.  
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Table 5.33 Final Cost Model Results 
 
Variable Label DF Parameter Estimate 
Standard 
Error 
t 
Value Pr > |t| 
Intercept Intercept 1 277864 127481 2.15 0.0399 
TEMPORAL TEMPORAL 1 -123102 24307 -5.56 <.0001 
PHYSICAL PHYSICAL 1 -71011 75141 -1.06 0.2992 
HUMAN HUMAN 1 142950 55543 2.97 0.0058 
CAPITAL CAPITAL 1 -98136 40472 -2.81 0.0087 
COMPLEXITY COMPLEXITY 1 18113 54356 0.4 0.692 
SIMILARITY SIMILARITY 1 53406 25757 2.36 0.025 
FREQUENCY FREQUENCY 1 160158 30494 5.75 <.0001 
LAMBDA1  1 -335922 163067 -2.41 0.0225 
 
R2  = 0.6865 
 
5.11.4 Inference From the Internal Cost Equation 
 
The second stage results above from the internal organization cost model confirm and strengthen 
the predictions of the theory and the findings of the first stage selection model with regard to the 
effects of TCE factors on the sourcing decisions for health plans. 
 
The effect of temporal specificity (TEMPORAL) on the integration transaction costs is negative, 
as meaning that health plans will tend to reduce their transaction costs if DM programs that 
require stricter adherence to timing and scheduling  are built in–house rather than contracted. The 
significance of the factor indicates that the effect of this factor fosters integration through its 
effect on internal organization costs rather than by increasing the hazards of market exchange, as 
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noted by Masten et al. The effect of physical asset specificity (PHYSICAL) on the integration 
transaction costs is also negative, as meaning that health plans will tend to reduce their 
transaction costs if DM programs that require more specific tools and software  are integrated  
rather than outsourced. However, the coefficient on this factor is not significant, indicating that 
the principal effect of PHYSICAL on the integration decision derives from the hazards of market 
exchange. 
 
The cost coefficient of human asset specificity (HUMAN) is positive in the model, meaning that 
if DM programs requiring specific skills and knowledge from its employees are in-sourced, 
transaction costs for the health plan tend to rise. The second-stage estimates indicate that the 
correlation between the human asset specificity and the likelihood of integration is a consequence 
of the rise in internal organization costs, rather than decrease in costs of market exchange as the 
theory predicts. 
 
The coefficient of dedicated asset specificity (CAPITAL) is negative, meaning that if DM 
programs requiring greater investments unique to the program are in-sourced, transaction costs 
for the health plan tend to decrease. The significance of the factor again indicates that the effect 
of this factor fosters integration through its effect on internal organization costs rather than by 
increasing the hazards of market exchange, as with the factors for temporal and human asset 
specificity. 
 
The effect of uncertainty (COMPLEXITY) is positive, meaning that DM programs for which 
effectiveness and performance measurement are more difficult should be outsourced by health 
plans in order to reduce their incurred transaction costs. The coefficient on this factor is not 
significant, indicating that the principal effect of uncertainty on the integration decision derives 
from the hazards of market exchange. The effect of similarity (SIMILARITY) on the in-sourced 
transaction cost is also positive, meaning that if DM programs similar to the ones the health plan 
may be involved in are integrated, transaction costs for the health plan tend to rise. Unlike 
complexity, this factor is also significant, indicating that the effect of this factor fosters 
integration through its effect on internal organization costs rather than by increasing the hazards 
of market exchange. 
 
  
118 
Finally, the effect of frequency (FREQUENCY) in the in-sourced transaction cost model is 
positive, meaning that if DM programs health plans risk increasing their incurred transaction 
costs if they integrate DM programs requiring a high frequency of contact with the individuals 
enrolled in the program. The significance of the factor indicates that the effect of this factor 
fosters integration through its effect on internal organization costs, and not by increasing the 
hazards of market exchange. 
 
The second stage findings confirm and strengthen the findings of the first stage estimation with 
regards to the transaction cost factors. In addition, we can deduce that the factors similarity, 
temporal, human, capital and frequency have their primary effect on the internal organization 
costs rather than on market costs as the theory suggests, whereas the factors complexity and 
physical act principally on the costs of market exchange. Thus, from the above, it is seen that 
hypothesis 2 stated in section 3.3 is satisfied. 
5.12 Comparison of First and Second Stage Results 
 
Table 5.34 presents a comparison between the coefficients obtained for the independent variables 
from the selection and the substantial equation. A side by side comparison of the parameter 
coefficients obtained from the first and second stage parameter coefficients establishes the fact 
that the effect of the transaction cost factors is captured both in terms of effect on organizational 
form and in terms of costs in the case of health plans. 
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Table 5.34 Comparison of Selection and Substantial Model Coefficients 
 
Estimate 
Parameter DF 
First stage 
Second stage 
cost estimate 
Intercept 1 
1.6295 
(0.3276) 
277864          
(0.0399) 
TEMPORAL 1 
0.0476 
(0.8270) 
-123102          
(<.0001) 
PHYSICAL 1 
0.6327 
(0.0144) 
-71011          
(0.2992) 
HUMAN 1 
-0.5188 
(0.0377) 
142950          
(0.0058) 
CAPITAL 1 
0.5214 
(0.0040) 
-98136          
(0.0087) 
COMPLEXITY 1 
-0.6031 
(0.0120) 
18113                
(0.6920) 
SIMILARITY 1 
-0.2788 
(0.0491) 
53406                
(0.0250) 
FREQUENCY 1 
-0.1736 
(0.4469) 
160158          
(<.0001) 
UNCERTAINTY 1 
-0.067 
(0.7471) 
 
LAMBDA 
(inverse mills 
ratio) 
1  
-335922         
(0.0225) 
Pr>Chisq statistics in parenthesis 
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5.13 Comparison of Actual and Predicted In-Sourced Costs 
 
In order to determine the accuracy and effectiveness of the model, we need to check the means 
and statistics of the predicted costs with the actual recorded values. Table 5.35 presents the means 
for both the actual and predicted costs, while table 5.36 reports the predicted value and the error 
for a sub-sample of the in-sourced set.  
5.13.1 Means for the Actual and Predicted In-Sourced Costs 
 
From table 5.35, the mean, standard deviation and the minimum and maximum values for the 
actual and predicted in-sourced costs can be inferred. The variable “total_insourced_cost” is the 
actual transaction cost of setting up and maintaining a disease management program in-house, 
whereas the variable “pred_in_cost” is the predicted cost produced by the second stage regression 
model as detailed in the earlier section.  
 
Table 5.35 Means and Statistics for Actual and Predicted In-Sourced Costs 
 
Variable N Mean Std Dev 
TOTAL_INSOURCED_COST 40 135708 150068.67 
 PRED_IN_COST 39 139187.69 124605.61 
  
  Variable Minimum Maximum 
TOTAL_INSOURCED_COST 0 691200 
  PRED_IN_COST -52659.15 585426.79 
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5.13.2 Comparison of Actual and Predicted Costs for Sub-Sample of Data 
 
Presented below in table 5.36 is a sub-sample of the integrated subset from which the prediction 
accuracy can be determined. Also calculated is the prediction error, which is also reported for the 
chosen subset. The error for each case is calculated as the (actual cost- predicted cost)/(actual 
cost)*100.  
 
Table 5.36 Comparison Between Actual and Predicted Costs for Sub-Sample of Data  
 
Organization Disease 
ACTUAL 
COST ($) 
PREDICTED 
COST ($) 
ERROR (%) 
Florida Health Care 
Plans 
Other:  
Hypertension 
178,560 192,234.7674 -7.658359877 
Partners 
HealthCare 
Congestive Heart 
Failure (CHF) 
691,200 585,426.7885 15.30283731 
Health Alliance 
Plan 
Diabetes 376,800 294,539.1615 21.83143271 
Ault International 
Medical 
Management, LLC 
Other:  all chronic 
health conditions 
288,000 209,266.0364 27.33818179 
Memphis Managed 
Care Corp 
Diabetes 333,600 216,655.5245 35.05529842 
 
5.13.3 Rolling Up the Costs for Each Organization in the In-Sourced Subset 
 
Since most organizations in the integrated subset have multiple DM programs, we can combine 
the costs for each program to get a total value for each organization. Table 5.37 presents the 
means of the total costs (actual and predicted) for each organization. The variable 
“sum_actual_in_costs” represents the sum of the integrated costs for each disease management 
program offered by a particular health plan. The second variable (sum_pred_in_cost) is the sum 
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of the predicted in-house costs for each disease management program that were obtained from the 
second stage cost model for each given organization. 
  
Table 5.37 Rolling Up the Costs for Each Organization in the Integrated Subset 
 
The MEANS Procedure 
Variable N Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum 
SUM_ACTUAL_IN_COST 16 339270 386307.2 0 1507200 
SUM_PRED_IN_COST 15 361888 322802.46 -263295.75 981298.71 
 
5.14 Creating the Log Specification Model for the In-Sourced Costs 
 
From above we see that the predicted costs are negative for a few data points. In order to 
constrain them in the positive direction and also to provide a better fit to the data, the log 
specification of the model to predict the in-sourced costs of a single DM program is taken. The 
results are as below: 
5.14.1 Running the Model 
 
For this case, the log value of the recorded transaction costs is calculated and used as the 
dependent variable, whereas the seven independent transaction cost factors and the inverse mills 
ratio (lambda) are kept unchanged and used as the independent variables for the following model.  
The SAS commands for this stage are given below. 
 
DATA LAMBDA_LOG; 
SET LAMBDA; 
IF TOTAL_INSOURCED_COST ^= 0 THEN TOTAL_INSOURCED_COST_LOG = 
LOG(TOTAL_INSOURCED_COST); 
RUN;  
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The data set “lambda” is the data set that was originally used to construct the second stage cost 
model for the in-source subset.  The log value of the actual costs are now used as the dependent 
variable, whereas the transaction cost factors and the inverse mills ratio are used as the 
independent factors as before. The “predicted” command produces the predicted value of the 
costs and stores it in the variable “pred_in_cost_log” in the new data set called 
“insourced_pred_log”. 
 
PROC REG DATA=LAMBDA_LOG; 
MODEL TOTAL_INSOURCED_COST_LOG = temporal physical human capital complexity  
similarity frequency LAMBDA1; 
output out=INSOURCED_PRED_LOG predicted=PRED_IN_COST_LOG; 
RUN; 
 
The results have been reported in table 5.38, and contain the same terms and statistics as 
explained in section 5.11.1. There is one observation that has missing data, which is removed, as 
in the earlier case and can be seen in the results below.  
 
Table 5.38 Analysis of Variance for Log Specification of In-Sourced Cost Model 
        
The REG Procedure 
Model: MODEL1 
Dependent Variable: TOTAL_INSOURCED_COST_LOG 
 
                     Number of Observations Read                                  40 
                     Number of Observations Used                                  39 
                     Number of Observations with Missing Values           1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
124 
Table 5.38 (Continued) 
 
Analysis of Variance 
Source DF Sum of Squares 
Mean 
Square F Value Pr > F 
Model 8 45.82037 5.72755 26.71 <.0001 
Error 30 6.43346 0.21445   
Corrected 
Total 38 52.25382    
 
 
Root MSE 0.46309 R-Square 0.8769 
Dependent 
Mean 11.26964 
Adj R-
Sq 0.844 
Coeff Var 4.10915     
 
5.14.2 Results of the Log Specification In-Sourced Cost Model 
 
Table 5.39 reports the coefficients for the log specification of the internal cost model. For an 
explanation of the terms please see section 5.11.2. 
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Table 5.39 Parameter Estimates for the In-Sourced Log Specification Model 
 
Variable Label DF Parameter    Estimate 
Standard 
Error 
t 
Value Pr > |t| 
Intercept Intercept 1 12.64238 0.63224 20 <.0001 
TEMPORAL TEMPORAL 1 -1.04877 0.10819 -9.69 <.0001 
PHYSICAL PHYSICAL 1 -1.4895 0.32845 -4.53 <.0001 
HUMAN HUMAN 1 1.58807 0.23536 6.75 <.0001 
CAPITAL CAPITAL 1 -0.50171 0.17094 -2.93 0.0063 
COMPLEXITY COMPLEXITY 1 0.61511 0.22129 2.78 0.0093 
SIMILARITY SIMILARITY 1 0.54914 0.11057 4.97 <.0001 
FREQUENCY FREQUENCY 1 0.99731 0.13612 7.33 <.0001 
LAMBDA1  1 -3.33719 0.6821 -4.89 <.0001 
 
5.14.3 Correcting the Standard Errors for the Log Spec Model 
 
As before, this analysis produces unbiased parameter estimates for the independent variables. 
However, the standard estimates of these parameters are again biased because of 
heteroskedasticity, and the variance of the error term is not the same for each respondent. To 
correct the standard errors and get the unbiased estimates, we follow the same steps as outlined in 
section 5.11.3. 
 
The values for the variables RESS and DELTAS1 and the corrected value of the variance 
(VARC), the standard error (SEC) of the error term of the substantial equation, and RHO, the 
correlation between the error terms of the selection and substantial equations is as calculated as 
before and is as shown below, and the values for the corrected variance, standard error and 
correlation are noted in table 5.40: 
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DELTAS1 = -19.4699 
RESS = 6.433455 
 
Table 5.40 Log Specification Corrected Variance, Std. Error and Error Correlation  
 
The MEANS Procedure 
 
Variable N Value 
VARC 40 5.7247836 
SEC 40 2.392652 
RHO 40 -1.3947661 
 
Computation of the standard errors of the separate observations (RHOI) and transformation of the 
standard errors into weights (WGT): 
 
RHOI = sqrt(VARC+LAMB*LAMB*DELTA). 
WGT = 1/RHOI. 
 
Now the substantial analysis is run again, with the computed weights (WGT) as weight. The 
results of the new regression are as reported below in table 5.41. 
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Table 5.41 Log Spec Heteroskedasticity Correction Results 
 
Number of Observations Read 40 
Number of Observations Used 39 
Number of Observations with Missing Values 1 
Weight: WGT 
 
Analysis of Variance 
Source DF Sum of Squares 
Mean 
Square F Value Pr > F 
Model 8 38.31308 4.78914 24.4 <.0001 
Error 30 5.88712 0.19624 
Corrected 
Total 38 44.20021  
 
 
Root MSE 0.44299 R-Square 0.8668 
Dependent Mean 11.28769 Adj R-Sq 0.8313 
Coeff Var 3.92451   
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Table 5.41 (Continued) 
 
Parameter Estimates 
 
 
Variable 
 
Label 
 
DF 
Parameter 
Estimate 
Standard 
Error 
 
t 
Value 
 
Pr > |t| 
Intercept Intercept 1 12.48772 0.59526 20.98 <.0001 
TEMPORAL TEMPORAL 1 -1.00912 0.11035 -9.14 <.0001 
PHYSICAL PHYSICAL 1 -1.38213 0.34778 -3.97 0.0004 
HUMAN HUMAN 1 1.53842 0.25731 5.98 <.0001 
CAPITAL CAPITAL 1 -0.47016 0.18438 -2.55 0.0161 
COMPLEXITY COMPLEXITY 1 0.55885 0.24576 2.27 0.0303 
SIMILARITY SIMILARITY 1 0.53643 0.12081 4.44 0.0001 
FREQUENCY FREQUENCY 1 0.92685 0.13861 6.69 <.0001 
LAMBDA1  1 -3.13836 0.75417 -4.16 0.0002 
 
Now combining the parameter estimates of the substantial analysis with the standard errors of this 
WLS analysis, the Heckman procedure is completed. Thus, combining the parameter estimates 
and R2 from the initial step and the standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity and 
endogeneity of the selection correction index, the final results as shown below in table 5.42. 
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Table 5.42 Final Log Spec Cost Model Results 
 
Variable Label DF Parameter    Estimate 
Standard 
Error 
t 
Value Pr > |t| 
Intercept Intercept 1 12.64238 0.59526 20 <.0001 
TEMPORAL TEMPORAL 1 -1.04877 0.11035 -9.69 <.0001 
PHYSICAL PHYSICAL 1 -1.4895 0.34778 -4.53 <.0001 
HUMAN HUMAN 1 1.58807 0.25731 6.75 <.0001 
CAPITAL CAPITAL 1 -0.50171 0.18438 -2.93 0.0063 
COMPLEXITY COMPLEXITY 1 0.61511 0.24576 2.78 0.0093 
SIMILARITY SIMILARITY 1 0.54914 0.12081 4.97 <.0001 
FREQUENCY FREQUENCY 1 0.99731 0.13861 7.33 <.0001 
LAMBDA1  1 -3.33719 0.75417 -4.89 <.0001 
 
R2  = 0.876 
 
5.15 Comparison of Actual and Predicted In-Sourced Costs 
 
The predicted costs for the log specification of the cost model are obtained by taking the 
exponential of the predicted values obtained from the results as detailed in section 5.14.2.  
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From the above model, the predicted values of the in-sourced TCE costs are calculated again, 
along with the prediction error which is given as: ((actual cost- predicted cost)/ actual cost) * 100, 
with the variable name “error_act”. The results are as given below. The SAS commands are as 
follows: 
 
DATA INSOURCED_PRED_LOG; 
SET INSOURCED_PRED_LOG; 
PRED_IN_COST_NEW = EXP(PRED_IN_COST_LOG); 
ERROR1_ACT = ((TOTAL_INSOURCED_COST - 
PRED_IN_COST_NEW)/TOTAL_INSOURCED_COST)* 100; 
RUN; 
 
PROC MEANS DATA  = INSOURCED_PRED_LOG; 
VAR TOTAL_INSOURCED_COST  PRED_IN_COST_NEW PRED_IN_COST_LOG 
ERROR1_ACT ; 
TITLE 'MEANS FOR WHOLE IN-SOURCED ORGANIZATION SET - LOG SPEC'; 
RUN; 
5.15.1 Means for the Actual and Predicted In-Sourced Costs From the Log Specification               
Model 
 
The means, standard deviation and minimum and maximum values of the actual and predicted 
costs from the log specification of the model produced by the SAS commands stated above are 
presented in table 5.43 along with the statistics for the prediction error. 
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Table 5.43 Means and Statistics for Actual and Predicted In-Sourced Costs From the Log 
Specification Model 
 
The MEANS Procedure 
Variable N Mean 
TOTAL_INSOURCED_COST 40 135708 
PRED_IN_COST_NEW 39 135799.25 
PRED_IN_COST_LOG 39 11.2696393 
ERROR1_ACT 39 -7.0213513 
  
Variable Std Dev Minimum Maximum  
TOTAL_INSOURCED_COST 150068.67 0 691200 
PRED_IN_COST_NEW 172988.02 9474.78 867799.57 
PRED_IN_COST_LOG 1.0980889 9.1563888 13.6737161 
ERROR1_ACT 34.8613776 -103.8299626 72.7442827 
 
Looking at the means of the actual and the predicted in-sourced costs, we see that the log 
specification of the model does a better job of cost prediction. The mean error is -7.102% which 
is a small value. We also see that all the predicted costs are constrained in the positive direction 
as required. 
 
Comparing the predictions and errors of the sub-sample of in-sourced programs given below and 
the means of the predictions and errors from above, we see that the log specification model 
provides better cost estimates for the data provided. 
5.15.2 Comparison of Actual and Predicted Costs for Sub-Sample of Data From the Log 
Specification Model 
 
The increased accuracy and effectiveness of the log specification of the cost model can be seen 
from table 5.44, where a comparison of the predicted costs and associated errors can be made for 
a sub-sample of the data. 
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Table 5.44 Comparison of Actual and Predicted Costs for Sub-Sample of Data From the 
Log Specification Model 
 
Organization 
TOTAL_IN_COST 
($) (Actual 
Measured Cost) 
PRED 
COST from 
log spec ($) 
PRED COST 
from normal 
reg ($) 
ERROR 
from log 
spec (%) 
ERROR 
from 
normal 
reg (%) 
QualChoice 84960 84292.11017 118441.2832 0.786123 -39.4083 
Memphis 
Managed 
Care Corp 
333600 205669.8881 216655.5245 38.34835 35.0553 
Health 
Alliance Plan 
376800 271550.8577 226399.5965 27.93236 39.91518 
IMS 
Managed 
Care, Inc. 
37440 44010.33494 49318.03133 -17.54897 -31.7255 
CareGuide, 
Inc. 
52320 57981.23142 95784.32581 -10.8204 -83.074 
 
5.15.3 Combined Actual Cost, Combined Predicted Cost and Combined Error Estimate 
Using the Log Specification of the Cost Model 
 
As in the linear specification, we can sum up the integrated costs for the various DM programs of 
each firm and provide a total estimate for each organization. Table 5.45 presents the means and 
other statistics for the costs, while table 5.46 presents the costs calculated for the whole integrated 
subset. The variable “sum_actual_in_cost_log” is the summation of the actual in-house costs for 
each responding health plan, while the second variable. “sum_pred_in_cost_log” is the total of 
the predicted in-sourced costs for each of the health plans in the integrated subset of the data. The 
variable “error_act” is the prediction error at the health plan level calculated as detailed in section 
5.15.  
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Table 5.45 Summing Up the Actual and Predicted Costs and the Error Estimate for Each 
Organization  
 
The MEANS Procedure 
Variable N Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum 
SUM_ACTUAL_IN_ 
COST_LOG 16 339,270.00 386,307.20 0 1,507,200.00 
SUM_PRED_IN_ 
COST_LOG 15 353,078.06 382,246.54 47,373.90 1,425,801.08 
ERROR_ACT 15 -3.5859624 41.549059 -103.829962 70.2153988 
 
5.15.4 Cost and Error Estimates for the Whole In-Sourced Subset using the Log 
Specification of the Cost Model 
 
The whole integrated subset along with the actual and predicted costs obtained from the log 
specification of the in-sourced cost model and the error, both summed up at the organization level 
are as reported below in table 5.46. 
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Table 5.46 Cost and Error Estimates for the Full In-Sourced Subset From the Log 
Specification Model 
Organization 
Number  
of DM 
programs 
SUM of 
Actual TCE costs ($) 
SUM of 
predicted 
TCE costs ($) 
ERROR (%) 
Healthy Futures, Inc 1 86400 176109.0877 -103.8299626 
HealthPartners 2 244800 376669.232 -53.86815032 
Partners HealthCare 1 691200 867799.5654 -25.54970564 
Miller & Huffman 
Outcome Architects, 
LLC 
2 108000 133761.615 -23.85334724 
IMS Managed Care, 
Inc. 
5 187200 220051.6747 -17.54897152 
CareGuide, Inc. 5 261600 289906.1571 -10.82039644 
Solucia Inc 5 43200 47373.89726 -9.661799223 
QualChoice 5 424800 421460.5509 0.786122679 
Health Alliance Plan 4 1507200 1425801.083 5.400671268 
Mountain States 
Home Care 
1 77760 71412.70046 8.162679445 
Contra Costa Health 
Plan 
1 119040 108339.5013 8.988994183 
Florida Health Care 
Plans 
4 839520 734717.5781 12.48361229 
Memphis Managed 
Care Corp 
1 333600 205669.8881 38.34835489 
Ault International 
Medical 
Management, LLC 
1 288000 152763.6563 46.95706377 
Quality First 
Healthcare, Inc. 
1 216000 64334.73854 70.21539882 
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5.15.5 Comparison of Coefficients From the Regular and Log Specification of the In-
Sourced Cost Model 
 
Presented below in table 5.47 is a comparison between the coefficients of the independent 
transaction cost variables from both the linear and log specification of the models.  
 
Table 5.47 Coefficient Comparison Between Standard and Log Specification of the Cost 
Model 
 
Estimate 
Parameter DF 
First stage regression Log specification regression 
277864 12.64238 
Intercept 1 
(2.15) (20.00) 
-123102 -1.04877 
TEMPORAL 1 
(-5.56) (-9.69) 
-71011 -1.4895 
PHYSICAL 1 
(-1.06) (-4.53) 
142950 1.58807 
HUMAN 1 
(2.97) (6.75) 
-98136 -0.50171 
CAPITAL 1 
(-2.81) (-2.93) 
18113 0.61511 
COMPLEXITY 1 
(0.4) (2.78) 
53406 0.54914 
SIMILARITY 1 
(2.36) (4.97) 
160158 0.99731 
FREQUENCY 1 
(5.75) (7.33) 
-335922 -3.33719 LAMBDA 
(inverse mills 
ratio) 
1 
(-2.41) (-4.89) 
t – Statistics in parenthesis 
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It can be seen that the log specification of the model preserves the effect of the transaction cost 
factors on the in-house costs obtained from the linear specification of the integrated cost model, 
however, as seen from the previous sections, it also produces a better fit for the data (R2  = 0.876 
as compared to 0.6865) and constrains the predicted costs in the positive direction.  
5.15.6 Comparison of Summed Actual and Predicted Costs From the Regular and Log 
Specification of the In-Sourced Cost Model 
 
Comparison of the rolled up actual and predicted costs by the normal and the log specification of 
the model are as shown below in table 5.48. This table provides a side by side representation of 
the major statistics and means obtained by the normal/linear specification of the cost model with 
the actual in-house costs recorded. The first row presents the actual costs, while the second row 
reports the predicted costs obtained via the two separate methods. 
 
Table 5.48 Comparison of Costs From the Standard and Log Specification of the Cost 
Model  
 
Variab
le N STD DEV ($) MIN ($) MAX ($) 
MEAN 
($) 
 
Std 
Re
g 
Log 
Spec 
Std 
Reg 
Log 
Spec 
Std 
Reg 
Log 
Spec 
Std 
Reg 
Log 
Spec 
Std 
Reg 
Lo
g 
Spe
c 
SUM 
OF 
ACTU
AL 
COST
S 
16 16 386307
.2 386307.2 0 0 
1507
200 
15072
00 
339
270 
3
3
9
2
7
0 
SUM 
OF 
PRED 
COST
S 
15 15 322802
.5 
382246.5
4 
-
2632
96 
4737
3.9 
9812
98.7 
14258
01.1 
361
888 
353
078
.06 
 Error 9.65 % 
-
3.5
8% 
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We see that the log specification model does a good job of TCE cost prediction for the in-sourced 
subset. Thus, using both the selection and the log specification of the in-house model in tandem, 
the most appropriate organization form for a particular DM program and the associated costs for 
the program if it were to be integrated by the health plan can be accurately determined for the 
consideration of the management and decision makers.  
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Chapter 6. Conclusions and Future Research 
 
This chapter includes the conclusion to this research and presents directions for further research. 
Section 6.1 provides the conclusions drawn from the research. In Section 6.2, the use of 
organizational form and cost analysis and prediction using transaction cost economics as a 
decision making tool is presented. Section 6.3 provides the directions for future research in this 
area. 
 
6.1 Conclusions 
 
In the preceding research, we have applied predictive modeling and switching regression 
techniques to the sourcing decision problem of disease management programs in health plans to 
determine the factors most heavily influencing this decision and the transaction costs associated 
with the decision. The results support the hypothesis that transaction cost factors play a major role 
in determining the organizational form adopted by a health plan for such programs. For the cases 
that were studied, and from the results of the probit models, one of the principal findings is that 
while we see that integration becomes more likely as the importance of scheduling increases, 
temporal specificity is not a significant factor in determining organizational form, as has been 
found to be the case in other industries. This effect may be due to the fact that while delays in 
scheduling do have an impact on the transaction costs experienced by the firm, DM programs do 
not exhibit the phenomena where the delay in one part of the program or task can reverberate and 
cause delays throughout the rest of the project, as is seen in other industries such as automotive 
and shipbuilding industries. We also see that the factors for physical asset specificity, human 
asset specificity, uncertainty and dedicated asset specificity play a vital role in determining the 
form adopted by the organization. The results provide evidence that integration becomes more 
probable in the presence of relationship specific physical assets and tools and for capital 
investment that is specific to that task, service or program. 
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It is seen that the effect of human asset specificity is the opposite, that is, programs that require 
more specific skills or knowledge are more likely to be contracted rather than built in–house. In 
addition, it is seen that organizations tend to outsource programs that are similar to the ones they 
already have in operation and those that may have a high degree of uncertainty in their 
performance and effectiveness measurement.  The most important findings of this stage are that 
temporal specificity does not play as major a role as hypothesized in disease management 
programs, whereas the transaction cost factors physical asset specificity, dedicated asset 
specificity and uncertainty are major factors in deciding the organizational form chosen by a 
health plan for a particular disease management program.   
Finally, the model to predict the in-sourced costs for DM programs is constructed. The results 
indicate that the factors for temporal specificity, human asset specificity, dedicated assets and 
similarity exert their influence on the costs of internal organization, whereas the primary effect of 
physical asset specificity and uncertainty is predominantly on market costs and not on the costs of 
internal organization. 
6.2 Organizational Form and Cost Analysis and Prediction as a Decision Making Tool 
 
Transaction costs are unique in the fact that unlike other costs incurred such as direct and 
overhead costs, transaction costs are not recorded or measured. However, as has been shown in 
this research, the costs are significant, and the efficiency and effectiveness of the disease 
management program can be greatly improved by minimizing the effect of these factors, while 
improving the profitability of the organization. The prediction results from TCE models can be 
used as a decision making tool by management executives of health plans. The decision variables 
in this approach are the organization form and the predicted costs. Depending on the organization 
and management of the health plan, the type of disease management program planned and the 
levels of the various TCE factors, the executives can decide the values for the above mentioned 
variables and feed that into the models, which would provide them with the organization form to 
be used in that case and also the in-sourced costs for that program. Thus, a decision can be made 
whether to integrate or contract the program in order to minimize the transaction costs incurred. 
For example, a health plan that has contracted one or more of its DM programs may find that the 
transaction costs can be reduced if the programs were to be integrated. Whereas, the transaction 
costs for a DM program that has been built in-house may be calculated using our models, and if 
the associated costs can be reduced by contracting to an external DMO, that option can be 
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exercised by the health plan. Thus, for a highly competitive industry such as health insurance, 
reducing transaction costs associated with DM programs can give health plans a competitive edge 
in the market and improve the management and profitability for this facet of its services 
considerably.  In most cases, the decision makers would want to select the form such that both 
matches their organizational and management objectives as well as minimizes the transaction 
costs. 
 
Concluding, this research presents a decision making approach for planning the setup and 
management procedures for use by planning and management executives in health plans. The 
importance of internal organization costs distinct from that of market transaction costs suggests 
that analyses of integration decisions should encompass costs of organizing within as well as in 
between firms, rather than focusing only on market transaction costs, as prevalent economic 
theory suggests. Based on the levels of the various factors and the possible impact, the planners 
can make a choice in selecting the form that best fulfils their objectives and minimizes the costs. 
This is a general approach and can be applied to any health plan and its DM programs for form 
and cost prediction. 
6.3 Future Work 
 
Even though the sample size on which the models are built is 93 observations, it captures most of 
the facets of the disease management industry. Hence, the methodology used to study these 
observations can be extended to much larger sample sizes covering hundreds of health plans and 
DM programs. Increasing the sample size will potentially further strengthen the predictive 
capabilities of the form and cost models. The present study was conducted with a small number 
of observations in a relatively new industry. In addition to the unique features of disease 
management programs, the tasks and services in this industry are also influenced by government 
and federal regulations, which can be taken into account by constructing new proxies for these 
factors. Also, the independent transaction cost variables are imprecise proxies for the variables of 
true interest, hence there is a need for the refinement of these variables and for new proxies that 
permit cross firm and most ideally cross industry comparisons of transaction cost factors and 
costs. Further, since only data on the internal organization costs were accurately measurable, the 
burden of estimating the internal cost model was heavily dependent on the integrated subset of 
the total data set.  
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A decision support software can also be developed for a general purpose use by management 
executives and planners in health plans and government health agencies. The proposed software 
would have a graphical user interface with input screens to allow users to feed the transaction cost 
factor levels for any disease management program. Depending on the input the software will run 
the two models and provide the ideal organization form and the transaction costs for the in–
sourced form of the program for the consideration of the management.  
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Appendix A. SAS Code 
  
/******************IMPORTING ****************************************/ 
/*****************THE DATA SET**********************************/ 
/***************************************************************/ 
 
proc import datafile=" C:\Documents and Settings\nchandav\Desktop\SURVEY.xls" 
out=SURVEY replace; 
run; 
 
/******************"SURVEY" IS RAW DATA 
SET*****************************************/ 
/*****************************************************************************
*****/ 
 
data survey1; 
set survey; 
if form = 'In-sourced/Integrated' then DEP = 1; 
else if form = 'Outsourced' then DEP = 0; 
run; 
 
data survey2  ; 
set survey1; 
if DEP in (0,1); 
run; 
 
/**********GETTING RELEVANT FREQUENCIES*** 
************************************/ 
 
proc freq data = survey2; 
tables DEP form temporal physical human capital complexity  
similarity frequency uncertainty ORGANIZATION DISEASE/ 
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norow nocol nopercent; 
TITLE 'Responding organizations and number of respective responses'; 
run; 
 
/**********CHECKING CORRELATION BETWEEN ALL 9 VARIABLES IN FULL DATA 
SET*****************/ 
 
proc CORR data = survey2; 
VAR DEP temporal physical human capital complexity  
similarity frequency uncertainty ; 
TITLE 'Means and correlations for all variables'; 
run; 
 
/* PICK 80 RANDOM DATA POINTS FOR TRAINING SET*/ 
 
data SURVEY3 (DROP = address email position email telephone nr date name); 
set survey2; 
x = ranuni(4546654); 
run; 
 
proc sort data = SURVEY3; by x; run; 
 
data TRAINING VALIDATION; 
set SURVEY3; 
if _n_ <= 80 THEN OUTPUT TRAINING; 
ELSE OUTPUT VALIDATION; 
run; 
 
DATA TRAINING; 
SET TRAINING; 
TYPE = 'TRAINING'; 
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RUN; 
 
PROC FREQ DATA = TRAINING; 
TABLES DEP; 
TITLE 'Frequencies for the training set'; 
RUN; 
 
DATA VALIDATION; 
SET VALIDATION; 
TYPE = 'VALIDATION'; 
ACTUAL_FORM  = DEP; 
RUN; 
 
PROC FREQ DATA = VALIDATION; 
TABLES ACTUAL_FORM; 
TITLE 'Frequencies for the validation set'; 
RUN; 
 
DATA VALIDATION (DROP = DEP); 
SET VALIDATION; 
RUN; 
 
/* BUILDING THE MODEL WITH THE TRAINING SET*/ 
 
proc logistic data=TRAINING descending; 
model DEP = temporal physical human capital complexity  
similarity frequency uncertainty/LINK=PROBIT ctable 
pprob=(0.05 to 1 by 0.05); 
output out=prob XBETA= g predicted=phat; 
TITLE 'FIRST STAGE SELECTION MODEL'; 
  run; 
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DATA COMBINED; 
SET TRAINING VALIDATION; 
RUN; 
 
/* RUNNING THE MODEL WITH THE COMBINED SET*/ 
 
proc logistic data=COMBINED descending; 
  model DEP = temporal physical human capital complexity  
similarity frequency uncertainty/LINK=PROBIT ; 
output out=prob2 XBETA= g2 predicted=phat2; 
TITLE 'FIRST STAGE SELECTION MODEL FOR COMBINED DATA SET'; 
  run; 
 
 
DATA PROB2; 
SET PROB2; 
IF PHAT2 >= 0.55 THEN PRED_FORM = 1; 
ELSE PRED_FORM = 0; 
RUN; 
 
/**********CHECKING CLASSIFICATION OF TRAINING 
SET***************************************/ 
 
PROC FREQ DATA = PROB2; 
TABLES PRED_FORM*DEP/ 
norow nocol nopercent; 
TITLE 'Classification table for Training set'; 
RUN; 
 
/**********CHECKING CLASSIFICATION OF VALIDATION 
SET***************************************/ 
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PROC FREQ DATA = PROB2; 
TABLES PRED_FORM*ACTUAL_FORM/ 
norow nocol nopercent; 
TITLE 'Classification table for validation set'; 
RUN; 
 
 
/**********STEP – I-b ***************************************/ 
/**********2ND CASE FOR MODEL *************************************/ 
/**********TRAINING VALIDADATION FOR LOGISTIC PROBIT**************/ 
/**********WITH FACTOR UNCERTAINTY REMOVED***********************/ 
 
proc logistic data=TRAINING descending; 
model DEP = temporal physical human capital complexity  
similarity frequency/LINK=PROBIT ctable 
pprob=(0.05 to 1 by 0.05); 
output out=prob_NO_UNCERT XBETA= g_NO_UNCERT predicted=phat_NO_UNCERT; 
TITLE 'FIRST STAGE SELECTION MODEL WITH NO UNCERTAINTY'; 
run; 
 
DATA COMBINED_NO_UNCERT; 
SET TRAINING VALIDATION; 
RUN; 
 
 
proc logistic data=COMBINED_NO_UNCERT descending; 
  model DEP = temporal physical human capital complexity  
similarity frequency /LINK=PROBIT ; 
output out=prob2_NO_UNCERT XBETA= g2_NO_UNCERT predicted=phat2_NO_UNCERT; 
TITLE 'FIRST STAGE SELECTION MODEL FOR COMBINED DATA SET WITH NO 
UNCERTAINTY'; 
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run; 
 
DATA PROB2_NO_UNCERT; 
SET PROB2_NO_UNCERT; 
IF PHAT2_NO_UNCERT >= 0.55 THEN PRED_FORM = 1; 
ELSE PRED_FORM = 0; 
RUN; 
 
/**********CHECKING CLASSIFICATION OF TRAINING 
SET***************************************/ 
 
PROC FREQ DATA = PROB2_NO_UNCERT; 
TABLES PRED_FORM*DEP/ 
norow nocol nopercent; 
TITLE 'Classification table for training set'; 
RUN; 
 
/**********CHECKING CLASSIFICATION OF VALIDATION 
SET***************************************/ 
 
PROC FREQ DATA = PROB2_NO_UNCERT; 
TABLES PRED_FORM*ACTUAL_FORM/ 
norow nocol nopercent; 
TITLE 'Classification table for validation set'; 
RUN; 
 
 
/**********PART II ************************************************/ 
/*********CALCULATION OF IN-SOURCED AND ******************************/ 
/**********OUTSOURCED COSTS **************************************/ 
/********** ($60 HOURLY RATE) ***************************************/ 
  
156 
Appendix A (Continued) 
 
data COMBINED2; 
set PROB2; 
IF ACTUAL_FORM ^= . THEN DEP = ACTUAL_FORM; 
RUN; 
 
data insourced2; 
set COMBINED2; 
if (dep = 1); 
 
INSOURCED_ADMIN_COST = STARTUP_TIME_INSOURCED_DAYS*8*60; 
 
if INSOURCED_ADMIN_COST = . then INSOURCED_ADMIN_COST = 0; 
 
SEARCH_INFO_COST = SEARCH_INFO_TIME_DAYS*8*60; 
 
if SEARCH_INFO_COST = . then SEARCH_INFO_COST = 0; 
 
SUPERVISORY_COST = SUPERVISORY_POLICING_TIME_HOURS_*4*12*60; 
 
if SUPERVISORY_COST= . then SUPERVISORY_COST = 0; 
 
TOTAL_INSOURCED_COST = 
INSOURCED_ADMIN_COST+SEARCH_INFO_COST+SUPERVISORY_COST; 
run; 
 
 
data outsourced2; 
set COMBINED2; 
if (dep = 0); 
 
SEARCH_INFO_COST = SEARCH_INFO_TIME_DAYS*8*60; 
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if SEARCH_INFO_COST = . then SEARCH_INFO_COST = 0; 
 
SUPERVISORY_COST = SUPERVISORY_POLICING_TIME_HOURS_*4*12*60; 
 
if SUPERVISORY_COST= . then SUPERVISORY_COST = 0; 
 
if LEGAL_COST_OUTSOURCED_DOLLARS= . then 
LEGAL_COST_OUTSOURCED_DOLLARS = 0; 
 
TOTAL_OUTSOURCED_COST = 
LEGAL_COST_OUTSOURCED_DOLLARS+SEARCH_INFO_COST+SUPERVISORY_COS
T; 
run; 
 
/* MEANS FOR IN – SOURCED COSTS*/ 
 
proc means data = insourced2 ; 
var INSOURCED_ADMIN_COST SEARCH_INFO_COST SUPERVISORY_COST 
TOTAL_INSOURCED_COST ; 
TITLE 'MEANS FOR IN - SOURCED COSTS'; 
run; 
 
/* MEANS FOR OUTSOURCED COSTS*/ 
 
proc means data = outsourced2 ; 
var LEGAL_COST_OUTSOURCED_DOLLARS SEARCH_INFO_COST 
SUPERVISORY_COST 
TOTAL_OUTSOURCED_COST; 
TITLE 'MEANS FOR OUT - SOURCED COSTS'; 
run; 
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/**********PART III ************************************************/ 
/*********CALCULATION OF THE ******************************/ 
/**********THE INVERSE MILLS RATIO ******************************/ 
/**********FOR THE HECKMAN 2 STAGE ESTIMATION************************/ 
/**********TO DERIVE THE IN-SOURCED************************/ 
/*********COST EQUATION ******************************/ 
DATA LAMBDA; 
SET INSOURCED2; 
IF DEP=1 AND TOTAL_INSOURCED_COST ^= . AND TOTAL_INSOURCED_COST ^= 0 
THEN DO; 
PDFG2 = PDF('NORMAL',G2); 
CDFG2 = CDF('NORMAL',G2); 
LAMBDA1 = ((1/sqrt(2*3.141592654))*(exp(-G2*G2*0.5)))/CDF('NORMAL',G2); 
LAMBDA2 = (PDFG2/CDFG2); 
lambda3=(1/sqrt(2*3.141592654)*exp(-1*g2**2/2))/probnorm(g2); 
DELTA1 = -LAMBDA1*G2-LAMBDA1*LAMBDA1; 
DELTA2 = -LAMBDA2*G2-LAMBDA2*LAMBDA2; 
DELTA3 = -LAMBDA3*G2-LAMBDA3*LAMBDA3; 
h1=lambda1**2+lambda1*g2;  
h2=lambda2**2+lambda2*g2;  
h3=lambda3**2+lambda3*g2;  
END; 
RUN; 
 
PROC MEANS DATA = LAMBDA ; 
VAR LAMBDA1 LAMBDA2 lambda3 DELTA1 DELTA2 DELTA3 H1 H2 H3; 
TITLE 'RESULTS FOR THE INVERSE MILLS RATIO AND CONTROL FACTOR DELTA'; 
RUN; 
 
/* BUILDING THE IN – SOURCED COST MODEL*/ 
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PROC REG DATA=LAMBDA; 
MODEL TOTAL_INSOURCED_COST = temporal physical human capital complexity  
similarity frequency LAMBDA1; 
output out=INSOURCED_PRED predicted=PRED_IN_COST; 
TITLE 'ORGANIZATION COST MODEL FOR IN - SOURCED COSTS'; 
RUN; 
 
DATA INSOURCED_PRED; 
SET INSOURCED_PRED; 
ERROR = ( (TOTAL_INSOURCED_COST - 
PRED_IN_COST)/TOTAL_INSOURCED_COST)* 100; 
RUN; 
 
/* MEANS FOR PREDICTED AND ACTUAL IN – SOURCED COSTS*/ 
 
PROC MEANS DATA  = INSOURCED_PRED; 
VAR TOTAL_INSOURCED_COST PRED_IN_COST ; 
TITLE 'Comparison of Actual and predicted in - sourced costs'; 
RUN; 
/**********CORRECTING HETEROSKEDASTICITY FOR COST 
MODEL*******************/ 
/*************************************************************************/ 
PROC REG DATA=LAMBDA; 
MODEL TOTAL_INSOURCED_COST = temporal physical human capital complexity  
similarity frequency LAMBDA1; 
output out=INSOURCED_PRED predicted=PRED_IN_COST residual= RES; 
RUN; 
 
DATA INSOURCED_PRED; 
SET INSOURCED_PRED; 
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RES2 = RES*RES; 
LAMB= -335922; 
N= 39; 
RUN; 
 
PROC SQL; 
  SELECT SUM(DELTA1) AS DELTAS1 
    FROM INSOURCED_PRED; 
QUIT; 
 
 
PROC SQL; 
  SELECT SUM(RES2) AS RESS 
    FROM INSOURCED_PRED; 
QUIT; 
 
DATA INSOURCED_PRED; 
SET INSOURCED_PRED; 
DELTAS1 = -19.4699; 
RESS = 2.694E11; 
VARC = RESS/N-LAMB*LAMB*DELTAS1/N; 
SEC = sqrt(VARC); 
RHO = sqrt(LAMB*LAMB/VARC); 
If (lamb<0) THEN RHO = 0-RHO; 
C = VARC+LAMB*LAMB*DELTA1; 
RHOI = sqrt(C); 
WGT = 1/RHOI; 
RUN; 
 
PROC MEANS DATA = INSOURCED_PRED; 
VAR VARC SEC RHO; 
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RUN; 
 
PROC REG DATA=INSOURCED_PRED; 
MODEL TOTAL_INSOURCED_COST = temporal physical human capital complexity  
similarity frequency LAMBDA1; 
weight WGT; 
output out=INSOURCED_PRED_NEW predicted=PRED_IN_COST_NEW residual= 
RES_NEW; 
title 'CORRECTING HETEROSKEDASTICITY FOR COST MODEL'; 
RUN; 
/*************************************************************************/ 
/**********PART IV ************************************************/ 
/*********CALCULATION OF THE ******************************/ 
/**********COMBINED COSTS******************************/ 
/**********FOR EACH HEALTH PLAN IN THE ************************/ 
/**********IN – SOURCED DATA SET************************/ 
 
DATA INSOURCED_PRED_C; 
SET INSOURCED_PRED; 
IF ORGANIZATION = 'Health Alliance  Plan'  
THEN ORGANIZATION = 'Health Alliance Plan'; 
RUN; 
 
PROC SQL; 
CREATE TABLE SUM_COSTS AS SELECT *, 
SUM(TOTAL_INSOURCED_COST) AS SUM_ACTUAL_IN_COST, 
SUM(PRED_IN_COST) AS SUM_PRED_IN_COST 
FROM INSOURCED_PRED_C 
GROUP BY ORGANIZATION; 
quit; 
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PROC SORT DATA = SUM_COSTS; 
BY ORGANIZATION; 
RUN; 
 
DATA SUM_COSTS3; 
SET SUM_COSTS; 
BY ORGANIZATION; 
IF FIRST.ORGANIZATION; 
RUN; 
 
DATA SUM_COSTS3; 
SET SUM_COSTS3; 
ERROR_ACT = ((SUM_ACTUAL_IN_COST - 
SUM_PRED_IN_COST)/SUM_ACTUAL_IN_COST)* 100; 
ERROR_ABS = (ABS(SUM_ACTUAL_IN_COST - 
SUM_PRED_IN_COST)/SUM_ACTUAL_IN_COST)* 100; 
RUN; 
 
/* MEANS FOR IN – SOURCED COSTS (WHOLE INTEGRATED SUBSET)*/ 
 
PROC MEANS DATA  = SUM_COSTS3; 
VAR SUM_ACTUAL_IN_COST SUM_PRED_IN_COST ERROR_ACT ERROR_ABS; 
TITLE 'MEANS FOR IN SOURCED ORGANIZATION SET '; 
 
RUN; 
 
/**************************************************/ 
/**************************************************/ 
 
DATA SUM_COSTS4; 
SET SUM_COSTS3; 
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IF TOTAL_INSOURCED_COST^=0; 
RUN; 
PROC MEANS DATA  = SUM_COSTS4; 
VAR SUM_ACTUAL_IN_COST SUM_PRED_IN_COST ERROR_ACT ERROR_ABS; 
TITLE 'MEANS FOR IN SOURCED ORGANIZATION WITH 1 MISSING REMOVED'; 
RUN; 
 
/**************************************************/ 
/**************************************************/ 
 
proc sort data = SUM_COSTS3; 
BY ERROR_ACT; 
RUN; 
 
 
/**********PART V ************************************************/ 
/**************LOG SPECIFICATION*********************************/ 
 /**************OF THE IN - SOURCED************************/ 
/*********COST MODEL FOR BETTER MODEL FIT****************************/ 
/*************AND POSITIVE CONSTRAINING******************************/ 
 
DATA LAMBDA_LOG; 
SET LAMBDA; 
TEMPORAL_LOG = log(TEMPORAL);  
 
physical_LOG = log(physical); 
human_LOG = log(human); 
capital_LOG = log(capital); 
complexity_LOG = log(complexity); 
similarity_LOG = log(similarity); 
frequency_LOG = log(frequency); 
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LAMBDA1_LOG = log(LAMBDA1); 
IF TOTAL_INSOURCED_COST ^= 0 THEN TOTAL_INSOURCED_COST_LOG = 
LOG(TOTAL_INSOURCED_COST); 
RUN;  
/* LOG SPECIFICATION OF THE COST MODEL*/ 
 
PROC REG DATA=LAMBDA_LOG; 
MODEL TOTAL_INSOURCED_COST_LOG = temporal physical human capital complexity  
similarity frequency LAMBDA1; 
output out=INSOURCED_PRED_LOG predicted=PRED_IN_COST_LOG; 
RUN; 
/*************************************************************************/ 
/***********HETEROSKEDASTICITY CORRECTION FOR LOG 
SPEC***********************************/ 
/*****************************************************************************
************/ 
PROC REG DATA=LAMBDA_LOG; 
MODEL TOTAL_INSOURCED_COST_LOG = temporal physical human capital complexity  
similarity frequency LAMBDA1; 
output out=INSOURCED_PRED_LOG predicted=PRED_IN_COST_LOG residual= RES; 
RUN; 
/**************************************************/ 
/**************************************************/ 
DATA INSOURCED_PRED_LOG; 
SET INSOURCED_PRED_LOG; 
RES2 = RES*RES; 
LAMB= -3.33719; 
N= 39; 
RUN; 
 
PROC SQL; 
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SELECT SUM(DELTA1) AS DELTAS1 
    FROM INSOURCED_PRED_LOG; 
QUIT; 
 
 
PROC SQL; 
  SELECT SUM(RES2) AS RESS 
    FROM INSOURCED_PRED_LOG; 
QUIT; 
 
DATA INSOURCED_PRED_LOG; 
SET INSOURCED_PRED_LOG; 
DELTAS1 = -19.4699; 
RESS =  6.433455; 
VARC = RESS/N-LAMB*LAMB*DELTAS1/N; 
SEC = sqrt(VARC); 
RHO = sqrt(LAMB*LAMB/VARC); 
If (lamb<0) THEN RHO = 0-RHO; 
C = VARC+LAMB*LAMB*DELTA1; 
RHOI = sqrt(C); 
WGT = 1/RHOI; 
RUN; 
 
PROC MEANS DATA = INSOURCED_PRED_LOG; 
VAR VARC SEC RHO; 
RUN; 
 
PROC REG DATA=INSOURCED_PRED_LOG; 
MODEL TOTAL_INSOURCED_COST_LOG = temporal physical human capital complexity  
similarity frequency LAMBDA1; 
weight WGT; 
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output out=INSOURCED_PRED_NEW_LOG predicted=PRED_IN_COST_NEW_LOG 
residual= RES_NEW_LOG; 
title 'CORRECTING HETEROSKEDASTICITY FOR LOG SPEC OF COST MODEL'; 
RUN; 
/*****************************************************************************/ 
/**************************************************/ 
/**************************************************/ 
 
DATA INSOURCED_PRED_LOG; 
SET INSOURCED_PRED_LOG; 
PRED_IN_COST_NEW = EXP(PRED_IN_COST_LOG); 
ERROR1_ACT = ((TOTAL_INSOURCED_COST - 
PRED_IN_COST_NEW)/TOTAL_INSOURCED_COST)* 100; 
ERROR1_ABS = (ABS(TOTAL_INSOURCED_COST - 
PRED_IN_COST_NEW)/TOTAL_INSOURCED_COST)* 100; 
RUN; 
 
PROC MEANS DATA  = INSOURCED_PRED_LOG; 
VAR TOTAL_INSOURCED_COST  PRED_IN_COST_NEW PRED_IN_COST_LOG 
ERROR1_ACT ERROR1_ABS; 
TITLE 'MEANS FOR WHOLE IN SOURCED ORGANIZATION SET - LOG SPEC'; 
RUN; 
 
/**************************************************/ 
/**************************************************/ 
 
DATA INSOURCED_PRED_LOG_B; 
SET INSOURCED_PRED_LOG; 
IF TOTAL_INSOURCED_COST^= 0; 
RUN; 
PROC MEANS DATA  = INSOURCED_PRED_LOG_B; 
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VAR TOTAL_INSOURCED_COST  PRED_IN_COST_NEW PRED_IN_COST_LOG 
ERROR1_ACT ERROR1_ABS; 
TITLE 'MEANS FOR IN SOURCED ORGANIZATION SET - LOG SPEC WITH 1 MISSING 
REMOVED'; 
RUN; 
 
/**************************************************/ 
/**************************************************/ 
 
DATA GOOD_ERROR_LOG; 
SET INSOURCED_PRED_LOG; 
WHERE ERROR1_ABS <= 100; 
RUN; 
 
PROC MEANS DATA  = GOOD_ERROR_LOG; 
VAR ERROR1_ABS ; 
RUN; 
/**************CREATING TABLE************************/ 
/***************WITH COMBINED COSTS FOR EACH 
ORGANIZATION******************/ 
/******************FOR COMBINED ERROR 
CALCULATION**************************/ 
 
DATA INSOURCED_PRED_LOG2; 
SET INSOURCED_PRED_LOG; 
IF ORGANIZATION = 'Health Alliance  Plan'  
THEN ORGANIZATION = 'Health Alliance Plan'; 
RUN; 
 
/* FREQUENCIES FOR INTEGRATED SUBSET*/ 
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PROC FREQ DATA = INSOURCED_PRED_LOG2 ; 
TABLES ORGANIZATION DISEASE ; 
TITLE 'FREQUENCIES FOR IN - SOURCED SUB - SET'; 
RUN; 
 
/* CALCULATING TOTAL COST PER HEALTH PLAN*/ 
 
PROC SQL; 
CREATE TABLE SUM_COSTS_LOG AS SELECT *, 
SUM(TOTAL_INSOURCED_COST) AS SUM_ACTUAL_IN_COST_LOG, 
SUM(PRED_IN_COST_NEW) AS SUM_PRED_IN_COST_LOG 
FROM INSOURCED_PRED_LOG2 
GROUP BY ORGANIZATION; 
quit; 
 
DATA SUM_COSTS_LOG2; 
SET SUM_COSTS_LOG; 
BY ORGANIZATION; 
 
IF FIRST.ORGANIZATION; 
RUN; 
 
DATA SUM_COSTS_LOG2; 
SET SUM_COSTS_LOG2; 
ERROR_ACT = ((SUM_ACTUAL_IN_COST_LOG - 
SUM_PRED_IN_COST_LOG)/SUM_ACTUAL_IN_COST_LOG)* 100; 
ERROR_ABS = (ABS(SUM_ACTUAL_IN_COST_LOG - 
SUM_PRED_IN_COST_LOG)/SUM_ACTUAL_IN_COST_LOG)* 100; 
RUN; 
 
PROC MEANS DATA  = SUM_COSTS_LOG2; 
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VAR SUM_ACTUAL_IN_COST_LOG SUM_PRED_IN_COST_LOG ERROR_ACT 
ERROR_ABS; 
TITLE 'MEANS FOR WHOLE ORGANIZATION SET'; 
RUN; 
 
DATA SUM_COSTS_LOG3; 
SET SUM_COSTS_LOG2; 
IF TOTAL_INSOURCED_COST ^= 0; 
RUN; 
 
PROC MEANS DATA  = SUM_COSTS_LOG3; 
VAR SUM_ACTUAL_IN_COST_LOG SUM_PRED_IN_COST_LOG ERROR_ACT 
ERROR_ABS; 
TITLE 'MEANS FOR ORGANIZATION SET WITH MISSING REMOVED'; 
RUN; 
 
proc sort data = SUM_COSTS_LOG2; 
BY ERROR_ACT; 
RUN; 
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Disease Management (DM) Outsourcing Survey 
Please take the time to answer the following questions; your input is greatly appreciated. 
Please include your contact information so the results may be sent to you. 
Preliminary Information:  
Please enter the name of your organization: 
 
Please enter your name: 
 
Please enter your position: 
 
Please enter your email address: 
 
Please enter your telephone number: 
 
Please enter your mailing address: 
 
  
171 
Appendix B (Continued) 
 
Disease management Questions: 
 
Q 1) Please enter the disease for which the program has been implemented: 
 
 
Diabetes 
Asthma 
Coronary Artery Disease(CAD) 
Congestive Heart Failure (CHF) 
Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Disease (COPD) 
Other:  
 
 
 
Q 2) Is this Disease Management program: 
 
In-sourced/Integrated (go to Q3-a next) 
Outsourced (go to Q3-b next) 
 
other: Please specify  
 
 
Q3-a) What was the approx. time spent (in days) in administrative, facility planning, and 
other start-up tasks prior to implementation of this in-sourced program? (Go to Q 4 next) 
 
 
 
Q3-b) What was the approx. legal cost (in $) involved in bargaining, negotiating and 
drawing up an appropriate contract for this outsourced DM program? 
 
 
 
Q 4) What was the approx. time spent (in days) to obtain relevant information in 
preparation for implementing this program? 
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Q 5) What is the approx. time spent (in hours) per week for supervisory and managerial 
tasks for this program? 
 
 
 
Please rate the following on a scale from 1 to 5: 
 
Q 6) Scheduling requirements for a particular task or service (such as patient interventions, 
patient/program effectiveness checks, and risk evaluations) are sometimes critical in a 
particular program. On the other hand, there is more flexibility regarding the timely 
completion of tasks and services in other disease management programs. Using the scale, 
rate how important, in terms of costs, it is to have tasks in this program done on schedule. 
 
1 - "Not Important"   2   3   4   5- "Very Important"    
 
 
Q 7) To what extent are the tools and assets such as the clinical databases and feedback 
systems, predictive models for patient identification, and monitoring and reporting 
processes specific to this program? Using the scale below, rate the specificity of the assets 
required for this program. 
 
1 - "Relatively Standard" 
2 
3 - "Somewhat Specific" 
4 
5 - "Very Specific" 
 
Relatively Standard - the facilities, assets, etc., used in the program can be easily adapted for use 
by other industries and other disease management programs. 
 
Somewhat Specific - the facilities, assets, etc., used in the program can be easily adapted for use 
by other disease management programs. 
 
Very Specific - the facilities, assets, etc., used in the program cannot be easily adapted for use by 
others, even other disease management programs.  
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Q 8) To what extent are the skills, knowledge, or experience of the program employees 
specific to the tasks/services involved in this particular program? 
 
1 - "Relatively standard" 
2 
3 - "Somewhat specific" 
4 
5 - "Very specific" 
 
Relatively standard – the skills, knowledge, and experience of the employees used in the program 
are comparably valued in applications by other industries and other disease management 
programs. 
 
Somewhat specific – the skills, knowledge, and experience of the employees used in the program 
are comparably valued in applications by other disease management programs. 
 
Very specific - the skills, knowledge, and experience of the employees used in the program would 
not be comparably valued in applications by others, even other disease management programs.  
 
 
Q 9) Using the scale below, please rate the investment made in the program in terms of 
capital, facilities, software and equipment for the setup and monitoring of this specific 
program, which cannot be used for another program. 
 
1 - "Low"   2   3   4   5 - "Very High"    
 
 
Q 10) Please rate the complexity of tasks and services involved in this program using the 
following scale. 
 
1 - "Fairly Simple"   2   3   4   5 - "Very Complex"    
 
 
Q 11) How similar is this program to the other disease management programs offered by 
the health plan? 
 
1 - "Not Similar"   2   3   4   5 - "Very Similar"    
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Q 12) Using the scale below, please rate the frequency of contact with the individuals 
enrolled in the program. 
 
1 - "Very Rare"   2   3   4   5 - "Very Frequent"    
 
 
Q 13) Using the scale below, please rate the difficulty in measuring the outcomes, 
effectiveness and performance of this program. 
 
1 - "Easy"   2   3   4   5 - "Very Difficult"    
 
 
Submit
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